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FROM THE EDITORS
Thirty years ago, the Goldwater-Nichols Act fundamentally reshaped the way
the U.S. military goes about its business. Virtually everyone now on active duty
is a child of the Goldwater-Nichols era. Distinct service cultures are still very
much with us, but “jointness” is deeply embedded in the way our current military operates and thinks, as well as in the incentive structures that shape officers’
careers. It is legitimate to ask whether this has tended to obscure the unintended
consequences and opportunity costs of our current joint system. In “The Effect of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994,” Steven Wills
traces the impact of this historic legislation on the Navy’s capacity to engage in
strategic planning at the end of the Cold War. The emergence during this period
of the regional combatant commands as the nexus of war planning reflected both
the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and a dramatically altered strategic environment;
a predictable consequence of this was a gradual decline in the strategic planning
capability and capacity of the Navy Staff. As Wills indicates, the impact of all this
on the Navy has been particularly challenging given the inherently global nature
of American naval power. In very recent years, one should note, the Navy broadly
has come to recognize the need to reconstitute a cadre of strategic thinkers and
planners within its own ranks if it is to sustain its proper role in shaping America’s
response to an increasingly threatening global strategic environment. Steven
Wills is a retired surface warfare officer and a doctoral candidate in military history at Ohio University.
China’s ongoing efforts to establish a permanent presence in the South China
Sea continue to pose a fundamental challenge to regional security and the international legal order. In trying to understand how the Chinese may employ force
in the future to advance these efforts, it is important to give careful attention to
their past behavior in the region. Toshi Yoshihara, in “The 1974 Paracels Sea
Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” provides a detailed analysis of China’s brief clash
with the South Vietnamese navy over control of the Paracel Islands—the firstever employment of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) against a foreign
power. China’s victory, against a better-armed adversary, is a point of pride for
today’s PLAN and has generated a substantial Chinese-language literature, much
of which is exploited here for the first time. Toshi Yoshihara is a professor in the
Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War College.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
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To understand the evolution of China’s naval capabilities over recent decades, it
is important not to neglect the evolution of China’s naval leadership. In “Who’s at
the Helm? The Past, Present, and Future Leaders of China’s Navy,” Jeffrey Becker
offers a detailed assessment of the growing profile of the PLAN throughout the
Chinese military establishment and the striking improvements in the professionalism of the current and emerging cohorts of China’s naval leadership, above all
through enhanced professional military education and greater interaction with
foreign navies. Jeffrey Becker is an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses China
Studies Division.
Too often forgotten today, but also of considerable interest, is the maritime
dimension of the final stages of the Chinese civil war. In “The Battle of Quemoy:
The Amphibious Assault That Held the Postwar Military Balance in the Taiwan
Strait,” Maochun Miles Yu tells the story of the disastrous 1949 attempt by the
People’s Republic of China to dislodge a substantial Kuomintang force from the
island of Quemoy, strategically situated just offshore of the port of Amoy, the
natural embarkation point for an eventual invasion of Taiwan contemplated at
the time by Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. The outcome of this battle
had long-term consequences: it secured Taiwan as an independent Nationalist
entity and revived flagging American support for the cause of Chiang Kai-shek.
Maochun Miles Yu is a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.
In today’s Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan is more revered than read. Much of this
reflects his ponderous and discursive writing style, but also the impression that
his thought is hopelessly dated by the prejudices of his time, particularly his favorable view of American imperialism. In “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,” Thomas F. X. Varacalli
makes a compelling case that Mahan’s grand strategic vision was more nuanced
and complex than is generally credited, and indeed that it offers an interesting
synthesis of elements of contemporary international relations theory that are
usually seen as incompatible. Thomas F. X. Varacalli is a doctoral candidate in
political science at Louisiana State University.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401841-2236).
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

The CNO’s Design and the Naval War College

Admiral John Richardson, the
thirty-first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), released a document entitled “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” Representing his
“commander’s intent” for our Navy as we move forward under his leadership, the
document provides a framework for thinking about the challenges we face and
the manner in which he wants us to address them. To maximize awareness of this
document, we are reprinting it here in the “President’s Forum” for your review
and reflection.
I believe it is important to note that the CNO’s guidance is not a “campaign
plan” or a “strategy,” but has been explicitly conceptualized as a “design.” With
this document, the CNO has set the example for effective leadership in a complex
world through its emphasis on decentralized execution and continuous assessment, learning, and adaptation. Acknowledging the increasing complexity of the
national security environment, and abiding by the tenets of mission command,
the CNO framed his guidance by identifying clear objectives, organizing broad
lines of effort (LOEs), specifying the initial key tasks associated with each LOE,
and outlining the core attributes we all must demonstrate for our Navy to succeed. The CNO’s “design” approach provides enough specificity to gain synergy
across the Navy, while at the same time it provides enough flexibility for organizations to apply the design in a manner consistent with their unique situations.
Here at the Naval War College, we have a professional responsibility to apply
this Design to all our efforts across the campus. With the Design’s emphasis on
learning and leader development, we are uniquely positioned to contribute, and
in many ways we are already executing consistent with the CNO’s guidance. I
believe, however, that there are still areas in which we can improve our alignment
IN THE FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY,
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with the specific objectives of the four LOEs and the key tasks supporting each.
In the months to come, we will review all our education, research, and leaderdevelopment efforts from the perspective of the Design, and determine the
changes necessary to ensure we are moving forward in accordance with the
CNO’s guidance. Our collective efforts to focus and act on these changes will ensure the Naval War College steadies on a course that will help the Navy maintain
maritime superiority in the decades to come.
I hope you enjoy this issue of the Review, and I encourage vibrant discussion
in the pages of future issues regarding the Design.

P. GARDNER HOWE III

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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A DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY

MISSION
The United States Navy will be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat
incident to operations at sea. Our Navy will protect America from attack and preserve America’s strategic influence in key regions of the world. U.S. naval forces
and operations—from the sea floor to space, from deep water to the littorals, and
in the information domain—will deter aggression and enable peaceful resolution
of crises on terms acceptable to the United States and our allies and partners. If
deterrence fails, the Navy will conduct decisive combat operations to defeat any
enemy.
INTRODUCTION
For 240 years, the U.S. Navy has been a cornerstone of American security and
prosperity. To continue to meet this obligation, we must adapt to the emerging
security environment. The initiatives laid out in this Design represent initial
steps along a future course to achieve the aims articulated in the Revised Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (CS-21R) in this new environment. It’s a
tremendously complex challenge. As we get underway, we must first understand
our history—how we got to where we are. Moving forward, we’ll respect that we
won’t get it all right, and so we’ll monitor and assess ourselves and our surroundings as we go. We’ll learn and adapt, always getting better, striving to the limits
of performance. This cannot be a “top-down” effort; everybody must contribute.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
On the eve of the 20th century, the United States emerged from the Civil War and
laid the foundation to become a global power, but its course to continued prosperity was unclear. Navy Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan helped to chart that course,
arguing that American growth required access to overseas markets, which in turn
required a preeminent navy to protect that access. America became a nation with
global interests, and the seas were the path to new frontiers.
The essence of Mahan’s vision still pertains: America’s interests lie beyond our
own shores. What was true in the late 19th century holds true today—America’s
success depends on our creativity, our entrepreneurism, and our access and relationships abroad. In an increasingly globalized world, America’s success is even
more reliant on the U.S. Navy.
In fulfilling our mission, it’s important to start with an assessment of the security environment. It is tempting to define the challenge solely in terms of our
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
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allies, partners, and competitors—the state and non-state actors on the world
stage. While these are critical, it is even more important to understand the dramatic changes that have taken place on the stage itself—the character of the environment in which competition and cooperation occur. Fundamentally, the world
has become dramatically more globalized, and this trend is accelerating. Our way
ahead must account for this new reality. In particular, this Design will address
three major and interrelated global forces that are increasingly used, increasingly
stressed, increasingly important, and increasingly contested. These three forces
energize the quickly changing environment in which the Navy must operate, and
if required, fight and win.
The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the sea floor—the classic maritime system. For millennia, the seas have
served to connect people and societies to help them prosper. As the global economy continues to expand and become more connected, the maritime system is
becoming increasingly used by the United States and the world as a whole. Shipping traffic over traditional sea lanes is increasing, new trade routes are opening
in the Arctic, and new technologies are making undersea resources more accessible. This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and
illicit shipment of material and people. The maritime system is becoming more
heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before.
A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information
system—the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and
wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe. Newer than
the maritime system, the information system is more pervasive, enabling an even
greater multitude of connections between people and at a much lower cost of
entry—literally an individual with a computer is a powerful actor in this system!
Information, now passed in near-real time across links that continue to multiply,
is in turn driving an accelerating rate of change—from music to medicine, from
microfinance to missiles.
The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and
adoption. This is not just in information technologies, where Gordon Moore’s
projections of exponential advances in processing, storage, and switches continue
to be realized. Scientists are also unlocking new properties of commonplace materials and creating new materials altogether at astonishing speeds. Novel uses for
increasingly sophisticated robotics, energy storage, 3-D printing, and networks of
low-cost sensors, to name just a few examples, are changing almost every facet of
how we work and live. Genetic science is just beginning to demonstrate its power.
Artificial intelligence is just getting started and could fundamentally reshape the
environment. And as technology is introduced at an accelerating rate, it is being
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adopted by society just as fast—people are using these new tools as quickly as
they are introduced, and in new and novel ways.
These three forces—the forces at play in the maritime system, the force of the
information system, and the force of technology entering the environment—and
the interplay between them have profound implications for the United States
Navy. We must do everything we can to seize the potential afforded by this environment. Our competitors are moving quickly, and our adversaries are bent on
leaving us swirling in their wake.
And the competitors themselves have changed. For the first time in 25 years,
the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China
both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers. Their
goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many
of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological, and information systems. They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons,
both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision, and destructive
capacity. Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition
below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the
weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum.
The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost
two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.
Russia and China are not the only actors seeking to gain advantages in the
emerging security environment in ways that threaten U.S. and global interests.
Others are now pursuing advanced technology, including military technologies
that were once the exclusive province of great powers—this trend will only continue. Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and
missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security
in North Asia and beyond. And while the recent international agreement with
Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy
forces, and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the
Navy must remain prepared to respond. Finally, international terrorist groups
have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat
to stability and security around the world. All of these actors seek to exploit all
three forces described above—the speed, precision, and reach that the maritime
and information systems now enable, bolstered by new technologies—to counter
U.S. military advantages and to threaten the rules and norms that have been the
basis of prosperity and world order for the last 70 years.
There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment. Barring an
unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the
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Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not
be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges we face. The budget environment
will force tough choices, but must also inspire new thinking.
Looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in
character, are increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more
quickly. This will require us to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our
operations. But as we change in many areas, it is important to remember that
there will also be constants. The nature of war has always been, and will remain,
a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides,
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply. America’s importance to the world holds fast. Our nation’s reliance on its Navy—our Navy—
continues to grow.
WHY A “DESIGN?”
The scope and complexity of the challenges we face demand a different approach
than that offered by a classic campaign plan. This guidance frames the problem
and a way forward while acknowledging that there is inherent and fundamental
uncertainty in both the problem definition and the proposed solution.
Accordingly, we will make our best initial assessment of the environment, formulate a way ahead, and move out. But as we move, we will continually assess the
environment, to ensure that it responds in a way that is consistent with achieving
our goals. Where necessary, we will make adjustments, challenging ourselves to
approach the limits of performance.
This Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority will guide our behaviors
and investments, both this year and in the years to come. More specific details
about programs and funding adjustments will be reflected in our annual budget
documents.
CORE ATTRIBUTES
One clear implication of the current environment is the need for the Navy to
prepare for decentralized operations, guided by commander’s intent. The ability
to achieve this end is reliant on the trust and confidence that is based on a clear
understanding, among peers and between commanders and subordinates, of the
risk that can be tolerated. This trust and confidence is enhanced by our actions,
which must reflect our core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Four
core attributes of our professional identity will help to serve as guiding criteria
for our decisions and actions. If we abide by these attributes, our values should
be clearly evident in our actions.
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• Integrity: Our behaviors as individuals and as an organization align with our
values as a profession. We actively strengthen each other’s resolve to act consistently with our values. As individuals, as teams, and as a Navy, our conduct
must always be upright and honorable both in public and when nobody’s
looking.

• Accountability: We are a mission-focused force. We achieve and maintain
high standards. Our actions support our strategy. We clearly define the
problem we’re trying to solve and the proposed outcomes. In execution, we
honestly assess our progress and adjust as required—we are our own toughest
critic.

• Initiative: On their own, everybody strives to be the best they can be—we
give 100% when on the job. Our leaders take ownership and act to the limit
of their authorities. We foster a questioning attitude and look at new ideas
with an open mind. Our most junior teammate may have the best idea; we
must be open to capturing that idea.

• Toughness: We can take a hit and keep going, tapping all sources of strength
and resilience: rigorous training for operations and combat, the fighting
spirit of our people, and the steadfast support of our families. We don’t give
up the ship.
FOUR LINES OF EFFORT
The execution of this Design is built along four Lines of Effort that focus on war
fighting, learning faster, strengthening our Navy team, and building partnerships.
These lines of effort are inextricably linked and must be considered together to
get a sense of the total effort. The corresponding objectives and first year tasks
listed under each line of effort define how we will begin to move forward.
Strengthen Naval Power at and from Sea: Maintain a fleet that is trained and
ready to operate and fight decisively—from the deep ocean to the littorals, from
the sea floor to space, and in the information domain. Align our organization to
best support generating operational excellence.
1.	 Maintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic deterrent triad.
This is foundational to our survival as a nation.
2.	 In partnership with the Marine Corps, develop concepts and capabilities
to provide more options to national leaders, from non-conflict competition to high-end combat at sea. Operations short of conflict should be
designed to contain and control escalation on terms favorable to the U.S.
Combat at sea must address “blue-water” scenarios far from land and
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power projection ashore in a highly “informationalized” and contested
environment. All scenarios must address the threat of long-range precision strike. Test and refine concepts through focused wargaming, modeling, and simulations. Validate these concepts through fleet exercises, unit
training, and certification.
3.	 Further advance and ingrain information warfare. Expand the Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare concept to encompass all of information
warfare, to include space and cyberspace.
4.	 To better meet today’s force demands, explore alternative fleet designs,
including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and unmanned systems. This effort will include exploring new naval platforms
and formations—again in a highly “informationalized” environment—to
meet combatant commander needs.
5.	 Examine the organization of United States Fleet Forces Command, Commander Pacific Fleet, and their subordinate commands to better support
clearly defining operational and warfighting demands and then to generate ready forces to meet those demands.
6.	 Examine OPNAV organization to rationalize our headquarters in support
of warfighting requirements.
Achieve High Velocity Learning at Every Level: Apply the best concepts, techniques, and technologies to accelerate learning as individuals, teams, and organizations. Clearly know the objective and the theoretical limits of performance—set
aspirational goals. Begin problem definition by studying history—do not relearn
old lessons. Start by seeing what you can accomplish without additional resources.
During execution, conduct routine and rigorous self-assessment. Adapt processes to be inherently receptive to innovation and creativity.
1.	 Implement individual, team, and organizational best practices to inculcate
high velocity learning as a matter of routine.
2.	 Expand the use of learning-centered technologies, simulators, online
gaming, analytics, and other tools as a means to bring in creativity, operational agility, and insight.
3.	 Optimize the Navy intellectual enterprise to maximize combat effectiveness and efficiency. Reinvigorate an assessment culture and processes.
4.	 Understand the lessons of history so as not to relearn them.
Strengthen Our Navy Team for the Future: We are one Navy Team—comprised of
a diverse mix of active duty and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and our families
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—with a history of service, sacrifice, and success. We will build on this history to
create a climate of operational excellence that will keep us ready to prevail in all
future challenges.
1.	 Aggressively pursue implementation of the core tenets of the “Sailor 2025”
program—fully integrated and transparent data and analytics, increased
career choice and flexibility, expanded family support, and tailored
learning.
2.	 Accelerate “Sailor 2025” efforts to leverage information technology to enhance personnel system and training modernization efforts.
3.	 Strengthen and broaden leadership development programs to renew
and reinforce the Navy Team’s dedication to the naval profession. Leader
development will be fleet-centered and will begin early in our careers, focusing on character and commitment to Navy core values. Character and
leadership will be rewarded through challenging assignments and
advancement.
4.	 Strengthen organizational integrity by balancing administrative requirements with the benefits gained from the time spent. The goal will be to
return more time to leaders and empower them to develop their teams.
5.	 Strengthen the role of Navy leaders in leading and managing civilian
professionals as key contributors to the mission effectiveness of our Navy
Team.
Expand and Strengthen Our Network of Partners: Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies, and partners—who operate
with the Navy to support our shared interests.
1.	 Enhance integration with our Joint Service and interagency partners at all
levels of interaction, to include current and future planning, concept, and
capability development and assessment.
2.	 Prioritize key international partnerships through information sharing,
interoperability initiatives, and combined operations; explore new opportunities for combined forward operations.
3.	 Deepen the dialogue with private research and development labs, and
academia. Ensure that our Navy labs and research centers are competitive
and fully engaged with their private-sector partners.
4.	 Increase the volume and range of interaction with commercial industry.
Seek opportunities through non-traditional partners.
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DESIRED OUTCOME
A Naval Force that produces leaders and teams who learn and adapt to achieve
maximum possible performance, and who achieve and maintain high standards
to be ready for decisive operations and combat.
CONCLUSION
We will remain the world’s finest navy only if we all fight each and every minute
to get better. Our competitors are focused on taking the lead—we must pick up
the pace and deny them. The margins of victory are razor thin—but decisive! I
am counting on your integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness to execute
the lines of effort described in this Design, execute our mission, and achieve our
end state. I am honored and proud to lead you.

JOHN M. RICHARDSON
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THE EFFEC T OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AC T
OF 1986 ON NAVAL STR ATEGY, 1987–1994
Steven Wills

I

n late 1990, veteran U.S. Navy strategist Captain Peter M. Swartz was preparing to
return to the United States after a three-year joint assignment at the U.S. mission
to NATO in Brussels, Belgium. Swartz desired to return to the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and to the business of naval strategy in which he
had been so engaged during the previous decade. Swartz was advised strongly
by his mentor in Brussels, Admiral Jim Hogg, the U.S. military representative to
NATO’s Military Committee, to take instead a position as a special assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, U.S. Army.
Swartz reiterated that he was not interested in yet another joint job but instead
desired to return to the business of creating and disseminating naval strategy. He
checked, however, with various Navy colleagues and friends. He was surprised
at how many old Navy friends told him the job working for General Powell was
“a plum assignment”; they unanimously urged him to take it. One front-running
naval officer went so far as to suggest that if Swartz did not want it, he should
let that officer know immediately, so he could bid for it. Admiral Hogg grew
impatient and gave Swartz one more day to make up his mind. He accepted the
position.
Swartz plunged immediately into his new job, which involved a very close and
positive working relationship with General Powell—just when Saddam Hussein
was wreaking havoc on Kuwait and threatening Saudi Arabia. As Swartz found
his way around the Pentagon again, he noticed a very high level of Navy talent
on the Joint Staff—talent that had never been assigned there by the Navy in all
his previous experience in the Pentagon during the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast,
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when he returned to visit his old haunts and reestablish his Washington Navy
network, he was nonplussed by the decline in the experience base and educational background in some OPNAV shops.
Swartz had an occasion in September 1990 to visit the Joint Staff J8 office
to get input on a project he was working on for General Powell. While there,
he spoke to Commander Joe Sestak, whom he knew by reputation and whose
Harvard doctoral dissertation on the Seventh Fleet Swartz had previously read
and exploited. Swartz commented to Sestak that he found the disparity of talent
between OPNAV and the Joint Staff both new and disconcerting; he feared for
the future intellectual prowess of those in OPNAV and other key Navy institutions. This was a particular concern for Swartz since he had participated in and
fostered that prowess during his years in OPNAV in the 1980s as an author of
and advocate for the Maritime Strategy. Sestak responded, “Captain, you’ve been
away. Goldwater-Nichols happened while you were gone, don’t you remember?
Do you remember how hard you and your colleagues fought against it? Do you
remember that you lost?”1
INITIAL IMPACT
Sestak’s short response encapsulated a significant period of change for the
Navy from 1989 to early 1994. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 significantly
changed the way the nation, and particularly the U.S. Navy, approached the business of strategy. Alterations to the military chain of command that the legislation
brought about had officially separated the leaders of the Navy from the service’s
operational forces as regional, combatant commander–based strategy replaced
that of centralized, service-based global leadership. The physical domains
of those regional commanders also increasingly cut across traditional naval
geographic command boundaries. In addition to removing the responsibility
for strategy from the Navy’s leadership, the Goldwater-Nichols Act effectively
dispersed the naval service’s informal but highly effective cohort of strategic
experts who had been responsible for decades of naval strategy, removed them
from naval control, and scattered them in assignments on the Joint Staff and the
regional and functional commanders’ (CINC) staffs. The personnel changes the
legislation brought about forced many strategy experts like Swartz into joint jobs
instead of their traditional billets on the OPNAV staff.
This initially had a very positive effect: seasoned, knowledgeable, and experienced naval strategists were now populating influential joint staffs, where their
capabilities and concepts ensured that the nation continued to deploy and use
its naval power sensibly. OPNAV office OP-06, the professional home of naval
strategic concepts during the Cold War, still had a reasonably positive reputation and attracted some of the Navy’s brightest officers at the end of the 1980s.
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However, as young officers sought important jobs in Washington, they increasingly recoiled from assignment to OPNAV, instead embracing joint strategy duty
as an essential ticket on the way to flag rank. Many continued to look for joint assignments for their next tour in Washington, while others sought billets in those
OPNAV offices with strong connections to their warfare communities. Thus, after
Goldwater-Nichols the “bench” at OP-06 began to weaken, and entering the
1990s its strength continued to slide.
This combination of change in command structure, alteration of traditional
naval concepts of the battle space, and migration of Navy strategy experts from
OPNAV to the Joint Staff altered the Navy’s concept of strategy. The Navy’s most
senior officers no longer controlled the forces they built, trained, and equipped.
The concepts of naval strategy that remained in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols
were regional rather than global in character. Finally, the legislation’s joint personnel requirements effectively served to disband the Navy’s carefully constructed cohort of strategic experts, dispersing them throughout the joint force. While
perhaps useful in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, these changes
would have significant impacts in the first decade of the twenty-first century as
the Navy sought new strategic solutions to a dwindling budget and an aging,
contracting force structure.
GENESIS OF THE LEGISLATION
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the most significant shake-up in the Department of Defense since its creation in 1949.2 The failure to achieve desired results
during the Vietnam War may have been the early catalyst for the defense reform
movement of the late 1970s, but events that followed provided further impetus
for change. A series of military disasters since the end of the Vietnam War—
including the failure to rescue hostages in the SS Mayaguez and Iran hostage
crises of 1973 and 1979–81, respectively, and problems with interservice planning and communication during the 1983 Lebanon peacekeeping mission and
invasion of Grenada—provided significant impetus for reform.3 The impression
of excessive defense spending resulting from soaring Reagan administration military budgets caught the eye of some members of Congress and helped generate
additional legislative-branch interest in defense reform.4
The reform movement had strong support within Congress and from some
key Reagan administration officials and the defense intellectual community.
Congressional supporters such as cosponsors Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
and Representative Bill Nichols (D-Ga.), Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), and Representatives Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) and Les Aspin (D-Wis.) felt that greater centralization of power in the CJCS office would improve the quality of advice available
to the nation’s civilian leadership. Goldwater called the legislation “the only
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goddamn thing I have ever done in the Senate that was worth a damn.”5 Reagan
administration members such as National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane
supported reform efforts, as did former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, whom President Reagan appointed chairman of a presidential blue-ribbon
commission on defense reform. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was not in
favor of reform at first, but later shifted his position—for practical reasons, rather
than due to an actual change in his beliefs.6
The Navy and Marine Corps leadership, including Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Admiral James D. Watkins and Marine Corps Commandant General P.
X. Kelley, were generally opThe legislation’s joint personnel requirements
posed to the legislation, as
effectively served to disband the Navy’s carethey believed it restricted
fully constructed cohort of strategic experts,
their traditional freedom of
dispersing them throughout the joint force.
action and gave other services
uninformed control over shipbuilding and naval and marine operations. Navy Secretary John Lehman offered
the most vocal criticisms of the proposed legislation and quickly became the
effective leader of the opposition. He stated that the proposed legislation would
create inefficient bureaucracy in the Defense Department and reduce the quality
of military advice offered to the president. Lehman also opposed concentrating
so much power in the office of the CJCS, which would restrict advice flowing to
the president to “the opinion and decision of one man, the chairman himself, and
his general staff bureaucracy.”7 Lehman’s opposition campaign was so well organized and effective that Senator Goldwater wrote directly to Defense Secretary
Weinberger and President Reagan to complain that the efforts of Lehman’s staff
were illegal.8
Despite opposition, and reinforced by findings from Packard’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management, the legislation passed Congress by a significant bipartisan majority in both the House of Representatives (383–27) and
Senate (95–0).9
Although hailed as a great triumph for the defense reform movement, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act was more of an incomplete armistice than a “victory on
the Potomac,” as the act’s author James Locher contended in his 2002 book. In
fact, defense reformers had a considerably more radical plan to change fundamentally the structure of senior military leadership and the armed forces’ organization for combat. The Senate Armed Services Committee Staff study entitled
Defense Organization: The Need for Change, authored by Locher, contained
ninety-one specific recommendations. It specifically suggested the disestablishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in favor of a Joint Military Advisory Council independent of all service functions; a reorganization of the military along
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mission, rather than service, lines; and removal from the chain of command of
service component commanders located within the unified commands.10
Locher has officially dismissed these proposals as diversionary “bullet traps”
designed to divert antireform opponents from more-moderate goals.11 Yet
similar recommendations appear in the memoirs of Senator Goldwater as well
as those of Senator John Tower.12 There had also been strong arguments from
analysts influenced by the policies of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara
for reorganization of the Defense Department around joint missions rather than
geographic or service constructs ever since the Symington Commission of 1961,
which recommended the abolition of the separate civilian military departments,
the replacement of the JCS with a group of senior officers separated from their respective service affiliations, and the reduction in authority of the individual service chiefs to mere administrative and logistics duties.13 This evidence suggests
that pro-reform advocates had a much longer list of objectives that were not met
in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The inability of the reform camp to implement fully the more comprehensive reforms suggests that Secretary Lehman’s
opposition movement was highly effective in preventing significant alteration to
U.S. defense organization. The partial reform that was implemented made for an
uncertain climate as the military services grappled with the problem of creating
strategy in the post–Cold War era.
SUBSTANCE AND EFFECTS OF THE ACT
The legislation had three significant effects on the creation of military strategy
within the services and in the Department of Defense at large. It elevated the CJCS
to the position of principal military adviser to the president. It gave each regional
combatant commander greater power over his or her organization and regional
strategy at the expense of service chiefs. These first two changes further restricted
service leaders’ abilities to influence the development of strategy and formulation of the defense budget, as well as the roles and force structure of the services.
Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had the effect of diverting talented officers
from their traditional roles on service staffs to the heretofore less-desirable
joint and CINC staffs. The services’ own abilities to create and advocate new
comprehensive, global, strategic concepts withered in this new environment.
As the 1980s came to a close it became evident the Navy would need to implement the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in an environment in
which “senior four-star officers no longer had control of the fleet.”14 While the
service chiefs had been organizationally removed from the military chain of command in 1958 as part of the Eisenhower reform package, they retained significant
influence over operational forces. This influence was apparent in the production
and evolution of the 1980s-era Maritime Strategy. While anchored in the Navy’s
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traditional responsibility to provide naval force through the six-hundred-ship
Navy concept, the Maritime Strategy also served as a “contingent warfighting
doctrine” describing how the U.S. Navy proposed to combat the Soviet Union
across the multiple regional commands.15
The Maritime Strategy was the latest in a series of naval strategic documents
from the late 1940s to the 1980s that sought to articulate the Navy’s place in Cold
War national strategy. These documents generally had been produced at the
behest and under the guidance of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. Some
regional combatant commanders resisted this influence at the time. They, not the
CNO, were responsible for the employment of combat units against the enemy.
Future CJCS, then–Pacific commander Admiral William Crowe responded to a
1984 presentation of the Maritime Strategy, saying, “I’m not sure why the CNO
needs a maritime strategy; I need one, but he doesn’t.”16 This was an ironic statement, since Admiral Crowe, while serving on the OPNAV staff (OP-06; Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Strategy, Plans, and Policy) during the mid-1970s,
had been responsible for creating the OPNAV staff office specifically charged
with strategy creation (OP-603) and filling it with strategy experts.17 Dividing
up the fleet into theaters subject to the individual war-fighting concepts of individual CINCs, not to mention the CINCs’ reluctance to deploy their own ships
across CINC boundaries, hamstrung the Navy’s attempts to organize, train, and
equip its forces to deter or confront the Soviet Union.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act seemed, at the time, to settle this argument in
favor of the primacy of the CJCS and combatant commanders over the service
chiefs. The legislation elevated the chairman from a position of first among
equals to that of principal military assistant to the president and gave the chairman the authority to convene, set the agenda for, and preside over the meetings
of the JCS.18 While individual members of the JCS were not prohibited from
offering separate advice to the president on their own initiative, the chairman’s
own advice took priority in presidential review over that offered by other service
chiefs.19 The chairman was also given significant authority over the strategic
planning and assessment functions of the JCS, with responsibility for providing
strategic direction and preparing strategic, logistics, and mobility plans for the
armed forces.20 The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make the chairman
a “supreme commander of the military services,” as some reformers proposed,
but it did demand that combatant commanders communicate with the Defense
Secretary and president through the CJCS officeholder, thus making the chairman a “de facto” supreme commander in the eyes of some.21 The service chiefs
retained their authority to train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant commanders, but responsibility for strategy appeared, at that time, to reside firmly in
joint hands. These provisions would make comprehensive, global, service-based
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strategic concepts much more difficult to create and implement in the postGoldwater-Nichols era.
EFFECTS ON PLANNING
The effects of the legislation soon manifested themselves in the first postGoldwater-Nichols Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in early 1987. Intelligence
reporting at that time indicated that a Soviet attack would be evident at least two
weeks before it started, thus giving planners time to reinforce Western forces on
the Central European front.22 This appraisal led to some planning reassessments
regarding where to focus primary U.S. efforts early in a global conflict. Believing that constrained resources might force decision makers to choose between
preparing for a global and preparing for a regional war, Joint Staff planners in
1987 had attempted to incorporate greater emphasis on regional planning in the
National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) for fiscal years 1990–94.23 The
continued reduction of the Soviet threat, particularly the Soviets’ decreasing ability to project power rapidly into Central Europe and the Persian Gulf, allowed
Joint Staff planners to focus more on regional strategies. The director of the Joint
Staff Planning Office (J5) in 1989, Major General George Lee Butler, made the
projection of increased warning time a justification for greater focus on regional
planning.24
The impending end of the Cold War and expected drawdown in defense
spending occupied the efforts of other Joint Staff offices. The new office of the
Force Structure, Resource, and Assessments Directorate (J8), a direct product
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, conducted a review of several force-reduction
strategies entitled the “Quiet Study.” However, the departing chairman, Admiral
Crowe, did not want to recommend force reductions in the absence of a new
presidential strategy.25 But J8 conducted a second Quiet Study that further focused on regional instead of global conflicts.
The study’s conclusions were embraced by the new chairman, whose own
assumptions on the change to regional strategy were closely aligned with the
language of the Quiet Study 2 report. The appointment of General Colin Powell to the chairmanship by President George H. W. Bush in 1989 significantly
aided in the transformation from global to regional-based strategy. General
Powell embraced the new authority granted him under Goldwater-Nichols “with
alacrity” and used it to advance a post–Cold War agenda of change.26 General
Powell expanded the J5 and J8 projects into a combined effort that eventually
recommended a 25 percent cut in overall military strength in conjunction with
the change to a regional strategic focus. A briefing entitled “A View to the 90s”
was produced that encapsulated the views of the chairman as well as Defense
Secretary Richard Cheney, who largely agreed with Powell’s assessment. These
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changes also were incorporated into the president’s National Security Strategy
and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which were both products of the
Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
THE BATTLE IS JOINED
General Powell’s full presentation of these changes at a 26 February 1990 meeting
of the Joint Chiefs and regional commanders was the services’ first chance to oppose or propose changes to the chairman’s concept. The Navy, under the leadership of CNO Admiral Carlisle Trost, disagreed with the naval force structure outlined in “A View to the 90s.” Admiral Trost believed the Soviet Union still posed a
global naval threat, and he had two specific complaints about the proposed force
structure—which related directly to the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
First, and most important, “the Navy had not been a part of the development of
the force before it was ‘laid on the table’ with the strategy, and thus was not privy
to the analysis that validated its size and capabilities.”27 Second, due to this lack of
naval participation, the proposed naval force was too small to be effective in the
rotational forward presence mission it was intended to fill.28
Admiral Trost was fighting an uphill battle. Before his planned testimony on
force posture in April 1990, Senate Armed Services Committee members Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner (R-Va.) both said that the “Chiefs needed ‘to
come up here with a different story this year, it’s time to reduce.’”29 It was passage
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enabled Powell to create naval force structure
recommendations without input from the Navy’s service chief, and made possible
congressional favoring of Powell’s proposal over the objections of the responsible
service chief. As one chief noted, “[T]he planning for the defense build-down was
a case of someone determining in advance what was needed, and then seeing that
the result was produced.”30
General Powell further strengthened the hand of joint versus service-based
planning in the research, planning, and implementation of the first national military strategy (NMS) associated with the new NMSD and DPG. There was broad
agreement that a change in focus from global to regional-based strategies was
in order, although some global plans against residual Soviet action persisted.31
These concepts formed the basis of the 1991 Contingency Planning Guidance
(CPG) document, which “established a new framework for operational planning
based upon both the changes that had taken place in the strategic environment
and expected force reductions.”32 The CPG in turn was the basis for the Joint
Strategic Contingency Planning document that was the basis for the new, 1991
NMS that was adopted on 27 January 1992.33 The latter document directed the
regional commanders in chief to “prepare operational plans that focused on regional threats.”34 The service chiefs all objected to the new strategy, to a degree,
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but when confronted with President Bush’s demand to reduce the defense budget
owing to the end of the Cold War, they quickly assented and moved to protect
their respective budgets.35 The results of the Gulf War also appeared to “validate
the conceptual underpinnings of the new military strategy,” discouraging further
argument over its scope and implementation.36
These changes were especially hard on the Navy. It struggled to adjust to a new
national military strategy, a new force structure determined by outsiders, and a
fundamental shift in the service’s own maritime strategy concepts. Admiral Frank
Kelso II, who replaced Admiral Trost as CNO in 1990, had planned to write a
comprehensive naval plan on a logical reduction of naval forces for the postwar
world, but could not gain the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of Defense fast enough to get ahead of General Powell’s efforts.37 The
results of Kelso’s efforts later appeared in the Naval Institute Proceedings in April
1991. Kelso said, “I never got approval to publish the article in time for it to have
the effect I desired. It was finally published after General Powell came up with a
450-ship Navy that he called a base force. The article had absolutely zero effect
or impact, because it was not a ‘put your step forward.’ It was ‘Okay, you’ve been
drug down ship by ship now.’ In other words, it came after the fact that the reductions had started.”38
Not only was the senior naval leadership no longer in command of the fleet,
those leaders’ opinions on naval strategy and force structure were rejected in favor of those of an army general. While defense cuts were inevitable in the wake of
the Cold War, as they had been after the Second World War, in this case the CJCS
rather than the CNO or even the Secretary of the Navy made the recommendation to Congress and the president about what naval forces would be retained.
The Navy’s inability to exert influence on its own size, composition, and missions
would negatively impact the ability of naval leadership to create strategy from
1991 onward.
THE NEW PERSPECTIVE
The chairman’s new powers also extended to the strategic orientation of the services. Before 1986, naval officers involved in strategic and operational planning
had been accustomed to think of broad ocean areas as single conceptual units,
and the older naval organization of the Atlantic and Pacific commands had reinforced that way of thinking.39 The chairman’s new powers, however, included the
right periodically to review and adjust the missions, responsibilities, geographic
boundaries, and force structure of each combatant command.40
The Navy had historically seen the whole of the world’s oceans as a unitary
theater of action uniquely suited to naval control. The service had not, however,
fully articulated this concept on paper until the creation of the first version of
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the Maritime Strategy in October 1982.41 Naval leaders had also been loath to
give land-based commanders any control over ocean areas, owing to their belief
in a unitary global ocean battle space.42 But while a global Cold War supported
the Navy’s view, its end allowed for the development of a number of regional
strategies.
General Powell’s “A View to the 90s” briefing was based on his vision that the
disintegration of the Soviet empire called for new regional strategies that should
assume the United States would remain a superpower because of its military
capabilities, forces, and alliance relationships.43 His solution to this challenge
involved reshaping not only the force structure but the geographically defined
battle space in which that force operated. Naval historian John Hattendorf described the effect of this change on the Navy as one of “structural change in
command authority” that “had the intended effect of increasing joint strategic
and operational planning in specific geographical locations,” but “also had the
unintended effect of making it more difficult to implement coordinated concepts
for oceans—the natural geographical unit of maritime space.”44
This process had begun even before Powell was appointed chairman. The 1987
review of combatant command (COCOM) boundaries required by the GoldwaterNichols Act generated several disputes between the services. The Army attempted
to revive a previous plan for a subordinate unified Northeast Asia Command centered on the Korean Peninsula, but this requirement was rejected in the course
of the Joint Chiefs’ review.45 Of more concern was an appraisal of whether U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM) should assume responsibility for the eastern
Mediterranean water space directly adjacent to the “confrontational” states of
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.46 CNO Admiral Trost counterproposed that both the
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf be reassigned to U.S. Pacific Command, arguing
that “USCINCCENT could not carry out his mission without command of the
seas stretching all the way back to the California coast, which was USCINCPAC’s
responsibility.” In the end, the JCS review made only a moderate change—it
assigned limited areas of the Gulfs of Oman and Aden to USCENTCOM
—and even so Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had to intervene personally to settle the situation.47 The Navy’s objections to the proposed changes to
COCOM oceanic boundaries demonstrated the service’s concept of a unified
ocean area of responsibility within which the inherent maneuverability, reach,
power, and flexibility of naval forces could be optimally deployed and redeployed
to meet the nation’s challenges.
The Navy had mixed success in retaining its traditional maritime responsibilities during General Powell’s 1991 COCOM review. The new Strategic Command
and U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) had force structures favorable to naval
leadership, but USACOM acquired maritime geographic responsibilities over the
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objections of the Navy and Marine Corps leadership. General Powell in particular
desired that the Navy gunnery range in Vieques, Puerto Rico, be available for
joint exercises.48
CHANGES THROUGH THE ’90s
These adjustments to COCOM boundaries and areas of responsibility were
minor in comparison with changes in the late 1990s. But it was the chairman’s
greater Goldwater-Nichols-mandated authority that made them possible, and
they supported the continued shift from a global to a regional-based strategy in
the aftermath of the Cold War.
The 1992 presidential DPG read, “We can shift our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to focus on the less-demanding
regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future.”49 This
document further identified four elements of the regional defense concept: planning for uncertainty, shaping the future security environment, maintenance of
“strategic depth,” and continued U.S. leadership to maintain security and prevent
the rise of a successor to the Soviet Union.50
Although the CINC positions were originally designed as regional commanders for a global conflict with the Soviet Union, they took on new prominence after
1991 as the active facilitators of a new world order friendly to U.S. interests. This
new role was stated in a 16 April 1992 memo by Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Paul Wolfowitz on the contents of the 1992 DPG: “The perceived ability
of the U.S. to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor, even in
the cases where we do not actually do so.” Wolfowitz continued:
Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend
credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote
U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis-response
capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective
defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies
to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending
and of unnecessary arms competition.51

While the new post–Cold War national strategy and national military strategy
were the original products of the civilian presidential administration and defense secretariat, the principal military inputs came from the office of the chairman and the Joint Staff. The services provided only limited input, confined to
a defense of their spending programs. In comparison with the environment in
which the Navy had produced the Maritime Strategy, it had now lost control of
the argument about the size and composition of its force and how and where it
would fight.
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THE NAVY’S LEGACY OF STRATEGISTS
This change in the Navy’s fortunes was not due to a deficiency in qualified strategic thinkers. The service had cultivated a cadre of experts since the days of
War Plan ORANGE, when Navy strategists such as Charles “Savvy” Cooke and
Richmond K. Turner accurately anticipated the maritime strategy and course of
the future Pacific war of 1941–45.52
This tradition continued throughout the Cold War, with the service mentoring
and sustaining a number of experts in naval strategy. While these officers were
assigned operational, fleet-related billets in the course of their regular career
paths, they were also rotated through a small number of strategic planning offices
on the CNO’s staff. They often worked in concert with civilian academics at the
Naval War College, the traditional home of naval strategic thought and culture
since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late nineteenth century.
These officers were the product of what naval historian John Hattendorf called
“[a] resurgence of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy” in response to the tenure
of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (1961–68), during which longrange planning had been reduced to a series of five-year planning cycles.53 CNO
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt first sought to create a new cadre of strategists through
the Naval War College. This effort was not entirely successful. The overall curriculum of the War College improved thanks to the efforts of then-President Vice
Admiral Stansfield Turner, but the school did not attract enough of the Navy’s
best to create a new strategic culture rapidly.54 Zumwalt’s other focus, however—
on strategic problems in the Pacific and Indian Oceans—did create the desired
strategic culture through the CNO office staffs that worked on these issues.
The CNO OP-06 and the newly created OP-00K (CNO Executive Panel) offices in particular were a veritable breeding ground for naval strategic thinkers
over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s. These officers worked in close
cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Center for Naval Analyses, and did much of the planning and staff work that led to and included the
Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. The Navy did have a strategy subspecialty code
that officers could acquire through appropriate military or civilian education, but
this cadre of strategic experts was informally organized. This was especially true
in the case of the strategy experts assigned to the CNO’s staff. Captain William
Spencer Johnson, who served multiple assignments in the OP-06 office in the
1970s and 1980s, recalled that the executive assistant to the flag officer in charge
of OP-06 kept a wooden box in his office with file cards detailing those who had
served in OP-06. This simple filing system recorded their current service billets
and when they would again be available for service on the OP-06 staff. The admiral in charge of OP-06 essentially had unofficial detailing authority over these
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officers, and with the support of Naval Personnel Command could order their
return when requested.55
The officers who headed the OP-06 office included a number of former fleet
commanders, such as Admirals James “Ace” Lyons, Henry “Hank” Mustin, and
Charles Larson, as well as future CJCS Admiral William Crowe. Staff members
such as Captains Swartz and Johnson completed multiple tours within the OP06 organization over the course of their careers.56 Multiple assignments within
OP-06 produced a strong but unofficial strategic community of talented men and
women within the larger CNO staff.
The efforts of Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Murray stimulated the CNO,
Admiral Hayward, to create the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) in the
summer of 1981. The group
“The planning for the defense build-down was was convened under Mura case of someone determining in advance
ray’s leadership and mentorwhat was needed, and then seeing that the
ship, assisted by Commander
result was produced.”
Kenneth McGruther, Naval
Reserve Commander John
Hanley, and others. The initial purpose of the group, according to Commander
McGruther, was to “reinforce in the Soviet mind the perception that it could not
win a war with the United States, both before a war, to enhance deterrence, and at
all phases of the war should it occur.”57
The first SSG became very influential in determining how elements of the
new Maritime Strategy would eventually be employed. Murray desired that the
group work on problems of strategy that would be broad enough to be useful,
but narrow enough in scope to be reasonably accomplished. The SSG could not
accomplish these goals in isolation and would need to travel globally and discuss
its proposals with multiple senior officers and staffs.58 The SSG continued operating over the course of the 1980s and supported further improvements in the
emerging maritime strategy.
The other important product coming from both the OPNAV strategy offices
and the SSG was the officers themselves, those who gained great professional expertise from their assignments to these groups.59 They constituted an expanding
cadre of strategic-minded officers trained both to create strategy and to anticipate
responses to that strategy from opponents. The interaction of the OPNAV strategy offices such as OP-603, the SSG, and naval intelligence experts channeled the
inspiration for a new naval strategy to confront the Soviet Union into plans and
war-fighting doctrine useful to operational commanders. This group’s combination of operational, academic, and cooperative experience was well suited to the
rapid and effective production and updating of strategy-related materials.
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The changes wrought by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation would eventually
transform this group over time from an officially constituted forum to an ad
hoc assembly maintained by the members themselves. This alteration occurred
through modification of both missions and personnel composition of these cooperative strategic entities.
One of the most contested aspects of the legislation was the establishment of
a rigorous qualification, assignment, and management program for joint-duty
officers. Owing to a perceived predilection in the services to assign less-qualified
officers to the Joint Staff, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to submit an
annual Joint Officer Management report to the legislative branch. This document
was to report joint-duty officers’ number, promotion rate, and promotion rate in
comparison with non-joint-qualified officers, and to which billets each service
assigned such officers. This focus on joint assignments caused a significant shift
in where the talented officers of each service were assigned.
The OP-06 office had risen to prominence during the 1980s in the course of its
work with the Maritime Strategy. CNOs Hayward and Watkins as well as Secretary Lehman valued its inputs and contributions (along with those of the 00K office) to the creation of the NMS and its communication to a wider audience. The
emphasis demanded by Goldwater-Nichols on joint versus service-centric activities, however, helped bring about a significant reorganization in the OPNAV
office structure that weakened the influence of OP-06 on both naval and wider
strategic concerns.
Over the period of 1992–93, CNO Kelso conducted a major reorganization
of the OPNAV staff structure in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions; it was conceptualized and implemented by Vice Admiral Bill Owens, one
of the members of the first SSG. OP codes became N-coded offices that mirrored
the Joint Staff. A new and powerful N8 office (Integration of Capabilities and
Resources) was constructed from the warfare “baron” offices of OP-02, -03, and
-05 (Deputy CNOs for submarine, surface, and air warfare, respectively); Owens
was the first to head the new office.60 N8 was considerably more powerful than
the old OP-06 in a new world in which Goldwater-Nichols had determined that
services only built, trained, and equipped forces, but did not conduct strategic
planning for their use. OP-06 itself became N3/N5 and lost influence, as OPNAV
had considerably less influence on the Joint Staff now that it worked for the CJCS
alone and not the collective Joint Chiefs.61
The SSG also changed in form and content, but perhaps less directly than the
offices of the OPNAV staff. The SSG moved from being a Cold War naval strategy
and operations think tank to being a wider DIME (i.e., diplomacy, information,
military, economics) effort.62 It acquired its first members outside the Navy and
Marine Corps in 1993 and its focus became a global search for places where naval
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forces would be relevant. Much of this change was precipitated by the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but some was in response to the
activities of the empowered office of the CJCS. The chairman, rather than Navy
flag officers, now made force-structure recommendations.
BUDGET AND OTHER CHALLENGES
Admiral Kelso had replaced Admiral Trost as CNO in June 1990 and was immediately confronted by a host of direct and indirect challenges to the maintenance
of a robust naval force structure. Kelso acknowledged in his Senate confirmation
hearing that the Maritime Strategy was “on the shelf,” and that the six-hundredship Navy concept should be replaced by a more flexible number.63 The end of the
Maritime Strategy and change of CNO leadership created a power struggle in the
OPNAV staff as competing offices sought to present new strategic visions to the
CNO. This struggle produced a general document known as “The Way Ahead.”64
Budget estimates, however, continued to stymie the CNO’s efforts to support
his vision functionally. Kelso had hoped to kick off the 1991 budget season with
a positive and influential Total Force Assessment briefing to accompany the
Navy’s budget proposals. Instead, he got a sobering and dismal appraisal of what
force the Navy might field in the post–Cold War era. Captain Richard Diamond,
the OP-603 branch chief who gave the brief, recalled that Kelso responded to its
contents with a “barrage of scatological invectives and expletives.” One particular
slide, entitled “The Coming USN Budget Train Wreck,” predicted that the Navy
“was about to face a major budget crisis that made a new strategic rationale
mandatory”; it caused the CNO to “go into overdrive” in his negative response.65
The slide “flipper” for that brief, Commander Paul Giarra, USN (Ret.), said, “The
CNO left the room without providing any guidance to the assembled three-star
officers present for the brief,” and for a time this caused great uncertainty.66
Even so, if the challenges had been limited to dramatically shrinking budgets, Admiral Kelso might have had greater influence on controlling the Navy’s
response to the empowered CJCS, but his immediate focus was on troubling
service-specific issues. He was, in particular, distracted by negative publicity
about the USS Iowa B-turret explosion, the Tailhook scandal, and the crash/death
of F-14 pilot Lieutenant Kara Hultgreen, USN. In such an environment, Admiral
Kelso could not concentrate on strategy as well as he needed to.67
EFFECT ON THE STRATEGY COHORT
The legislation affected not only the Navy offices that created strategy but also the
careers of individual naval officers engaged in that effort. The new emphasis on
joint, vice service, offices that the Goldwater-Nichols provisions demanded created a significant impact on officers in the ranks of O-4 (lieutenant commander)
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to O-6 (captain) who would normally have been recruited to serve in OP-06 (now
N3/N5) and other purely service staff positions. Those officers were now drawn
to joint positions to meet the new requirements that demanded joint service as
a precursor to consideration for flag rank. The service solution was to “shorten
some assignments and eliminate others” so that joint assignments could be fitted
into the same nominal twenty-year career plan demanded by the 1980 Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act.68
The addition of joint assignments was further complicated by an overall manpower reduction at the end of the Cold War. The number of Navy joint billets
for officers in the ranks of O-4 to O-6 increased by 10 percent over the period
1989–99 in spite of a nearly 15 percent overall postwar decline in the number
of officers in those ranks. 69
These changes also seem
The Navy had historically seen the whole of
to have affected the overall
the world’s oceans as a unitary theater of acamount of service-based extion uniquely suited to naval control.
pertise that the average naval
officer acquired over the course of his or her career. A 2001 analysis suggested,
“[t]he prescribed tour lengths in Goldwater-Nichols tend to deepen officers’ joint
opportunities but may limit the breadth of experience.”70
The experience of the strategy cadre of OP-06 would not initially seem to support this assumption. The individuals who spearheaded the drive to create the
NMS in the 1980s found continued employment in the strategy business during
the 1990s. As noted at the outset, Captain Swartz, after some initial misgivings
about having two consecutive joint assignments, became one of General Colin
Powell’s special assistants. Captain Diamond became OP-603 (the Strategic Concepts office of OP-06) in February 1990 and exerted significant influence on the
development and coordination of the follow-on strategic concept to the NMS
known as “. . . From the Sea.”71 Commander Sestak contributed what Diamond
referred to as “the bumper sticker” for the new strategy in the phrase, “The Navy/
Marine Corps Team is the Enabling Force for Follow-on Joint Operations.”72 Diamond, along with Swartz and other OP-60, OP-00K, and SSG alumni, founded a
regular naval strategy discussion group that first began meeting in 1988.73
Yet while these officers continued their strategic vocation in both Navy and
later joint offices involved in producing strategic work, their shoes were not being filled by a new generation of Navy-created strategy experts. The provisions
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act appear to be the direct cause of this change, in the
eyes of some of these experts. Captain R. Robinson “Robby” Harris, a former
member of the SSG and 00K, has suggested that the OPNAV staff in general is “a
shadow of what it was twenty years ago in both quantity and background” owing
to the changes caused by the legislation’s joint-officer requirements.74 The new
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requirements for joint assignment appeared to have harmed the ability of the
Navy to send officers to multiple tours within OPNAV strategy offices. Captain
Johnson believes that the joint requirements prevented the Navy from sending
officers to multiple assignments in OP-06 where they would have acquired further strategic competence and maintained corporate memory in naval strategic
planning.75 Before Goldwater-Nichols, Johnson asserts, it was commonplace for
strategy-coded officers to have multiple OPNAV tours in strategic planning offices.76 Now there is barely time for one such assignment if an officer is also to
meet the joint requirements necessary for eligibility for flag rank. This lack of
repeat experience in OPNAV has further weakened the Navy’s ability to create
strategy on its own. Secretary Lehman says the joint requirements have created
excessively large staffs that draw too many officers from experience-generating
operational billets.77 Together, these changes have meant a Navy with fewer strategic planners and possibly less operational experience, and have forced it to fill
a much larger staff pool, thus leaving it bereft of its own strategic veterans.
THE PRICE PAID
Of course the armed forces of the United States were going to face significant cuts
in the wake of the Cold War. A new strategy would have emerged in response to
this sea change in international affairs alone. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation,
however, significantly complicated that process for the U.S. Navy.
The Navy had been the most significant source of organized opposition to
the legislation, and its senior officers, at the end of the 1980s and in the early
1990s, remained antagonistic to the law’s tenets as it struggled to adjust to a new
international situation and a new internal Defense Department organization.
The legislation did not have the same impact on Navy strategy as the end of the
Cold War, but the empowered CJCS, new concepts in combatant commander
area of responsibility, and the personnel changes demanded made the process of
creating new strategies for the naval service, especially those involving a global
responsibility, more challenging in the years after 1992. The Goldwater-Nichols
Act gave the CJCS the decisive voice in determining naval force structure and
how maritime geographic areas of responsibility were divided.
Further, the legislation altered the career paths of naval officers by mandating
joint assignments as a precursor to flag rank. This action caused a practical migration of talented, career-minded officers out of service offices such as OP-06,
where they had been carefully trained, mentored, and subsequently assigned
important Navy follow-on assignments, into joint billets in which the Navy could
no longer make direct use of their talents. These officers continued to contribute
to the process of strategy creation in the 1990s, but there was no longer a strong
service staff organization to mentor and aid them in their development.
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These changes caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 fundamentally altered the process by which the U.S. Navy developed both strategy and the people
involved in that creative process. While these changes did not have a significant
negative impact in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, they later affected the Navy’s ability to emulate the Maritime Strategy experience and again
produce war-winning global strategic concepts in response to regional threats
that can no longer be contained by regional planning alone—concepts that effectively employ the inherent mobility, flexibility, and power of a globally deployable, free-ranging, offensively oriented fleet.
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THE 1974 PAR ACELS SEA BAT TLE
A Campaign Appraisal
Toshi Yoshihara

O

n 19 January 1974, the Chinese and South Vietnamese navies clashed near
the disputed Paracel Islands. The short but intense battle left China in
control of seemingly unremarkable spits of land and surrounding waters in the
South China Sea. The skirmish involved small, secondhand combatants armed
with outdated weaponry. The fighting lasted for several hours, producing modest
casualties in ships and men. The incident merited little public attention, especially when compared with past titanic struggles at sea, such as those of the two
world wars. Unsurprisingly, the battle remains an understudied, if not forgotten,
episode in naval history.1
But its obscurity is undeserved. Newly available Chinese-language sources
reveal a far more complex naval operation than is commonly depicted in Western scholarship.2 Hitherto-unknown details of the battle illustrate how Chinese
strategists tailored their tactics so as to coerce, deter, and defeat a rival claimant
in the South China Sea. Notably, China employed a mix of conventional and irregular forces to meet its operational objectives. Such hybrid methods not only
were common in Chinese naval history, but also foreshadowed the kinds of
combined maritime warfare China has employed
Professor Yoshihara, of the Strategy and Policy facrecently against its neighbors in maritime Asia,
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Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affili- including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Inate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute deed, Chinese operations in the Paracels represent
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an archetype that could be employed again in the
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in the South China Sea. In 1988, China seized six reefs and atolls of the Spratly
Islands after another skirmish with the Vietnamese at Johnson South Reef. In
late 1994, the Chinese built structures on Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef,
leaving a weak Manila no choice but to accept the fait accompli. In 2012, China
compelled the Philippines to yield control of Scarborough Shoal after a standoff
at sea over fishing rights in the area. Beginning in late 2013, China embarked on a
massive land reclamation project in the Spratlys, building up artificial islands that
added up to thousands of acres of land. Some of the man-made islands feature
military-grade runways, deep-draft piers to accommodate warships, facilities to
host garrisons, and other support infrastructure. China’s extension of its maritime power into the South China Sea, which has gathered momentum in recent
years, began with the foothold gained in the Paracels.
The conflict and its aftermath also left an outsize and lasting legacy in Asian
international relations. The territorial dispute that gave rise to fighting forty years
ago remains unresolved and continues to stoke Sino-Vietnamese enmity. When
Beijing placed an oil rig in waters close to the Paracels in May 2014, violent protests targeting Chinese businesses broke out across Vietnam. At sea, Vietnamese
maritime law enforcement vessels sought to break the security cordon formed
around the rig by Chinese civilian, paramilitary, and naval vessels. Amid the
standoff, bilateral relations plunged to new lows. The contest, then, is far from
over; and the passions the dispute still stirs up trace back to 1974.
The Paracels battle erupted at an inflection point in the history of China’s turbulent politics. The nation was still reeling from the Cultural Revolution when
the fighting broke out. The radical political movement had so ravaged military
readiness that the Chinese navy nearly paid for it with defeat in the Paracels campaign. Mao Zedong devoted attention to the crisis, issuing his last military orders
during the conflict before his death two years later. Deng Xiaoping, rehabilitated
from the purges of the Cultural Revolution, oversaw the naval campaign. Liu
Huaqing formulated fortification plans for the Paracels not long after the smoke
had cleared from the battlefield. Deng, the architect of China’s reform and opening, and Liu, the father of the modern Chinese navy, would later navigate their
nation out of the dark era under Mao. Their roles in this clash likely served them
well as they positioned themselves to lead China.
For the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN), the campaign is
etched into the service’s institutional memory, constituting an essential part of the
navy’s “glorious history.”3 The “counterattack in self-defense” vanquished South
Vietnam’s navy and secured China’s control over the Paracels.4 It is considered
the PLA Navy’s first sea battle against an external enemy. (The fighting against
the Nationalists along the mainland coast in the 1950s and 1960s is regarded
as an extension of the Chinese civil war.) The battle was also the first time that
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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the PLAN—then largely a coastal-defense force composed of obsolescent Soviet
vessels—operated so far from China’s shores. The disparity in naval power that
seemingly favored South Vietnam, (Republic of Vietnam, or RVN) has helped
Chinese commentators mythologize the triumph.
The battle’s legacies, ranging from regional animosity to China’s strategic
position in the South China Sea, call for a closer reexamination. The availability
of relevant Chinese literature now makes it possible to extract insights from the
clash. Reconstructing a clearer picture of the Sino-Vietnamese encounter at sea
helps to discern the ingredients of the Chinese navy’s operational success. Moreover, a retrospective analysis draws out the continuities in China’s use of force and
coercion at sea. In particular, Beijing’s combined employment of military and civilian vessels in 1974 suggests a durable operational preference for hybrid warfare
that is evident today in territorial disputes involving China. Such predispositions
carry implications for the various rival claimants in the South China Sea and for
the United States as the arbiter of security and stability in maritime Asia.
To maximize the analytical value of the naval skirmish, this article first reviews the geographic setting and the historical context of the Paracels dispute. It
recounts in greater detail the tit-for-tat maneuvers near the islands that brought
China and South Vietnam to conflict. The article then elaborates on the naval
battle and its aftermath, as the Chinese have retold them. It furnishes an assessment of the battle, critically analyzing China’s civil-military relations, the
operational performance of the PLAN, the role of friction and chance, and the
importance of paramilitary forces to Beijing. Finally, the article concludes with
some thoughts about how the battle may inform China’s future strategy in the
South China Sea and its implications for stakeholders in maritime Asia.
SOURCES AND METHODS
In recent years, Chinese historical accounts of the Paracels sea battle have proliferated across publicly available sources, including PLAN publications, academic
journals, professional periodicals, and popular magazines. Participants in the
campaign, from local commanders to tactical personnel, have agreed to interviews or produced their own eyewitness accounts, reflecting on their personal experiences. They have revealed fascinating details about the engagement and have
forthrightly offered critical assessments of how the Chinese waged the campaign.
A general openness to debate on politically neutral topics, including naval
affairs, partly explains this willingness to engage in frank discussions about
the battle. For over a decade the Chinese leadership has permitted a relatively
freewheeling discourse among officials, scholars, and commentators of various
stripes, encouraging them to hold forth on China’s seaborne future. President
Xi Jinping’s vow to transform China into a maritime power has further spurred
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
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seapower advocates to retail narratives that justify the nation’s turn to the seas.
China’s operational success in 1974 tells an uplifting story that dovetails with
recent Chinese efforts to promote the navy as a prized national project and to
enhance the society’s “maritime consciousness.” And, in light of Beijing’s ambitions and growing capacity to influence events in the South China Sea, the history
of the Paracels battle resonates with Chinese audiences.
The attention lavished on this incident opens a window onto China’s interpretations of its own naval history.5 Indeed, the literature helps to discern lessons the
Chinese have drawn from this battle as well as to identify lessons they may have
neglected or chosen to ignore. If these lessons—and false lessons—hold value for
China’s policymakers and military commanders, the battle may offer insights into
current Chinese strategy in offshore disputes. Equally important, Beijing’s growing assertiveness in maritime Asia, including its construction of artificial islands
in the Spratlys, is likely to increase policy demands in Washington and other
Asian capitals to understand better how China views its seascape.
Some caveats about sources and methods merit mentioning. This article is
based almost entirely on Chinese writings of the battle, including the PLAN’s
record of events, recollections of the participants involved in the clash, and secondary sources. China’s sparse experiences at sea, especially in the first decades of
communist rule, may have compelled Chinese analysts to dramatize overly, and
thus potentially distort, their nation’s naval successes. Not surprisingly, Chinese
accounts frequently portray the enemy unflatteringly while playing up China’s
virtues. Xenophobic biases and cheap propaganda points abound. What follows,
therefore, is not a neutral perspective.
While the Vietnamese side of the story is not represented here, this article
draws on the few available English-language memoirs by RVN naval officers who
were involved in the clash.6 It pays special attention to recollections that diverge
sharply from the Chinese version of events. Moreover, discrepancies exist among
the various Chinese descriptions of the battle. To the extent possible, this article
identifies those differences, recognizing that a definitive story is not possible
without access to official archives in both China and Vietnam. This is a first cut at
an important but largely underappreciated episode in China’s march to the seas.
THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT
The Paracel (西沙) Islands are roughly equidistant from China and Vietnam, located 300 kilometers south of Yulin, Hainan Island, and 370 kilometers east of Da
Nang. The archipelago is composed of coral islands, reefs, and banks divided into
two island groups. To the northeast is the Amphitrite (宣德) Group, in which
Woody (永兴) Island is the largest feature. To the southwest is the Crescent (永
乐) Group, consisting of Pattle (珊瑚), Money (金银), and Robert (甘泉) Islands
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NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 44

49

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

YO S H I HA R A

45

MAP 1
THE PARACEL ISLANDS

Source: Adapted from “Paracel and Spratly Islands: 1988,” Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/.

on the western side and Drummond (晋卿), Duncan (琛航), and Palm (广金)
Islands on the eastern side. About eighty kilometers of water separate the Amphitrite and Crescent Groups.
Chinese writings emphasize the geostrategic value of the Paracels, which sit
astride critical lines of communications. According to the PLAN’s official encyclopedia, “The Paracel Islands serve as China’s natural protective screen and
outpost. Sea and air routes heading to Singapore and Jakarta from China’s coast
must pass through this area, giving it an important status.”7 Located about 660
kilometers southwest of the Pratas Islands, 550 kilometers west of Scarborough
MAP 2

MAP 3

Source: “Paracel Islands,” in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, www.cia.gov/.

Source: “Paracel Islands, South China Sea,” [CartoGIS] Maps Online: ANU
[Australian National University] College of Asia & the Pacific, asiapacific
.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/.
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Shoal, and 700 kilometers northwest of the Spratly Islands, the centrally positioned archipelago is viewed as an essential stepping-stone to other Chineseclaimed islands across the South China Sea.
After the Second World War, the islands changed hands repeatedly, with countries asserting a confusing array of claims and counterclaims to the Paracels. In
1947, the Nationalists on the Chinese mainland seized control of Woody Island,
while the French, employing local Vietnamese troops, occupied Pattle Island at
the other end of the Paracels. The communist conquest of Hainan Island, one of
the last holdouts of the Chinese civil war, rendered untenable the Nationalist outpost on Woody Island. PLA troops seized the island after the Nationalist forces
evacuated it in 1950. In the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, Japan renounced all
its rights and claims to the Paracels and Spratlys but left the transfer of title unresolved. South Vietnam and China subsequently issued official declarations that
incorporated the Paracels as sovereign territory, in 1956 and 1958, respectively.8
In the meantime, China and South Vietnam occupied two halves of the Paracels. In 1955, a Chinese state-owned company began to mine guano on Woody
Island for use as fertilizer back on the mainland. The following year, the French
transferred Pattle Island to the Republic of Vietnam. In early 1959, Saigon’s navy
forcibly evicted Chinese fishermen from Duncan Island, thereby conferring
on South Vietnam control over the Crescent Group. Throughout the 1960s, an
uneasy stalemate prevailed as both sides built modest facilities and episodically
patrolled the waters around the islands.9 It is likely that the substantial U.S. naval
presence in the region and Washington’s backing of Saigon deterred China from
rolling back South Vietnam’s control of the disputed islands.
In the 1970s, the promise of offshore oil intensified the dispute in the South
China Sea. In mid-1973, Saigon granted energy exploration rights to Western
companies and conducted geological surveys of the waters near the Crescent
Group. That year, Beijing explicitly claimed the maritime resources present in
waters adjacent to Chinese territory. China, too, began drilling an oil well on
Woody Island in December 1973.10 The convergence of geopolitics, economics,
and competing territorial claims soon drew China and South Vietnam into an
escalating crisis.
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
In the summer of 1973, a series of provocations and reprisals set the two sides
on a collision course. In August, South Vietnam seized six islands in the Spratlys,
and a month later issued a formal declaration extending Saigon’s administrative control over ten islands there. In October, two Chinese fishing trawlers,
Nos. 402 and 407, appeared near the Crescent Group and began to work there.
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The crewmen planted Chinese flags on islands over which the Vietnamese had
established nominal control. They also set up a logistics team on Duncan Island,
reestablishing a presence there, from which South Vietnam had evicted them
more than a decade before.11 In November, South Vietnamese warships began
to harass the Chinese fishing boats, ramming them and arresting fishermen on
board. Some of the captured Chinese were reportedly brought to Da Nang, where
they were forced to confess their alleged crimes and acknowledge Saigon’s sovereignty over the islands.
On 10 January 1974, the crews of the two Chinese fishing boats constructed a
seafood processing plant on Robert Island.12 The following day, the Chinese foreign ministry reiterated China’s indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel Islands,
the Spratly (南沙) Islands, and Macclesfield (中沙) Bank. Four days later, the
RVN Navy dispatched the frigate HQ-16 to the Crescent Group. Upon encountering fishing boats Nos. 402 and 407 near Robert Island, HQ-16 ordered the
two vessels to leave the area.13 The frigate then fired warning shots at them and
shelled Robert Island, blasting the Chinese flag planted there. On 17 January, the
destroyer HQ-4 arrived on the scene to support HQ-16. Commandos on board
HQ-4 landed on Robert and Money Islands, pulling down Chinese flags there.
The following day, HQ-4 and HQ-16 rammed fishing vessel No. 407, damaging
it. That evening, frigate HQ-5 and fleet minesweeper HQ-10 joined in.14
After receiving reports from Nos. 402 and 407 about the RVN’s naval activities,
China began to sortie its forces. On 16 January, the South Sea Fleet ordered two
Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers, Nos. 271 and 274, to reach Woody Island as
soon as possible. The two warships hurried to their destination from Yulin naval
base on Hainan Island. After picking up armed maritime militia, ammunition,
and supplies at Woody Island the next day, Nos. 271 and 274 proceeded to the
Crescent Group. The commanders were under strict instructions to follow three
don’ts: (1) don’t stir up trouble; (2) don’t fire the first shot; and (3) don’t get the
worst of it.15 J-6 fighters (the Chinese version of the MiG-19) provided air cover
during the flotilla’s transit, but their limited range permitted only five minutes of
loiter time over the Paracels.16 The warships would have to fend for themselves.
The two sub chasers reached the Crescent Group on the evening of 17 January and landed four armed militia platoons (each numbering ten members) on
Duncan, Drummond, and Palm Islands in the wee hours of 18 January.17 At about
the same time, two Guangzhou-based Type 010 oceangoing minesweepers, Nos.
389 and 396, rushed to the Paracels to reinforce Nos. 271 and 274.
In a sign of the PLAN’s desperation, the No. 389 boat had just undergone
major shipyard repairs and was not yet certified for sea duty. Worse still, the
South Sea Fleet’s most capable frigates, the Type 065s, were unavailable owing
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PLAN ORDER OF BATTLE
No. 271 and
No. 274

Class: Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser
Displacement: 310 tons
Armament: one 3.5-inch gun

No. 389 and
No. 396

Class: Type 010 ocean minesweeper
Displacement: 500 tons
Armament: two 37 mm guns

No. 281 and
No. 282

Class: Hainan-class submarine chaser
Displacement: 500 tons
Armament: two 3-inch guns

Source: John E. Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1975–76 (New York: Franklin
Watts, 1975).

RVN NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE
HQ-5 and
HQ-16

Class: Barnegat-class seaplane tender
Displacement: 1,766 tons
Armament: one 5-inch gun

HQ-4

Class: Edsall-class destroyer escort
Displacement: 1,590 tons
Armament: two 3-inch guns

to unspecified mechanical problems.
Instead, the PLAN had to fall back on
two Hainan-class sub chasers, Nos. 281
and 282, attached to a coastal garrison
division in Shantou, nearly nine hundred
kilometers from Hainan. The pair sped to
Woody Island, refueling along the way in
Zhanjiang and Yulin.
China’s navy was clearly scrambling to
assemble its forces. The Cultural Revolution was largely responsible for the fleet’s
state of disrepair. Nonetheless, the pieces
were in place for confrontation. The hastily organized flotilla, four vessels in forward positions and two in the rear, were
to protect the fishing boats and resupply
the maritime militia on the islands.

THE BATTLE
On the morning of 19 January, the South
Vietnamese warships approached the
Chinese flotilla from two directions.
Source: Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1975–76.
HQ-4 and HQ-5 circled around Money
Island and Antelope Reef from the south toward Palm and Duncan Islands, while
HQ-10 and HQ-16 cut across the central lagoon of the Crescent Group from the
northwest. Sub chasers Nos. 271 and 274 were directed to monitor HQ-4 and
HQ-5 while Nos. 396 and 389 shadowed HQ-10 and HQ-16. In a bid to break
the stalemate, HQ-16 forced its way past the two Chinese ships and launched two
rubber boats carrying commandos to land on Duncan and Palm Islands.18 The
Vietnamese assault forces ran right into the Chinese militia, which had dug in
the day before. On Duncan Island, bayonet-wielding militiamen drove the commandos off the beach. On Palm Island, the defenders shot dead one Vietnamese
and wounded three others, forcing the landing party to retreat to its mother ship.
During the maneuver to land the commandos, HQ-16 rammed and damaged
No. 389.19
Up to this point, the confrontation at sea had involved only maneuver, with
no shots fired in anger. Chinese naval commanders, moreover, followed orders
not to initiate the fight. Unable to dislodge their foes at sea and ashore, the RVN
warships repositioned themselves into battle formation and charged the PLAN
units. Bearing down on the Chinese vessels, they unleashed the initial salvo. The
HQ-10

Class: Admirable-class minesweeper
Displacement: 650 tons
Armament: one 3-inch gun
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Vietnamese directed their fire at the ships’ bridges, killing No. 247’s political
commissar, Feng Songbai, on the spot.20 After taking direct hits, minesweeper
No. 389 caught fire and began to take on water.
The PLAN units immediately returned fire and surged toward the opponent’s
warships. The commanders received orders to “speed forward, fight close, and
hit hard.”21 The smaller, faster, and nimbler Chinese vessels purposefully sought
close combat (贴身战, literally, “stick-to-body combat”) against the larger, lumbering, and slower-firing RVN units.22 The tactic was to draw so near that the
enemy’s main deck guns would overshoot their targets. By fighting while sheltering in these blind spots, the Chinese effectively nullified the superior range and
lethality of the enemy’s firepower. The PLAN commanders chose a knife fight
against an adversary expecting a gunfight.
The RVN vessels sought to keep their distance, but the Chinese ships quickly
homed in from several thousand meters to hundreds of meters.23 Sub chasers
Nos. 271 and 274 concentrated their fire on HQ-4 while Nos. 396 and 389 attacked HQ-16. The PLAN units took aim at communication gear, radars, and
command posts to blind and deafen the enemy. In the intense exchange of fire,
HQ-4 started to fill with smoke.24 To the north, Nos. 396 and 389 drove off
HQ-16 after fierce fighting and then turned on HQ-10.25 In the melee, HQ-10’s
magazine exploded from a direct hit. By this time, the combatants were tangling
only tens of meters from each other. At such close range, No. 389’s crew raked
HQ-10’s deck with small-arms fire, killing the ship’s captain.26
HQ-16 retreated to the open sea after No. 396 turned back its attempts to
reach HQ-10. Following some more exchanges of fire, HQ-4 and HQ-5 also left
the scene, leaving behind the crippled HQ-10. In the meantime, No. 389 was in
trouble. The badly mauled ship listed heavily and its crew could not extinguish
the fire. Despite the risk of an explosion, trawlers Nos. 402 and 407 helped beach
the heavily damaged minesweeper on Duncan Island. Sub chasers Nos. 281 and
282 arrived from Woody Island belatedly, at around noon, and attacked HQ-10
three times, sinking the ship just south of Antelope Reef.27 HQ-16, HQ-4, and
HQ-5 loitered to the west of the Crescent Group but did not attempt to reengage
the PLAN units.28
The Chinese moved quickly to retake Vietnamese-occupied islands. They
wanted to cement their victory at sea; the naval command also feared that the opponent might counterattack with reinforcements. The South Sea Fleet mobilized
one frigate, five torpedo boats, and eight patrol boats for the follow-on operation.
The amphibious assault fleet, organized into three transport flotillas, was ordered
to send ashore three infantry companies (each numbering about one hundred),
one amphibious reconnaissance team, and the armed militia, totaling five
hundred troops. The first flotilla consisted of four patrol craft accompanied by
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 49

54

3/8/16 10:29 AM

50

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue

fishing boats Nos. 402 and 407, hauling one infantry company. Four patrol craft
and minesweeper No. 396 formed the second flotilla, with one infantry company
and one reconnaissance team on board. The single frigate doubled as the third
flotilla and the command ship, carrying one infantry company.29
The first flotilla assembled before Robert Island on the morning of 20 January. The patrol boats shelled the island to suppress the defenders there. Three
platoons embarked in rubber rafts and sampans conducted the amphibious assault, seizing the island in about ten minutes. Shortly thereafter, the patrol boats
and the minesweeper of the second flotilla opened fire on Pattle Island. As PLA
troops landed, some thirty Vietnamese retreated to the middle of the island,
where they eventually surrendered. Among those captured were a major in the
South Vietnamese army and an American liaison officer from the U.S. embassy
in Saigon. By the time the PLAN turned to Money Island, the Chinese found that
the RVN commandos had already abandoned their positions.30
When the fighting was over, it was clear who had won. The PLAN had sunk
one minesweeper, damaged three warships, killed or wounded over a hundred
Vietnamese officers and sailors, captured forty-eight soldiers, and seized three
islands, bringing the entire Paracel archipelago under China’s control. The RVN
Navy put one Chinese minesweeper out of action, shot up three other warships,
killed eighteen, and wounded sixty-seven others.31
THE BATTLE’S AFTERMATH
Stung by the defeat, Saigon threatened to escalate. The South Vietnamese navy
reportedly sent two destroyers to reinforce Da Nang and directed six warships
to head toward the Paracels.32 The RVN high command also alerted all ground,
naval, and air forces to heighten readiness for war. President Nguyen Van Thieu,
who arrived in Da Nang to oversee his forces personally, allegedly ordered the
South Vietnamese air force to bomb Chinese positions on the Paracels—before
rescinding the decision. At the same time, Saigon requested assistance from the
U.S. Seventh Fleet, but to no avail.
The Chinese girded for a Vietnamese counterattack. The Military Affairs
Commission (MAC) instructed the Guangzhou Military Region to supply the
defenders holding the Paracels. Yulin naval base soon became a logistical hub,
organizing substantial quantities of ammunition, weaponry, fuel, medicine, food,
water, and other supplies for delivery. The MAC placed all forces on high alert
and detached three Type 01 Chengdu-class guided-missile frigates from the East
Sea Fleet to reinforce their comrades. Equipped with SY-1 subsonic antiship
cruise missiles, the frigates packed the kind of punch that the South Sea Fleet
lacked. Mao Zedong personally ordered the three ships to transit the Taiwan
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Strait—the most direct route to the Paracels—despite concerns that Nationalist
forces on Taiwan and the offshore islands might ambush the flotilla on its way
south.33 Mao’s gamble paid off when the three frigates arrived safely after an uneventful, though nerve-racking, voyage.34
The South Sea Fleet also called into service Type 033 Romeo-class submarines,
including 157, 158, and 159, based in Yulin.35 On 20 January, submarine 157
undertook an unusual refueling mission after an oiler grounded on North Reef.
After the sub topped off patrol craft near Woody Island, it returned to port.36 Submarine 158 departed Yulin on 22 January to patrol the waters between Da Nang
and Pattle Island. Attesting to Chinese anxieties about a Vietnamese riposte, its
mission was to monitor enemy fleet movements and sink—without prior approval from high command—any RVN warships heading toward the Paracels.37
Intriguingly, a PLAN sonarman later claimed that he had detected a U.S. nuclearpowered attack submarine that had been “tracking us for a long time.”38 Submarine 159 subsequently took the place of submarine 158—under stricter rules of
engagement, as fears of an RVN counterstrike receded.
This show of force, particularly the appearance of the missile-armed frigates,
tipped the local naval balance of power around the Paracels in China’s favor.
Saigon soon realized that it was unable to reverse the new realities on the ground
and eventually backed down.
After the dust had settled, the Chinese leadership began to consider steps for
consolidating China’s presence on the Paracels. In July 1974, the State Council
and the MAC jointly issued a formal fortification plan. Beijing put Liu Huaqing,
then the PLAN’s deputy chief of staff, in charge of garrisoning the Paracels. Liu
led a ten-member team to Woody Island for an on-site inspection in October
1974. The following month, Liu briefed the PLAN’s leadership. Liu’s findings
would become the basis for constructing shore facilities, including an airfield and
a port, and for administering the island garrison in subsequent years.39
ASSESSMENT OF THE BATTLE
Recent Chinese publications have revealed, in vivid detail, a complex campaign
that involved various implements of maritime power, ranging from trawlers to
militia to submarines. Firsthand accounts make clear that it was not an easy win.
Leaders had to be resourceful, improvising solutions along the way to make up
for the decrepit material state of the PLAN. Chinese commanders committed
their fair share of blunders even as they caught some big breaks. Friction bedeviled the Chinese navy. This more complete picture of the incident provides
a sounder basis for evaluating the campaign and for assessing the lessons the
Chinese may have learned from the battle.
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Primacy of Politics. China’s political leadership retained a firm grip on all aspects
of the campaign.40 Operational imperatives repeatedly gave way to larger strategic
considerations. On the day the Vietnamese landed on Robert and Money Islands,
Mao Zedong personally approved the initial decision to respond more forcefully.41 He would maintain a watchful eye throughout the conflict. As the PLAN assembled its forces, the MAC stood up a six-member leading small group, headed
by Marshal Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping to supervise the entire operation.42
Working out of the Xishan Command Center under the General Staff Department, the group assumed direct operational control and reported directly to
Chairman Mao and the Politburo. Ye and Deng set the parameters of the campaign and asserted their will at key junctures during the battle and its aftermath.
Uncertainties surrounding possible U.S. reactions to escalation in the Paracels
may in part explain the close political oversight of the operation. On the one
hand, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent withdrawal of all U.S.
combat forces in South Vietnam had dramatically reduced America’s stake in the
fate of its client. The burden had shifted to Saigon to look after its own security.
War weariness afflicted decision makers in Washington as well. Simultaneously,
Sino-American ties were still basking in the afterglow of rapprochement in 1972.
Both sides were eager to court each other’s friendship to counterbalance the
Soviet threat. China’s tepid response to the U.S. mining of Haiphong following
Hanoi’s Easter offensive signaled that great-power interests had eclipsed those
of the regional players. The crisis over the Paracels thus represented a golden
opportunity to seize the islands while China’s strategic value to the United States
remained very high.
On the other hand, Saigon was still Washington’s ally. Equally worrying to
the Chinese, the United States had appeared tacitly to support its client’s position throughout the American phase of the Vietnam War; U.S. reconnaissance
flights over the Paracels in the 1960s had drawn numerous protests from China.
A violent clash of arms was certain to draw Washington’s unwanted attention.
Moreover, any U.S. diplomatic or military support to the RVN almost certainly
would have transformed the strategic landscape and the local balance of power.
The imperative to keep the United States out, even if direct American involvement was deemed unlikely, probably shaped the conduct of operations.
Recent Chinese accounts suggest that decision makers in Beijing carefully
weighed the risk of U.S. intervention during the crisis as they contemplated each
move. According to Admiral Kong Zhaonian, then the deputy commander of the
Chinese navy, the tactical principle of not firing the first shot in part reflected
worries about third-party intervention.43 By conceding the first tactical move to
the RVN Navy—so went the logic—China could cast South Vietnam as the aggressor, thus complicating America’s diplomatic position. The Chinese therefore
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framed (and still regard) the engagement as a “counterattack in self-defense.”
Conversely, evidence that China had drawn first blood might have given Washington a more tangible reason to back Saigon.
Such caution extended to the battle’s immediate aftermath. Buoyed by operational success, the South Sea Fleet’s commander, Zhang Yuanpei, ordered his warships to give chase and sink the fleeing enemy vessels; but the commander of the
Guangzhou Military Region, Xu Shiyou, speaking for the MAC, countermanded
Zhang’s directive.44 Fears of horizontal escalation again stayed the PLAN’s hand.
Concerns about a hostile U.S. response also stimulated debate about evicting
Vietnamese forces from Robert, Pattle, and Money Islands. Intelligence reports
that U.S. Navy warships were headed to the Paracels from the Philippines further
alarmed the leading small group.45 While the PLAN was likely tempted to ride the
momentum of victory at sea, such a seizure would represent a major escalation.
Chinese leaders feared that Washington might interpret such a climb up the ladder as a threat to the prebattle status quo. Admiral Kong recalled that even though
plans and forces were in place to conduct the island landings, local commanders
held back until their political masters made up their minds. Members of the leading small group apparently agonized over the decision to put troops ashore. In
the end, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping adjudicated the debate and ordered the
Guangzhou Military Region to go forward with the amphibious assault.46
The absence of outside intervention—due in no small part to tight political
control of military operations—was crucial to the strategic success of the naval
engagement.
David vs. Goliath. The battle exposed China’s military vulnerability to its south.
Owing to Sino-Soviet and cross-strait tensions, Beijing’s strategic gaze was riveted
to the north and east. Not surprisingly, the PLAN’s most capable ships belonged
to the North Sea and East Sea Fleets. The South Sea Fleet’s feeble force structure
reflected the South China Sea’s backwater status. As the crisis unfolded, the fleet
had few seagoing forces suitable for operations in the Paracels, a predicament
certainly made worse by the travails experienced during the Cultural Revolution. The frigate Nanning, a converted ex–Imperial Japanese Navy warship, was
well past its service life. As noted, the three Type 065 frigates were not ready for
sea duty. The PLAN’s fast-attack craft suffered from limited range and questionable seaworthiness. Only the submarine chasers and minesweepers possessed the
range to sustain patrols that far south.
Chinese commentators frequently point to the unfavorable tactical situation
confronting PLAN commanders on the eve of battle.47 The RVN Navy clearly
outsized and outgunned the PLAN: HQ-4 displaced nearly 1,600 tons at full load
and was armed with two three-inch guns; HQ-5 and HQ-16 each displaced about
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1,766 tons and were each equipped with a five-inch gun; HQ-10 displaced 650
tons and carried a three-inch gun. By contrast, the PLAN’s Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser, Type 010 oceangoing minesweeper, and Hainan-class sub chaser
displaced 310, 500, and 500 tons, respectively. All were armed with smallercaliber guns than their Vietnamese counterparts. As one study notes, even the
largest PLAN ship was smaller than the RVN’s smallest vessel.48
Yet China’s navy won. Chinese analysts credit the officers and sailors alike for
their tactical skill and élan.49 Such intangible qualities, in their eyes, more than
made up for the PLAN’s lack of heft and firepower. Indeed, the fighting spirit of
No. 398’s crew, which engaged in the equivalent of hand-to-hand combat against
HQ-10, remains part of the Chinese navy’s lore. That the PLAN overcame such
material asymmetries certainly dovetailed with the service’s long-standing smallship ethos. From the founding of the People’s Republic, the Chinese navy found
itself struggling from a position of inferiority against the U.S.-backed Nationalist
forces. Yet in the 1950s and 1960s the PLAN repeatedly bested its archrival at
sea, employing speed, daring, and stratagems. To Chinese observers, the battle
for the Paracels thus represents yet another example of how an enterprising and
determined weaker side can beat the strong.
However, such a feel-good story is overly simplistic, if not misleading. The
PLAN’s success resulted as much from Vietnamese incompetence and mistakes
as it did from Chinese tactical virtuosity.50 For example, some Chinese analysts
criticize the RVN Navy for dividing the flotilla during the initial approach on the
morning of 19 January. Had the Vietnamese concentrated their forces and their
fire—so goes this line of reasoning—they might have picked off PLAN warships
in sequence.51 At the same time, the decision to charge Chinese positions was imprudent. Proximity played to the opponent’s strengths while negating the RVN’s
advantages in range and firepower. Had the Vietnamese struck the Chinese from
a greater distance (assuming the crews possessed the necessary gunnery skills),
they might have avoided the close-in combat that so favored China’s tactical
preferences. In other words, a more capable and less cooperative opponent might
have changed the battle’s outcome. A false lesson thus lurks for the Chinese.
Fog, Friction, and Chance. During this battle Carl von Clausewitz would have
instantly recognized “the countless minor incidents” that “combine to lower the
general level of performance.”52 The terribly timed mechanical failures of the Type
065 frigates—the South Sea Fleet’s most suitable combatants for the mission—set
back the PLAN just as tensions rose in the Paracels. Had the frigates been available and rushed to the scene, the battle might have tipped even more favorably
toward China. Alternatively, their presence might have deterred the Vietnamese
from attacking in the first place.53
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However, the Chinese improvised, and managed—barely—to cobble together
a flotilla in response to the RVN’s naval presence. Even so, the PLAN was very
fortunate that the weather cooperated. The operation took place during the
northeast monsoon season, when surges—involving gusts of forty knots or
more—can strike without much warning. Had nature turned against the PLA,
the small combatants would have had trouble handling the rough seas, spelling
trouble for the entire operation. The PLAN was as lucky as it was good.
Command-and-control problems plagued the Chinese. On the night of 17
January, reinforcements consisting of torpedo boats were on their way to the Pa
racels but were recalled because of overlapping chains of command. The PLAN’s
deputy commander had arranged for the short-legged craft to refuel at Woody
Island before heading into the combat zone. Unaware of the plan, the Guangzhou
Military Region’s commander ordered the ships back to port, citing lack of fuel.54
Had the torpedo boats been present when hostilities broke out, the PLAN might
have won an even more decisive battle. Alternatively, the Vietnamese might have
backed down instead of picking a fight.
The late arrival of sub chasers Nos. 281 and 282 was yet another instance of
poor communications. On the night of 18 January, Wei Mingsen, the flotilla
commander, had received intelligence that the Vietnamese planned to attack the
next day. He thus requested that fleet headquarters dispatch Nos. 281 and 282,
which were awaiting instructions at Woody Island, only three to four hours away.
Yet it took the two ships more than twelve hours to arrive, well after the heaviest
fighting had ended. A postbattle investigation revealed that the South Sea Fleet
headquarters in Zhanjiang failed to follow proper communications protocol, thus
contributing to the significant delay in relaying the deployment orders.55 Had the
ships reached the Paracels earlier, the confrontation might have unfolded quite
differently.
The inability of the PLAN’s land-based airpower, centered on the J-6 fighter,
to conduct sustained combat air patrols exposed the Chinese flotilla to enemy
airpower. South Vietnam’s F-5 fighters similarly lacked the range to loiter over
the Paracels for more than five to fifteen minutes. Some Chinese analysts believe
that the appearance of the J-6s over the Paracels, even for a short time, boosted
morale and produced a certain deterrent effect on the adversary.56 But this assertion is difficult to test and verify. The Chinese were simply fortunate that the air
was uncontested.
Chance favored the Chinese navy again when Mao ordered the East Sea Fleet
to send reinforcements to the Paracels. Interfleet cooperation was rare, if not unheard of, with regional fleet autonomy the norm. It is unclear whether the lack of
interoperability added to the friction. Intriguingly, Taiwan did not object to the
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transit through the strait and made no moves to obstruct passage, even though it
was well positioned to harass the PLAN warships.57 The Chinese leadership, bracing for a possible Nationalist ambush, was puzzled and pleasantly surprised by
this conspicuous inactivity.58 Taiwan was clearly a complicating factor that could
have, at the very least, delayed the arrival of the three frigates. Beijing’s ability to
maneuver forces along the maritime periphery depended on Taipei’s acquiescence, if not goodwill. Perhaps leaders on both sides of the strait tacitly agreed
that South Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea needed to be overturned.
In another example of Clausewitzian fog and friction, a Chinese oiler piloted
by a crew unfamiliar with local waters ran aground on a reef. The tanker was en
route to replenish the assortment of fast-attack craft that had assembled to seize
the Vietnamese-held islands on 20 January. The combatants, capable only of oneway trips to the combat zone, were desperately short on fuel. Fuel-storage facilities did not exist on Woody Island, so only the grounded oiler could have supplied the fuel in offshore waters. Apparently out of options, the South Sea Fleet
ordered submarine 157 to step in as a substitute. After filling its ballast tanks with
fuel, the boat sprinted to the Paracels at full speed on the surface, a particularly
risky move in a time of hostilities. This hastily improvised and highly unorthodox
method of delivering fuel worked, to the relief of Chinese naval commanders.
Even so, this logistical failure left the PLAN’s flotilla dangerously exposed to a
vigorous Vietnamese counterattack. Had the enemy contested the seas, this glitch
could well have cascaded into disaster for the Chinese navy.
Paramilitary Instruments of Maritime Power. The civil-military integration of
China’s maritime power, involving the militia and the fishing trawlers, contributed directly to operational success. The militia, stationed forward on Woody
Island, acted on short notice. Akin to a rapid-response force, the militia slipped
onto the Crescent Group’s southeastern islands under the cover of night, preempting the Vietnamese. Indeed, the militia threw back RVN commandos attempting
to seize the islands the next day. The ability to act quickly and effectively denied
operational objectives to the enemy while likely buying time for regular troops to
mobilize on the mainland. Finally, the militia took part in the seizure of Robert
and Pattle Islands that helped to secure China’s control of the entire archipelago.
At sea, trawlers Nos. 402 and 407 acted as first responders. Months before the
battle, the fishing boats maintained initial presence in the Paracels while asserting claims to the islands by planting flags on them. The trawlers then sent early
warning to headquarters ashore when RVN warships first arrived in the Paracels.
The leaders on board also furnished tactical intelligence to the PLAN’s local commanders at sea. The ships helped transfer the militia onto Duncan, Drummond,
and Palm Islands the night before the battle and provided the means to conduct
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landings on Vietnamese-held islands after the RVN warships fled the area. The
fishing boats were pivotal in the rescue of crippled minesweeper No. 389.
A closer look at the institutional affiliation of Nos. 402 and 407 helps explain
their active participation throughout the confrontation. The trawlers belonged to
the South China Sea Aquatic Produce Company, an entity that had been operating in the Paracels since 1955.59 The company, in turn, fell under the control of
the Paracels, Spratlys, and Zhongsha Islands Authority, a county-level administrative organ of Guangdong’s provincial government. The authority was responsible for exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over the islands and surrounding
waters. Established in 1959, it was abolished in 2012 to yield to the establishment
of Sansha, a prefecture-level city on Woody Island that claimed administrative
powers over all islands and features in the South China Sea.
The fisheries company and the vessels it operated were also institutionally
linked to the militia. The militia came under the dual leadership of Hainan’s
military district and the Chinese Communist Party’s Work Committee of the
Paracels, Spratlys, and Zhongsha Islands. The aforementioned authority—
responsible for the fishing company—and the work committee formed a combined agency that administered the South China Sea islands under China’s control. It is thus not surprising that Nos. 402 and 407 coordinated so closely with
their militia and PLA counterparts. The PLAN drew strength from interagency
cooperation.
Wei Mingsen revealed that the fishing company’s deputy director, Zhang
Binglin, was on board No. 407 to supervise the trawlers personally. In fact, Zhang
boarded Wei’s ship to share intelligence about the Vietnamese prior to battle
and organized the 18 January militia landings on the islands. According to Wei,
Zhang was a demobilized PLA soldier who boasted of “rich combat experience.”60
Yang Gui, the captain of No. 407 and leader of the militia on board, also conferred
with Wei in person to confirm the presence of HQ-16.61 Yang has described the
core of his fishermen as “first-rate militia.”62 Both Wei and Yang recalled that
militia had ready access to grenades, high-powered rifles, and machine guns
below decks.
In contrast to a naval presence that could have conveyed belligerence, the
trawlers gave China a low-profile means to back up its territorial claims. Even
though the fishing boats engaged in provocative behavior, the ambiguities surrounding their identity and purpose furnished plausible deniability to Chinese
leaders. The ostensibly civilian character of the trawlers added ammunition to
Beijing’s diplomatic narrative that Saigon was the aggressor. Indeed, a U.S. intelligence report cited “Saigon’s military response to the move of Chinese fishermen
into the Crescent group” as the “key step in the escalation.”63 This interpretation
conformed to the story that Beijing likely wanted to tell.
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HISTORY RHYMING?
Chinese behavior during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident exhibits operational preferences that echo the 1974 Sino-Vietnamese clash in the Paracels. The
more recent crisis began when a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft detected
five Chinese fishing trawlers working near the shoal, located some two hundred
kilometers west of Luzon Island. To investigate the activities taking place inside
what the Philippines considers its exclusive economic zone, Manila dispatched
the navy’s flagship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar (a former U.S. Coast Guard cutter).
The discovery of coral, clams, and sharks on board the Chinese boats set in motion an action-reaction cycle. As the Philippine Navy sought to stop the poachers from hauling home the illegal catch, two China Marine Surveillance vessels
intervened, precluding further Philippine attempts to enforce the law. To ease
tensions, Manila recalled the frigate and deployed a coast guard vessel in its place.
Rather than reciprocate the gesture, Beijing turned up the pressure by sending the
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command’s newest ship, adding heft to the Chinese
show of resolve.
With at least eight Chinese vessels facing off against a lone Philippine cutter,
the balance of forces clearly favored Beijing. Moreover, in the event of escalation,
China’s civilian boats and paramilitary forces could count on the long reach of the
PLAN’s striking power. While Chinese warships largely stayed out of sight during the crisis, their presence just beyond the horizon likely influenced Manila’s
strategic calculus. Even so, the Philippines refused to back down, leading to a
months-long stalemate at sea. To bring an end to the standoff and arrest further
deterioration in bilateral ties, the United States brokered a behind-the-scenes
deal in which both sides agreed to remove their ships from the area. But shortly
after the mutual withdrawals, China sent back its maritime law enforcement
ships and closed off access to the shoal. Since then, Beijing has maintained a
presence there, retaining de facto control of the feature and surrounding waters.
Just as armed trawlers played an outsize role throughout the Paracels campaign, civilian and paramilitary vessels took part in the Scarborough Shoal incident. Chinese fishing boats triggered both crises by engaging in activities that,
at least in the eyes of rival claimants, were illicit or provocative. Militia-crewed
boats in 1974 and paramilitary ships in 2012 acted as China’s first line of defense,
helping to probe the intentions and capabilities of their opponents while asserting
Beijing’s claims. The noncombatant vessels enjoyed the protection of the PLAN
even as they served as the eyes and ears of the Chinese navy. Such mutual support enabled China to evaluate the tactical circumstances; demonstrate resolve
without militarizing the confrontation during the initial stages; calibrate the level
of coercive pressure needed to compel the opponent’s will; and, should deterrence
fail, apply force.
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The civilian character of the Chinese vessels constrained their rivals’ navies.
The South Vietnamese and Philippine navies were apparently loath to fire directly on lightly armed or unarmed civilian vessels, lest they risk major escalation
or diplomatic fallout. The two services thus found themselves maneuvering and
posturing in vain to expel the Chinese ships. Even as China’s maritime presence
imposed a stalemate, Beijing depicted its adversaries’ naval actions as major provocations, opening the way for a more muscular show of force. Nonmilitary units
also deprived outside powers, such as the United States, of adequate rationale to
intervene, yet they were more than enough to signal resolve to the local actors.
In both cases, Beijing waited for the other side to cross a red line before taking
action that decisively settled the dispute in its favor. China’s maritime services
sprang into action only after South Vietnam and the Philippines committed
their navies to confront the Chinese. Whether Beijing consciously maneuvered
its opponents into making the apparent first move or its rivals stumbled into that
first move is unclear. This “second-mover advantage” presumably conferred on
China the moral high ground to achieve more ambitious territorial objectives. As
Thomas Christensen observes, “It often appears that Beijing is waiting for provocations by others to legitimize Chinese actions that will consolidate control over
the islands that China has claimed for decades but not administered in the past.”64
Similarly, Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty contend that “China may be
engaging in a ‘status quo plus’ approach to maritime territorial dispute management, maintaining the status quo until a rival acts to advance its territorial claims,
and then responding vigorously to leave its rival in a disadvantaged position.”65
In both confrontations, the Chinese penchant for conceding the first move,
at least as China perceived it, extended to tactical rules of engagement. In 1974,
Chinese combatants were under strict orders not to fire the first shot. Demonstrating impressive discipline under duress, the PLAN unleashed its firepower
only after the RVN Navy obligingly launched the initial salvo. While the 2012
standoff avoided a firefight, the burden was on the Philippines to evict the
nonmilitary Chinese vessels through greater staying power or force. Beijing in
essence dared Manila to punch first, confident in the knowledge that it would
overwhelm the outgunned Philippine navy in retaliation. Manila wisely refused
to take the bait. A similar dynamic is discernible in the ongoing Sino-Japanese
tussle over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. China Coast Guard vessels regularly
intrude into or near the islands’ territorial waters, perhaps in hopes of setting off
an overreaction.
After Beijing forcibly ousted Saigon and nudged out Manila by way of thirdparty intervention, it built up overbearing power in the disputed areas that shut
out the rival claimants. The combined military-civilian flotilla that appeared
in force near the Paracels not only cemented China’s operational gains but also
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conferred permanence on the new status quo. Zhang Zhaozhong, a retired admiral and well-known talking head in Chinese media, memorably dubbed Beijing’s
postcrisis consolidation of its position around Scarborough a “cabbage strategy.”
The metaphor refers to the concentric layers of security—from the navy standing
watch at the outermost ring to the maritime law enforcement ships and fishing
boats patrolling along the inner rings—that surround the shoal. By hardening a
new reality with physical presence, China sought to telegraph irreversibility to
outside audiences.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
The United States and its regional partners confront an increasingly competitive
maritime environment. From a strictly material perspective, the Chinese navy
today is incomparably more powerful than it was in 1974. A replay of a weak and
unprepared China facing off against a better-armed local opponent is virtually
inconceivable.
At the tactical level, the roles have reversed rather dramatically: the PLAN
outguns many of its Asian neighbors, including Vietnam, by significant margins.
Indeed, the South Sea Fleet is no longer the neglected, rickety fleet from four
decades ago. It now commands a large share of the service’s newest surface combatants and, significantly, its base in Hainan is home to nuclear attack and nuclear
ballistic missile submarines.
Woody Island has evolved from a primitive outpost four decades ago to a
staging area from which fighters and warships can be launched. Farther south, a
group of newly created artificial islands boasts runways and port facilities that can
accommodate PLA air and naval forces. Should a network of mutually supporting, well-defended bases emerge across the South China Sea, a permanent forward presence would add teeth to China’s coercive leverage in maritime disputes.
Overall, China now possesses the military power to impose costs on the
United States about which Chinese leaders in 1974 could have only dreamed.
Modern Chinese destroyers, frigates, fast-attack craft, and submarines bristle
with long-range antiship cruise missiles that can strike from standoff distances.
Shore-based aircraft and truck-mounted cruise and ballistic missiles can reach
deep into the South China Sea, furnishing the kinds of protective cover that naval
units in 1974 sorely lacked.
Somewhat counterintuitively, a more powerful PLA could render unnecessary
violent clashes like the Paracels battle. Instead, China may rely even more on
its maritime law enforcement ships—the signature feature of China’s maritime
coercion in recent years—to assert its territorial claims while the Chinese navy
backstops such noncombatant units from just over the horizon. The Scarborough
Shoal incident and the ongoing face-off over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands
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amply demonstrate this civil-military integration of maritime power. Greater
conventional military means will thus further empower irregular forces to impose China’s will on rival claimants. And, if all else fails, Beijing can still call on
its navy to settle a dispute. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option
of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor. Indeed,
the navy’s lurking presence may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis, as
it apparently did during the Scarborough confrontation.
Even as the PLAN bulks up on more-capable platforms, China’s maritime
paramilitary forces are growing and modernizing at a breathtaking pace. According to a 2015 Pentagon report, China is pursuing “the largest MLE [maritime law
enforcement] modernization effort in Asia” and “China’s MLE fleet . . . is likely to
increase in size by 25 percent and is larger than that of all of the other claimants
combined.”66 The Paracels battle illustrates that China’s employment of paramilitary units at sea is by no means a new phenomenon. Moreover, the clash reveals a
well-pedigreed institutional nexus between the military and the maritime militia.
Decades-long adherence to People’s War under Mao helped hone the kinds of
doctrine, personnel, command-and-control, and administrative structures well
suited to combining conventional and irregular means. Such creative uses of civilian and militia personnel date back centuries; there may be more continuity to
current Chinese strategy in offshore disputes than is commonly acknowledged.67
Washington and other, Asian capitals should recognize that the complex interplay of Chinese naval and nonmilitary instruments of sea power will likely be a
permanent fixture in regional maritime disputes.
Hybrid warfare, to use today’s parlance, is neither novel nor unique to China.
Russia, too, resorted to the use of paramilitary troops to dismember parts of
Ukraine while avoiding a wider conflict with the West. There is thus an underlying logic of strategy that transcends the peculiarities of China’s way of warfare.
The apparent efficacy of mixing unorthodox methods with traditional tools of
war suggests that China may turn to this playbook again in future confrontations
in the South China Sea. With a more formidable conventional military backing
up China’s large and growing paramilitary forces, hybrid warfare could become
an even more attractive and effective option for Beijing in the coming years. The
United States and other stakeholders in the region must be alert to this prospect.

NOTES
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WHO’S AT THE HELM?
The Past, Present, and Future Leaders of China’s Navy
Jeffrey Becker

C

hina’s navy is undergoing a leadership transition not seen in a generation.
Between late 2014 and the time of this writing (spring 2015), the upper
echelons of leadership within the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or
PLAN) began experiencing substantial change in personnel, with eleven of the
fourteen positions on the navy’s Party Committee Standing Committee (referred
to below as the PLAN Standing Committee)—the navy’s highest decisionmaking body—turning over (see table 1).1
Many of these new leaders have been promoted from one of China’s three
fleets: the North Sea Fleet (NSF), East Sea Fleet (ESF), or South Sea Fleet (SSF).
In 2014, for example, Vice Admirals Tian Zhong and Jiang Weilie, former NSF
and SSF commanders, respectively, both became PLAN deputy commanders, a
position that carries with it a seat on the PLAN Standing Committee.
Tian and Jiang typify the PLAN’s Rising Cohort.
Jeffrey Becker is an Asia analyst at the Center for
Born in the mid-1950s, these two officers came of
Naval Analyses (CNA) China Studies Division. He
age in a navy that was just beginning to reform.
is the coauthor of Behind the Periscope: Leadership
in China’s Navy (CNA, 2013), and From Peasants to Since then, they have gained direct experience
Protesters: Social Ties, Resources, and Migrant La- with the navy’s new missions, including far-seas
bor Contention in Contemporary China (Lexington
operations. They are increasingly at ease conductBooks, 2014). His research has appeared in Comparative Political Studies and the Journal of Chinese ing international naval diplomacy. Vice Admirals
Political Science, as well as edited volumes on Chi- Tian and Zhong have led PLA delegations abroad,
nese politics. Dr. Becker holds a doctorate in politiVice Admiral Tian to Russia, North Korea, and
cal science from the George Washington University,
South Korea and Vice Admiral Jiang to the United
a master’s degree in political science from Columbia
University, and a master’s degree in international
States.2 In 2014, Vice Admiral Jiang served as the
relations and Asian studies from Colgate University.
PLA’s highest-ranking officer in attendance during
Naval War College Review, Spring 2016, Vol. 69, No. 2
China’s first-ever participation in the U.S.-led Rim
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of the Pacific naval exercise (RIMPAC 2014).3 Other officers newly promoted
to the PLAN Standing Committee have similar experiences and qualities. Vice
Admiral Qiu Yanpeng, a former ESF deputy commander, is a model officer for
China’s far-seas expeditionary navy, having led one of the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden
escort missions, training missions near the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands,
and multiple exercises with foreign navies.4
More changes are on the horizon. Before the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth
Party Congress in October 2012, rumors circulated of PLAN commander
TABLE 1
CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE PLAN STANDING COMMITTEE

Name

Position

First Year on
PLAN Standing
Committee

Former Positions of
New Members

Adm.
Wu Shengli

PLAN Commander

2006

Lt. Gen.
Miao Hua

PLAN Political Commissar

2014

Political Commissar,
Lanzhou Military Region

Vice Adm.
Wang Dengping

PLAN Deputy Political
Commissar

2014

Director, PLAN Political Department

Vice Adm.
Ding Haichun

PLAN Deputy Political
Commissar

2014

Political Commissar, East Sea Fleet

Vice Adm.
Tian Zhong

PLAN Deputy Commander

2014

Commander, North Sea Fleet

Vice Adm.
Jiang Weilie

PLAN Deputy Commander

2014

Commander, South Sea Fleet

Vice Adm.
Liu Yi

PLAN Deputy Commander

2011–12

Vice Adm.
Ding Yi

PLAN Deputy Commander

2014

Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet

Vice Adm.
Du Jingchen

PLAN Deputy Commander

2011

PLAN Chief of Staff

Vice Adm.
Wang Hai

PLAN Deputy Commander

2015

North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff

Vice Adm.
Qiu Yanpeng

PLAN Chief of Staff

2014

Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet

Rear Adm.
Yang Shiguang

Director, PLAN Political
Department

2014

Director, Political Department,
East Sea Fleet

Rear Adm.
Xu Weibing

Director, PLAN Logistics
Department

2011

Rear Adm.
Wang Jianguo

Director, PLAN Equipment
Department

2014
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Admiral Wu Shengli’s retirement.5 Although this did not come to pass, he is already the oldest member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest
decision-making body within China’s military.6 As a CMC member, Admiral Wu
has no known formal retirement date. However, past practice suggests he will
step down no later than the Nineteenth Party Congress, scheduled for 2017, when
he would be seventy-two.
These changes raise a number of questions for those interested in China’s naval
modernization. How do China’s new navy leaders compare with their fellow senior officers, and how will they affect the PLAN’s ongoing modernization efforts?
The PLA Navy’s transition from a coastal-defense force to a blue-water navy has
garnered significant attention in both policy and academic circles.7 However,
an examination of the individuals overseeing the PLAN’s transition largely has
been missing from this discussion. This article seeks to fill that void through an
examination of the PLAN’s current leadership transition.
CHINA’S NAVY LEADERSHIP IN TRANSITION
To do so, the article examines three groups of officers. The first is the PLA Navy’s
Old Guard: leaders who joined the PLA in the late 1960s and came of age largely
during the Cultural Revolution, one of the most tumultuous and chaotic periods
in modern Chinese history. These officers, however, are rapidly retiring, and are
being replaced by the second group examined here, the PLAN’s Rising Cohort.
This cohort consists of officers who joined the PLA largely in the mid-1970s to
early 1980s and came of age when the PLA was just beginning to transition from a
coastal-defense force to a blue-water navy. Naval officers who have recently transitioned into leadership positions, including those described above, are members
of this group. Members of the third group constitute the PLAN’s Future Leadership. These officers joined the PLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and came
of age during years of rapid economic growth and development. Although they
have not yet ascended to leadership positions, the PLAN’s next leadership core is
likely to be selected from this cohort.
This is a watershed moment for China’s navy leadership. The reforms of the
past two decades have been led by a generation of leaders who, while extraordinary in many ways, had little opportunity to experience the types of operations
they were tasked with readying the PLAN to undertake. They came of age in
a PLA that was ideologically oriented, internally focused, and concerned with
coastal defense. However, they have successfully overseen the development of
an increasingly professional, modern, and international navy. Their successors,
members of the Rising Cohort, have played an important and hands-on role in
the PLAN’s modernization program and led many of China’s early blue-water
operations, including historic global circumnavigations, training missions into
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 68

73

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

BECKER

69

the western Pacific, and early anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden.
Thus, for the first time in modern history, China’s navy will be led by officers for
whom at-sea and blue-water experience is the norm rather than the exception.
Following on their heels is the PLAN’s Future Leadership, the first cohort of
officers to join a Chinese navy that had already established a professional military
education system and begun taking on more-expansive roles and missions before
they joined. Not only do officers of this cohort have experience with blue-water
operations, but they have experience operating in concert with foreign navies in
combined military exercises and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
DR) missions. Their eventual promotion into leadership positions will likely create a second watershed moment for the PLAN, for the service will then be led
by officers experienced in not only engaging but operating with foreign navies,
enabling them to incorporate many of the international best practices learned
from these experiences.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After a brief examination
of PLAN leadership in historical and organizational perspective, the article
compares and contrasts the retiring Old Guard with the Rising Cohort, focusing
primarily on changes within the PLAN Standing Committee. It then provides a
comparative analysis of all three cohorts. The paper concludes by examining implications of this leadership transition for the PLAN and the PLA more broadly.
PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
PLAN leaders have historically carried little weight in the Chinese military or
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy. Early navy leaders were simply
ground force officers and Party personnel transferred from elsewhere. The
PLA Navy’s first commander, Xiao Jingguang, spent his early military career in
Guangdong, Wuhan, and Changsha. After Mao selected him to head the navy,
there was still significant debate whether the navy would be an independent
service or housed within the General Staff Department.8 It was not until 1988,
when career submariner Zhang Lianzhong was promoted to commander, that the
PLAN was led by a career naval officer.9 The PLAN’s first career-navy political
commissar did not come until the promotion of Zhou Kunren in 1993. In 2004,
for the first time in the reform era, the PLA institutionalized the practice of having the commanders of each of the three nonground services (the PLAN, the
PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery) serve concurrently in the CMC, thus
increasing the influence of these services in relation to the traditionally dominant
ground forces.10 Yet only recently were PLAN officers serving in military positions outside the navy allowed to wear their navy uniforms rather than the olive
green of the ground forces.11
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PLAN LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE PLA
Central Military
Commission
General Staff
Department

General
Logistics
Department

General Political
Department

Seven Military
Regions

PLA Navy HQ

PLA Air Force

General
Equipment
Department

Second Artillery

Shenyang MR
Beijing MR
Lanzhou MR
Jinan MR

North Sea
Fleet

East Sea
Fleet

South Sea
Fleet

Nanjing MR
Guangzhou MR
Chengdu MR

Key
PLA Navy Leadership Positions

Source: Adapted from Becker, Liebenberg, and Mackenzie, Behind the Periscope, p. 15.

From these humble beginnings, PLA Navy leaders appear to have gained considerable influence within the PLA over the past decade (see the figure). Detailed
information on budgetary spending by service remains unavailable, but it is clear
the PLA has made naval modernization a high priority, with acquisitions from
abroad and construction of new ships and weapons platforms.12 To be sure, the
PLA remains ground force–centric, but navy officers are now found in all levels
of China’s military and hold positions of great importance within the larger PLA
hierarchy.
HOW CHINA’S NAVY LEADERSHIP IS ORGANIZED
PLAN leaders hold important positions within the PLA’s four general departments: the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department
(GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Equipment Department (GED). These four organizations are tasked with coordinating and overseeing work within their specific purviews throughout the PLA. The GSD is responsible for planning, organizing, and directing military operations, and leads the
PLA’s modernization program. The GPD manages the political relationship between the CCP and the PLA, and ensures the Party controls the armed forces. The
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GLD oversees logistics work. The GED, also referred to as the General Armament
Department, oversees weapons and equipment development and maintenance.
This four-department structure is mirrored in China’s navy: the PLAN has a
headquarters department, which serves a function similar to the GSD’s, as well
as political, logistics, and equipment departments. Many lower-level departments
(erjibu, 二级部) found in the PLA’s four general departments are also replicated
within the PLAN. For example, the GSD Military Affairs Department is responsible PLA-wide for promulgating manuals and developing policies related to PLA
career tracks; the navy’s Military Affairs Department at PLAN headquarters has
similar responsibilities within the PLAN.13
Of China’s seven military regions (MRs), PLAN leaders serve in three (the
Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou MRs), and in China’s three fleets, which are bureaucratically subordinate to the three respective MRs, with the commander of
the fleet serving as deputy commander within that MR.
Most navy leaders are found at PLAN headquarters, or within the headquarters of one of the three fleets. However, PLAN personnel are increasingly holding
positions of importance in central-level organizations and the MRs. Admiral Sun
Jianguo, for example, is one of five deputy chiefs of the PLA General Staff, and
chair of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, a think tank for the
Second Department of the PLA General Staff Department, the organ responsible
for human intelligence gathering and analysis.14 Vice Admiral Liu Zhuoming, son
of the 1980s naval reformer Admiral Liu Huaqing, serves as the deputy director
of the General Equipment Department’s Science and Technology Commission,
a body responsible for overseeing high-priority defense science and technology
aspects of the PLA’s modernization program.15 Rear Admiral Guan Youfei is the
director of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, the primary
organization that manages China’s foreign military relations, while Rear Admiral
Li Ji serves as one of his deputy directors.16 Other PLAN officers serve as heads
of navy departments or joint logistics departments within the MRs, maintaining
force readiness and overseeing naval military training.
DEFINING PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
There exists no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a leadership
position within the PLA Navy. The few discussions of PLAN leadership that exist
focus almost exclusively on the PLAN commander, at most extending to a few
members of the PLAN Standing Committee.17 However, such a limited scope of
discussion leaves out many officers with influence over day-to-day operations
and over the PLAN’s long-term strategic direction. With this in mind, this article
substantially expands the discussion of PLAN leadership to encompass the following positions:
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• PLAN headquarters
• The PLA Navy commander and political commissar
• PLA Navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars
• The PLA Navy chief of staff and deputy chiefs of staff
• The directors, political commissars, and deputy directors of the navy’s
political, logistics, and equipment departments
• The directors of second-level departments
• China’s three fleets
• Fleet commanders and political commissars
• Fleet deputy commanders
• Fleet chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff
• Directors of the fleet political, logistics, and equipment departments
• The four PLA general departments
• Naval officers serving as deputy chiefs of the general staff
• Naval officers serving as assistants to the director of a general department
• Naval officers serving as directors or deputy directors of PLA first-level
departments
• The military regions
• Naval officers serving as MR deputy chiefs of staff
• Naval officers serving as deputy directors of MR logistics departments
• Naval officers serving as directors of MR navy departments
Definitions of PLAN “leadership” will remain subject to debate. However,
the positions listed above all entail extensive responsibilities for portfolios that
provide their incumbents with immediate PLAN-wide or fleet-wide influence.
Focusing on these positions, this article relies on a data set of profiles of eightyeight different PLAN officers serving in these positions.
A YOUNGER PLAN LEADERSHIP
Before 2014, one of the most striking qualities of PLA Navy leaders was their
advanced age. Almost every PLAN Standing Committee member had begun
his military career in the late 1960s or early 1970s and had come of age during
the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), when China experienced what amounted to
a low-intensity civil war.18 In 2013, seven of the thirteen PLAN Standing Committee members had joined the PLA between 1964 and 1969, while four joined
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between 1970 and 1972.
Only Logistics Department director Xu Weibing
PLA Navy Officers
U.S. Navy Officers
was younger, having
Admiral/General
64
Admiral
57
joined the PLA in 1978.19
Vice Admiral
61
Vice Admiral
56
PLAN leaders were
Rear Admiral
58
Rear Admiral
55
also considerably older
Senior Captain
52
than their foreign counterparts. For example, in
2013 the average age for the eleven serving U.S. Navy admirals (O-10) was fiftyseven, compared with an average age of sixty-four for the three PLA Navy officers
of comparable rank.20 Admiral Wu Shengli, born in 1945, was eight years older
than his USN counterpart at the time, Admiral Greenert.21 To put this in perspective, Admiral Wu’s continued tenure as PLAN commander would be roughly
equivalent to the U.S. Navy being led by an officer whose formative experiences
came during the middle period (1965–69) of the Vietnam War.
Recent changes have injected younger blood into the PLAN Standing Committee. In early 2014, immediately before the most recent round of personnel
changes, the average age of this body’s members was sixty-two; today it is fiftyeight.22 Only two actively serving members, Admiral Wu and Vice Admiral Du
Jingchen, joined the PLA in the 1960s (see table 3).
Moreover, fewer senior PLAN officers are remaining on active duty past the
age at which retirement is mandated, which provides opportunities for younger
officers to move up the ranks. Since the 1990s, the PLA has worked to normalize retirement ages for high-level officers, and roughly two-thirds of the officers
examined herein joined the PLA between 1970 and 1980.23 This appears to be
true across the PLA. For example, after examining the careers of 107 PLA commanders and deputy commanders serving since 2005 in the army, navy, and air
force, we found only seven officers within this group who had remained on active
service past their respective retirement ages.24

TABLE 2
AVERAGE AGES OF SELECT PLA NAVY AND U.S. OFFICERS

CHINA’S EAST COAST: THE CRADLE OF PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
Studies of civilian and military leadership under previous Chinese leaders Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao have shown an overrepresentation from eastern coastal
provinces such as Shandong and Jiangsu and an underrepresentation from
southern coastal provinces.25 This is true for PLAN leaders under Xi Jinping as
well, as most PLAN leaders come from the eastern third of the country, with a
significant portion hailing from the same east-coast provinces as under Jiang
and Hu. We identified the hometowns for forty-nine of the eighty-eight officers
examined within this data set. All of those officers hail from the eastern third of
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the country (see the map). Moreover, of those forty-nine officers, thirty-nine are
from coastal provinces such as Shandong (eight) or Jiangsu (eight), with others
hailing from Zhejiang (five), Liaoning (four), or Beijing (four). In contrast, we
could not identify any navy leaders from western provinces such as Qinghai,
Gansu, Sichuan, or Tibet.
Some provinces that are home to critical naval installations, such as Guangdong, home of the South Sea Fleet, or Shanghai, home to important bases for the
East Sea Fleet, each have only one leader in this data set, and no representation
on the PLAN Standing Committee. Eight of the fourteen current PLAN Standing Committee members hail from Jiangsu (three), Shandong (three), or Hebei
(two) (see table 3).
THREE COHORTS OF NAVY LEADERS
The section below compares and contrasts members of the navy’s past, present, and likely future leadership across a wide range of factors, including key
TABLE 3
HOME PROVINCES AND FIRST YEARS OF SERVICE FOR PLAN STANDING COMMITTEE
MEMBERS
Name

Position

Home
Province

First Year
of Service

Adm. Wu Shengli

PLAN Commander

Zhejianga

1964

Lt. Gen. Miao Hua

PLAN Political Commissar

Fujian

1972

Vice Adm. Wang Dengping

PLAN Deputy Political Commissar

Anhui

1970

Vice Adm. Ding Haichun

PLAN Deputy Political Commissar

Hunan

1972

Vice Adm. Tian Zhong

PLAN Deputy Commander

Hebei

1974

Vice Adm. Jiang Weilie

PLAN Deputy Commander

Jiangsu

1972

Vice Adm. Liu Yi

PLAN Deputy Commander

Shandong

1972

Vice Adm. Ding Yi

PLAN Deputy Commander

Jiangsu

1976

Vice Adm. Du Jingchen

PLAN Deputy Commander

Shandong

1969

Vice Adm. Wang Hai

PLAN Deputy Commander

Zhejiang

Unknown

Vice Adm. Qiu Yanpeng

PLAN Chief of Staff

Shandong

1974

Rear Adm. Yang Shiguang

Director, PLAN Political Department

Unknown

Unknown

Rear Adm. Xu Weibing

Director, PLAN Logistics Department

Jiangsu

1978

Rear Adm. Wang Jianguo

Director, PLAN Equipment Department

Unknown

Unknown

Note:
a. Admiral Wu grew up in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, as his father was mayor of that city in the 1950s. However, Wu’s ancestral home is Wuqiao,
Hebei Province, which is also the hometown of Admiral Sun Jianguo. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this distinction.
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historical experiences during the early stages of their careers, access to formal
technical and professional education, approach to doctrine, experience engaging with foreign military personnel, and combat experience. This comparison is
summarized in table 4.
PLA NAVY LEADERS BY PROVINCE
Heilongjiang

Jilin
1

Inner Mongolia

Liaoning
4

Beijing

Xinjiang

4

Gansu

2

Tianjin 2

Hebei
Shanxi 3 Shandong
8

Qinghai

Shanghai 1

Zhejiang

Guizhou
Yunnan

Anhui
1

8

Sichuan

su

Hubei 4

ng

Tibet

Jia

Henan
2

Shaanxi

Hunan
1

Guangxi

5

Jiangxi
Fujian
1
3

Guangdong
1

TABLE 4
THREE COHORTS OF PLA NAVY OFFICERS
Cohort

Early
Career
Period

Defining
Historic
Event

Professional
Technical
Expertise

Doctrine

International
Engagement

Combat
Experience

Old Guard

Late 1960s
Early
1970s

Cultural
Revolution
(1966–76)

Limited or no
formal training
until midcareer

Soviet Young
School; Mao’s
People’s
War at Sea

Limited
engagement at
senior levels

Limited

Rising
Cohort

Mid-1970s
Early
1980s

Economic
and military
reforms
(1979–85)

Rudimentary
technical
training

Offshore
defense

Growing
engagement
opportunities as
midcareer officers

None

Future
Leadership

Later
1980s

Military
modernization
(1986–92)

Increasingly
sophisticated
training as
junior officers

Offshore
defense and
far-seas
protection

Operational-level
engagement as
junior officers

None
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The Impact of History on China’s Navy Leadership
Shared historical experiences, particularly during individuals’ “formative years”
(late teens to early twenties), are frequently used to analyze Chinese military and
political elites.26 Most of the officers examined here joined the military during
these years, making this approach particularly well suited to the study of China’s
naval leadership. Differences among the cohorts are also exacerbated by the extreme changes that occurred in China over the past few decades. For example,
while members of the navy’s Old Guard grew up under Maoist socialism and began their military careers during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, members
of the slightly younger Rising Cohort began their careers during a period of significant transition, for both the military and China overall. In contrast, those in
the PLAN’s Future Leadership are some of the first officers to have never known
anything but a stable and prosperous China increasingly powerful and confident
on the world stage.
The Cultural Revolution and China’s Old Guard. Although many have recently
stepped down, PLAN officers who joined the PLA in the 1960s or early 1970s
remain in key positions. They include PLAN commander Wu Shengli as well
as PLAN Standing Committee members deputy commander Vice Admiral Du
Jingchen and deputy political commissar Vice Admiral Wang Dengping. Officers
within this cohort came of age during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, a
period during which China experienced a breakdown of society and government
as Mao sought to reestablish authority over the country through continuous and
often violent revolution. During this time, the lives of millions were affected, including many of the PLAN’s Old Guard.
For example, PLAN officers who began their military careers at this time
worked within an organization focused almost exclusively on domestic political
issues rather than professional military training and execution. With the breakdown of political authority, PLA troops, including PLAN units, were called on
to secure important centers of power and maintain law and order. During the
Wuhan incident in 1967—a pitched battle between rival political factions for
control of the Hubei provincial capital—Mao dispatched PLAN gunboats from
the East Sea Fleet to provide support to his factions fighting in the city.27 Other
units protected critical naval infrastructure on the Zhoushan islands near Shanghai, and their personnel provided temporary port labor to ensure the continued
flow of necessary supplies.28
Opportunities for the PLAN’s Old Guard to receive formal training and professional military education (PME) during this time were almost nonexistent.
By the mid-1960s, most of China’s PME institutions were shut down, and formal
training and technical knowledge were radically de-emphasized. For example,
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previous standards that required PLA Navy submarines to be manned with a 70 :
30 ratio of qualified to unqualified crewmen ran counter to Maoist teachings that
political will could overcome a lack of specialized expertise, so they were revised
to allow for as much as 80 percent of a submarine’s crew to be newly assigned, unqualified personnel.29 As many as 3,800 officers, including eleven rear admirals,
were purged during this time.30
Many in the current upper echelon of navy leaders were forced to wait until the
late 1970s to receive any form of PME. In 1964, just as many of the nation’s educational institutions were being shuttered, Admiral Wu was enrolled at the PLA Surveying and Mapping College in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, where he would remain
until 1968.31 In 1968, Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, who only recently retired as PLAN
political commissar, worked on a rural commune in Shaanxi as an “educated
youth.”32 Although he joined the PLA in 1968, Admiral Sun Jianguo, the PLAN’s
third-highest-ranking naval officer, was unable to attend the Naval Submarine
Academy until 1978.33 Recently retired deputy commander Vice Admiral Zhang
Yongyi had to wait years before attending the Shenyang Air Force Academy.34
From Cultural Revolution to Reform and Opening: The PLAN’s Rising Cohort. As
the older generation of leaders retires, officers who joined the PLA in the middleto-late 1970s or early 1980s are replacing them. Many of the PLAN’s newly promoted Standing Committee members are part of this group, including deputy
commanders Vice Admiral Tian Zhong and Vice Admiral Ding Yi, and chief of
staff Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng. They join PLAN Logistics Department director
Xu Weibing as part of China’s Rising Cohort of naval leaders.
Age differences between the Old Guard and the Rising Cohort are not always
great. The Rising Cohort’s Vice Admiral Jiang Weilie, for example, who joined
the PLA in 1972, is not far removed from the Old Guard’s deputy political commissar Vice Admiral Wang Dengping or deputy commander Vice Admiral Du
Jingchen, who joined the PLA in 1970 and 1969, respectively. Members of the
Rising Cohort were therefore affected by the Cultural Revolution as well. Yet as
they were just a few years younger, those experiences were often radically different. Members of the Rising Cohort likely experienced the worst excesses of the
Cultural Revolution as civilians, since many of the most violent events took place
in 1967 and 1968, immediately before they joined the PLA. Absent the PLA’s institutional protections, they were more likely to have been part of the “sent-down
youth” movement, which forced roughly 12 million urban youths to work in the
countryside between 1968 and 1975.35 Current NSF commander Yuan Yubai, an
older member of this cohort but one who did not join the PLA until 1973, spent
two years as a member of his county’s “Basic Line Education Work Team,” in
Gongan County, Hubei Province.36
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While marked by the Cultural Revolution, the PLAN’s Rising Cohort also
benefited greatly from China’s economic reform and opening period as well as
the PLA’s early modernization efforts, both of which began in the early 1980s.
By 1978, Deng Xiaoping had begun dismantling the collective system of rural
agricultural production and establishing incentives for state-owned industries
to increase production—steps that would put the Chinese economy on the road
to three decades of double-digit growth. Around the same time, the PLA had
reestablished its educational and training institutions, focusing primarily on rotational training and unit readiness. Cultural Revolution policies of preparing for
total war gave way to training to fight what the PLA refers to as “local wars under
high-tech conditions.” Most importantly, ideological purity was replaced with
technical acumen, with a shift in emphasis back from “red” to “expert.”37 Thus the
Rising Cohort represents the first group of leaders who did not have to transition
from an ideological to a professional focus midway through their careers.
A Rising and Confident China: The PLA Navy’s Future Leaders. As the Rising
Cohort moves up the ranks, this is creating space for a younger group of officers who came of age in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While they have not
yet ascended to top leadership positions, in all probability the PLAN’s next true
“generation” of leaders—in the sense that they will be removed from their predecessors’ experiences during the Cultural Revolution—will come from this cohort.
Many in this younger cohort are currently serving in naval academic institutions
or as ship commanding officers (COs) or political commissars. Examples include
Senior Captain Li Hanjun, who until 2014 was serving as the director of the training department at PLAN headquarters and is now the director of the military
training department at the Naval Command Academy.38 This also includes Senior Captain Zhang Zheng, the CO of the PLA Navy’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning;
Zou Fuquan, the CO of Haikou (CNS 171) during the first Gulf of Aden escort
operation in 2008; and Senior Captain Zhao Xiaogang, the PLA Navy’s task force
commander for China’s first-ever participation in RIMPAC.39
Born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these officers were children or adolescents during the Cultural Revolution, although it still undoubtedly influenced
their lives. In their adult lives, however, they have experienced a much more
stable domestic and international environment and an increasingly powerful and
prosperous China. By the mid-to-late 1980s, when many of these officers were
still in the early stages of their military careers, China’s relations with the United
States and the Soviet Union had improved considerably, allowing Deng Xiaoping
in 1985 to put forth his strategic reassessment of the current international climate
as one in which China could expect at least two decades of international stability.40 These changes to China’s strategic outlook mean that once these officers
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move into top-level positions, they will be the first PLAN leadership cohort to
have never served in a navy preparing for total war.
China’s reassessment of its international environment also allowed the PLA
to rethink its approach to training, modernization, and national defense. In the
mid-1990s, Jiang Zemin’s policy of “two transformations” (liangge zhuanbian,
两个转变) called for the army to shift from preparing to fight local wars under
normal conditions to fighting local wars in a high-tech environment, and for the
PLA as a whole to shift toward relying on quality rather than quantity.41 As part of
this reassessment, the PLA Navy in particular sought to professionalize its officer
corps and improve training and recruitment, and officers within this younger
cohort have benefited significantly. For example, since these officers joined the
PLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PLA has been downsized by roughly
1.7 million personnel.42 In addition, while much remains unknown about the
importance of personal connections in the PLA promotion system, this is also the
first group of navy officers for whom actual retirement at prescribed mandatory
ages is the standard, making promotion practices more routine.
The PLA Navy, like the PLA more broadly, has also sought to improve retention through increased compensation and improved living standards; PLAN
commander Wu himself has written on this subject.43 The navy’s procurement
of advanced weaponry in the mid- and late 1990s created even greater emphasis
on educating and training officers who could operate, support, and maintain
these new systems.44 Thus, as this cohort of officers was joining up, the PLAN
was beginning to recruit more college-educated personnel.45 A growing number
of younger PLAN officers have also studied in top-tier Chinese civilian universities; they include Senior Captain Zhang Zheng, who graduated from Shanghai
Jiaotong University in 1990 with a degree in engineering.46 While the PLAN’s
PME system continues to undergo reforms, the improvements China’s navy has
already made since these officers joined the PLA means the navy’s Future Leadership includes some of the most highly trained and technically proficient personnel in the modern history of the PLAN. 47
China’s Changing Approach to Naval Doctrine
As the PLAN leadership continues to transition to a new and younger cohort of
leaders, so has the PLAN’s approach to doctrine changed. Members of the navy’s
Old Guard were greatly influenced in their early careers by Mao’s views of guerrilla warfare, adapted to the navy in the form of “People’s War at Sea,” as well as
Soviet naval doctrine in the form of the Young School. In contrast, members of
the PLAN’s Rising Cohort were introduced in the early and middle stages of their
careers to the concept of offshore or “near seas” defense (jinhai fangyu, 近海防
御), a reorientation of Chinese naval assets seaward, and an extension of China’s
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area of operations. This gradual extension of the PLAN’s area of operations
continued with Hu Jintao’s 2004 directive for the PLA to take on “new historic
missions,” pushing the PLAN farther and farther afield.48
People’s War at Sea: The Influence of Mao and the Soviet Union. Navy operations and doctrine in the PLAN’s early years were heavily influenced by two independent strands of thought: Mao’s views of guerrilla warfare and Russian views
regarding asymmetric warfare at sea.49 While distinct approaches, both favored
the use of smaller units operating in dispersed groups to engage in commerce
raiding and coastal defense, and the PLAN’s approach to warfare reflected this
influence. For example, Chinese writings on naval operations during the PLAN’s
early years described the importance of “mak[ing] the best use of the sorghum
fields at sea—the reefs, islets, cold, fog, and waves—and bring[ing] into full play
the tactics and strategy of people’s war.”50
The PLAN’s early approach to war fighting can be seen in early coastal operations against Kuomintang (KMT) forces in the 1950s. In the 1954–55 naval ambush operations off the coast of Zhejiang, for example, the PLA Navy conducted
surprise attacks against KMT frigates and gunships using torpedo boats hidden
among larger merchant ships moving down the coast. These torpedo boats were
then dispatched on a rainy night with low visibility, and were able to get within
four kilometers of their KMT targets before being detected, successfully sinking
the KMT frigate Taiping and KMT gunship Dongting.51
The PLAN’s limited capacity to remain at sea for prolonged periods surely limited any opportunities for members of the navy’s Old Guard to acquire blue-water
experience early in their careers. However, this focus on hit-and-run tactics and
guerrilla warfare shows that the PLAN’s transition to its current form resulted as
much from a radical shift in mind-set as from the acquisition of new technology
and operational capabilities.
The Rising Cohort and Offshore Defense. Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 reassessment of
the international strategic environment helped usher in a shift in the PLA Navy’s
strategy to “offshore defense” (jinhai fangyu, 近海防御), which sought to extend
China’s strategic maritime periphery farther from its borders. Much ink has already been spilled in analyzing in nuanced detail this shift in doctrine.52 For those
in the navy’s Rising Cohort, however, this new doctrine fundamentally changed
how they would think about war fighting. The PLAN would no longer use hitand-run tactics but instead would train and prepare to fight in “more substantial
and organized formations.”53
The PLAN’s shift to offshore defense would also expand its area of operations
farther from China’s coast, creating what may be the most important difference
between this cohort and its predecessor: namely, that a much larger component
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of the Rising Cohort has direct experience with blue-water operations.54 Such
operations have become an increasingly important component of the PLAN’s
regimen, and active-duty PLAN officers have not been shy in noting the importance of blue-water operations to the future of the PLAN. For example, speaking
to the PLA Daily in 2012, current chief of staff then–rear admiral Qiu Yanpeng
noted, “With the constant improvement of China’s naval equipment and support
capability, the waters for maritime training also keep expanding. Open-sea training has become an effective means and inevitable choice to enhance the combat
capability of the PLA Navy.”55 China’s 2013 defense white paper notes that the
PLA Navy is “intensifying blue-water training” and “improving the training
mode of task force formation in blue water.”56
Prior to personnel changes in 2014, few members of the PLAN leadership had
any extensive experience with blue-water operations. With the exception of Du
Jingchen, no Standing Committee member had been involved with the PLAN’s
Gulf of Aden escort mission, a well-known and long-standing blue-water mission.57 Now not only is Vice Admiral Du joined by Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng as
another Standing Committee member with such experience (Qiu led the fourth
escort mission, in 2010), but almost half the members of the Standing Committee
have similar experiences leading blue-water operations.58 Other members of the
Rising Cohort with similar blue-water experience have recently been promoted as
well. Rear Admiral Zhang Wendan, the commander of the fifth Gulf of Aden task
force, was recently promoted to SSF chief of staff. Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming,
the leader of the twelfth task force, was promoted to NSF deputy commander.59
Early blue-water operations likely carried significant weight for the few members of the Old Guard who commanded them. For the navy’s Rising Cohort,
however, the impact on a career of commanding a blue-water operation is not
automatic. To paraphrase a senior PLA Navy officer:
Taking part in the escort operations is something we increasingly emphasize in
promotion. But escort participation by itself does not guarantee promotion [emphasis
added]. It is not the case that if you take part in the escort operations, you will
be promoted, and if you do not take part, you will not be promoted. If you take
part in the escort, and you show a good performance, then you may be promoted
60
[paraphrase].

Nor does commanding a Gulf of Aden task force specifically appear to lead
directly to promotion. While Vice Admiral Du was promoted less than a year
after commanding China’s first escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, no other Gulf
of Aden task force commander was promoted so quickly. Indeed, of the first
fourteen officers who led a Gulf of Aden escort mission between 2008 and 2013,
six remain in the same position at the time of this writing.61
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China’s Expanding Interests Abroad and the Next Generation of PLAN Leaders.
Since Hu Jintao’s 2004 “New Historic Missions” speech, in which he declared that
China’s interests abroad were expanding, and that the PLA, particularly the PLA
Navy, had an important role to play in defending those interests, the PLAN has
extended its operations farther afield.62 Moreover, this trend appears to show no
sign of slowing down. For example, the 2013 “Diversified Employment of China’s
Armed Forces” notes the continuing importance of “comprehensive security”
(zonghe anquan, 综合安全), including the strengthening of China’s overseas operational capabilities such as search and rescue and emergency evacuation and
protecting China’s overseas interests, all of which are important missions for
China’s navy.63 One of the main themes of the 2015 defense white paper “China’s
Military Strategy” is the need for China to “safeguard its maritime rights and
interests,” which requires that “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea
must be abandoned, and great[er] importance be attached to managing the sea
and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”64
These two documents continue the shift in the PLA’s focus from the land to the
sea, and from China’s coastal and littoral regions to far-seas operations. While it is
too soon to know for certain the impact this trend will have on the PLAN’s Future
Leadership cohort, two distinct possibilities suggest themselves.
First, the PLA’s continued placement of greater emphasis on China’s maritime
rights and interests may create opportunities for PLAN personnel to chip away
slowly at the PLA ground force’s monopoly on positions of power.
Second, as the PLAN continues to embrace its global role, the navy’s Future
Leadership may increasingly take on the views and perspectives of officers who
work in a truly blue-water navy. While this is not to suggest that China’s younger
leaders will forsake traditional security operations, some PLAN personnel have
already noted that China’s younger officers are more interested in far-seas operations outside the first island chain.65 As the PLAN continues this decades-long
shift from being an inward-looking, coastal-defense force to an outward-looking,
expeditionary navy, the PLAN’s next generation of leaders will have more experience at sea than any group of Chinese navy leaders in modern history.
International Engagement with Foreign Navies
Each successive cohort of PLAN leadership has become increasingly comfortable and confident operating in an international environment. While members
of the navy’s Old Guard were almost completely isolated from the international
maritime community early in their careers, those in the Rising Cohort have had
opportunities to engage with that community, developing a confidence and sophistication honed from experience with naval diplomacy unavailable to most of
their older counterparts save those of the highest rank. Yet even this confidence
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and experience are quickly being overshadowed by those in the PLAN’s Future
Leadership, who engage with foreign navies not only diplomatically but operationally, increasingly working side by side with their foreign counterparts in
bilateral and multilateral naval exercises as junior officers.
For China’s Old Guard, international engagement with foreign navies came
late in their careers. The Cultural Revolution effectively shut down China’s naval
diplomacy, and with the exception of a handful of senior exchanges with the
North Korean and Sri Lankan navies, China’s naval diplomacy did not restart
until the mid-1980s.66 For example, the PLA Navy did not conduct its first port
visit until 1985, when a three-ship task force visited Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
Sri Lanka. The Chinese navy only began to conduct combined military exercises
with foreign navies in earnest in the early 2000s, and the PLAN’s first bilateral
maritime exercise in the region did not take place until 2007, when members of
the Old Guard were already well established in their careers.
When the PLAN did begin engaging with foreign militaries, the importance
of these initial operations meant that they were entrusted to established senior
officers. For example, PLAN deputy commander Ding Yiping led the PLAN’s first
global circumnavigation in 2002 as a vice admiral. Vice Admiral Du Jingchen,
one of the PLAN’s current deputy commanders, led the PLAN’s first Gulf of Aden
operations as the South Sea Fleet’s chief of staff, but was promoted less than a year
later to PLAN chief of staff.
The PLAN’s Rising Cohort and Increasing International Engagement. The members of the PLAN’s Rising Cohort have had more exposure to naval diplomacy
engagement at much earlier stages in their careers than their predecessors. As
the PLAN continues to be China’s primary service for military diplomacy—
conducting counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, humanitarian missions
via the PLAN’s hospital ship Peace Ark, and traditional combat exercises such as
the annual MARITIME COOPERATION exercise with Russia—the opportunity to
engage with foreign navy personnel has become increasingly common.67 For example, as a senior captain commanding the East Sea Fleet’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla
in 2007, then–rear admiral Qiu Yanpeng led the PLAN’s contingent in AMAN-07,
a Pakistan-hosted multilateral exercise with eight other nations, including the
United States. This marked the first time China participated in a multilateral
combined naval exercise, the first time a PLAN task force traveled abroad without a supply ship, and the first time the navy used live ammunition overseas.68
China’s Future Leadership: Working with and alongside Foreign Navies. While the
PLAN’s Rising Cohort has had substantial international engagement experience
compared with the Old Guard, much of it has been limited to cursory diplomatic
events such as meetings during port visits or communications at sea. In contrast,
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China’s Future Leadership has begun actually operating with rather than simply
alongside foreign navies. For example, although U.S. Navy and PLAN ships have
been interacting in the Gulf of Aden for years, in 2013 the two navies conducted
their first exercise in that region, which included boarding operations, live-fire
drills, and helicopter landings.69 In September of that year the two navies conducted additional exercises off the coast of Hawaii.70 In the summer of 2014, China sent four ships to participate for the first time in RIMPAC, the world’s largest
multilateral naval exercise. Senior Captain Zhao Xiaogang, the PLA Navy’s task
force commander at RIMPAC 2014, and the COs of the PLAN’s four ships at the
exercise each worked closely with ships from the U.S., French, Singaporean, and
other navies for weeks, conducting a wide range of drills at sea and interacting
with them on a daily basis.
Working so closely with foreign navies at such an early stage in one’s career
was not a possibility for those in the PLAN’s Rising Cohort, and was unthinkable
for Admiral Wu and other members of the Old Guard early in their careers. As
the PLAN continues to work alongside and operate with foreign navies, China’s
future navy leaders will be provided with a fundamentally deeper knowledge
and understanding of foreign navies than can be claimed even by members of
the Rising Cohort.
Combat Experience
While younger generations of PLA Navy leaders are becoming increasingly well
educated, trained, and experienced with operations abroad, one characteristic
that unites all three cohorts is their lack of combat experience. Historically, the
PLAN’s combat experience has been limited to a few operations, including the
liberation of offshore islands from the KMT in the 1950s, two small skirmishes
with KMT forces in 1965, and clashes with the Vietnamese navy in 1974 and 1988
over the Paracel (Xisha) Islands and Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao) in the Spratly
Islands, respectively.71
We have no evidence that any of China’s current leadership has been directly
involved in combat operations. Even the navy’s Old Guard would have been too
young to have experienced most of the PLAN’s operations, which took place before even Admiral Wu, the PLAN’s elder statesman, joined the PLA. Many of the
Rising Cohort joined the PLAN around the time of the PLAN’s clash with Vietnam over the Paracels in 1974. This includes current PLAN Standing Committee
members Vice Admiral Tian Zhong and Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng as well as
ESF deputy commander Rear Admiral Shen Hao. Again, the short, confined nature of these operations likely precluded any of these officers from participating
directly, and certainly means they were unable to garner significant combat experience even if they did participate. However, for those officers joining the PLA

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 84

89

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

BECKER

85

at this time, the navy’s success likely served as a positive contrast to the failures
of the PLA ground forces in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.
The available evidence indicates that the closest any of China’s current navy
leaders came to participating in any of these operations was Admiral Wu’s role
in the 14 March 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish (chiguajiao haizhan, 吃瓜礁
海战).72 Although not directly involved, Admiral Wu was serving at the time as
commander of the East Sea Fleet’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla (zhidui, 支队), and had
authority over the frigate Yingtan (CNS 531), which took part in the conflict.73
THE FUTURE OF PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
With the PLA Navy undergoing one of the most substantial leadership transitions
in recent history, this article has sought to compare and contrast the members of
the PLAN’s Old Guard, who joined the PLA during the Cultural Revolution and
who are fast retiring, with the Rising Cohort of leaders who are taking their place.
The article also examines the navy’s Future Leadership, whose eventual ascent will
mark a second watershed moment in the evolution of China’s navy leadership.
The findings above suggest that a profound shift is already under way in terms
of the levels of professional education, training, international experience, and direct experience with the navy’s new operations that the PLAN’s emerging leaders
possess. While the Old Guard was tasked with overseeing a navy that was rapidly
transforming, the vast majority of them had little if any personal experience with
the skill sets they sought to develop within that navy. Although under this Old
Guard the navy began to recruit officer candidates with greater levels of formal
education and provide them with more-robust training, they themselves had had
limited opportunities for such training. Although the navy began to conduct advanced blue-water operations under their tenure, very few of these leaders, who
joined a coastal-defense force during the Cultural Revolution, had that type of
experience themselves.
How unique is China in this regard? Many developing navies must manage a
certain level of inversion in the technical skills found in their institution’s personnel, with younger, lower-ranking members being more technically sophisticated
than their older, higher-ranking counterparts. Developing navies in South Korea,
India, Vietnam, and others have faced similar challenges. However, the evidence
provided above suggests that this difference has been particularly acute for China. Very few countries denigrated the possession of technical skill and knowledge
or treated technical training as inversely related to political loyalty to the extent
that China did during much of the early military careers of members of the Old
Guard. Few countries were as closed to the outside world as China during the
Cultural Revolution. Viewed in this context, the accomplishments of this fastretiring cohort of PLAN leaders are all the more remarkable.
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The article’s findings also suggest that each successive cohort of navy leadership is increasingly developing the characteristics and obtaining the maritime
engagement experiences found in the officer corps of other modern, developed
navies. The Rising Cohort is more at ease interacting with foreign navies than
its predecessor, while those in the Future Leadership cohort have operated with
U.S. Navy ships and studied alongside foreign naval officers in NATO member
countries.74 These traits will likely facilitate future engagement with naval officers
from the United States and U.S.-allied countries, with whom they are likely to
have more and more in common.
Despite these changes, it is important to note some of the similarities that
remain between the old and the new. Like the Old Guard, the Rising Cohort
is dominated by officers from China’s developed coastal provinces. Like their
predecessors, they have a living memory of the Cultural Revolution, one of the
most dangerous and unstable periods in modern Chinese history. Although it is
unclear how this experience affected individual officers, they all remember a time
when China was weak, unstable, and under constant threat of war.
Finally, it is important to note that, despite the PLAN’s growing professionalism, PLA Navy leaders remain firmly embedded within the CCP. While some
have suggested the possibility that military modernization and PLA professionalization would lead to a Huntingtonian-style transition from a party to a
national army, this has not occurred.75 In fact, the party continues to have control
over PLAN personnel decisions, reflected over the past few years most clearly
in the CCP’s expansive anticorruption campaign, which has removed a number
of senior military figures on charges of corruption or lack of party discipline.
Within the navy, key leaders who have been caught up in the campaign include
deputy PLAN political commissar Vice Admiral Ma Faxiang and Rear Admiral
Jiang Zhonghua, the director of the Equipment Department for China’s South Sea
Fleet.76 Thus, it is important to remember that despite this growing professionalism among PLAN personnel, China’s new navy leaders will remain subject to
strict party control and oversight and will continue to identify first and foremost
with the party.
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THE BAT TLE OF QUEMOY
The Amphibious Assault That Held the Postwar Military Balance
in the Taiwan Strait
Maochun Miles Yu

I

n the annals of the communist world, the month of October enjoys supreme
sanctity. The Red October of 1917 ushered in the first socialist government,
which would eventually become the Soviet Union. In the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), October is indelibly enshrined as the anniversary month of the
founding of the communist state, observed with a multiday national celebration.
But each year, amid glorious celebratory glow marking the inauguration of the
PRC, the memory of a forbidden and inglorious episode surfaces—inevitably,
albeit surreptitiously and furtively—within China’s educated and political elite.
The event took place a little over three weeks after Mao Zedong triumphantly
announced at Tiananmen Square, on 1 October 1949, the establishment of the
People’s Republic. It is the subject of a substantial and nagging controversy that is
antithetical to the overall academic and political discouragement of real historical debate, especially concerning any stain on the exalted victories of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). To most inside China who know and care about the
episode, it was an ignominious defeat that undercuts the familiar and mandatory political culture
Maochun Miles Yu is a professor of East Asian military and naval history at the U.S. Naval Academy.
of triumph and glory.
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Quemoy so significant in the military history of the PRC, what has shaped its
enduring legacy and impact, is not just the lopsided defeat of the PLA troops but
how it was fought, its inauspicious timing, and the exposure of the PLA’s inability
to conduct naval and amphibious warfare.
This paper seeks to analyze the key contentious issues related to the PLA’s
Quemoy fiasco, mainly from documents and sources published in mainland
China and recently made available to the public. Though not grand or ambitious
in scope, the paper endeavors to look at how and why the battle of Quemoy was
fought and to dispel a few prevailing but mistaken notions based on faulty logic
and the changing historical narratives emerging from China’s highly mutable
political climate. Finally, it addresses, first, the pivotal role the battle played in
setting the pattern of confrontation that has produced a six-decade political and
military separation between Nationalist Taiwan and Communist China and, second, how the battle affected the United States in its Cold War strategy.
THE BATTLE
Quemoy, variously also called Jinmen, Chin-men, or Kinmen, is a tiny, barren
archipelago consisting mainly of Greater Quemoy and Lesser Quemoy, totaling a mere fifty-nine square miles. In October 1949 there were only about forty
thousand residents on the islands.1 The most striking feature of Quemoy lies not
in its size but in its extreme geographical proximity to the PRC mainland—only
six miles away from the metropolis of Xiamen (Amoy), which was in 1949 the
second-largest city in Fujian Province and had a population of over two hundred
thousand. It is important to point out that Xiamen Island (now connected to the
mainland, on which part of the city stands) is merely one mile from the Chinese
mainland and would be the primary spot to assemble troops and amphibious
vessels for any attempt to invade Taiwan.
But Quemoy controls the sea access in and out of Xiamen and the adjacent
coastal areas (see the map). For the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) government, which was in rapid strategic retreat to Taiwan, Quemoy assumed supreme
strategic importance to its own survival, because it could effectively frustrate the
PLA’s vowed intention to invade and take Taiwan.2
By the summer of 1949, the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and
the Communists had been raging for over three years and the Nationalists were
near total defeat all across China. By late July it was beyond any doubt that the
escape destination for the Nationalist government would be Taiwan. As a result,
massive transportation of assets and government functions from the mainland
to Taiwan began in full. Also that month the KMT’s leader, Chiang Kai-shek,
started to prepare for a pivotal battle to hold Quemoy, which was not even fortified at the time. Although nearby Xiamen Island was much more important in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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a political and psychological sense, Quemoy would be more crucial militarily,
because it could control all maritime assets in and access to the area, including
Xiamen. So from the beginning Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to lose Xiamen
but determined to keep Quemoy at any cost. He deployed the KMT’s 22nd Army
to garrison Quemoy, with about twenty thousand troops, in addition to a tank
battalion with twenty-one American-made M5A1 Stuart tanks, each of which
had a rapid-fire 47 mm gun. The Stuart tanks would play a pivotal role.
For three days, between 25 and 27 October, a battle for Quemoy raged. Invading PLA troops were greatly outnumbered, and the fighting was desperate on
both sides. In the end, however, the PLA suffered a devastating defeat, one that
shocked its high command. The entire three PLA regiments committed—9,086
men in all, including 350 local fishermen conscripted as captains of transport
craft—were annihilated. About five thousand were killed, and the rest were captured as prisoners of war.3
WAS THE SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT SHIPS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE FIASCO?
There is no doubt that a severe shortage of troop transports was a key factor in
deciding the outcome of the battle of Quemoy. But the problem was not just a lack
of vessels but poor planning and hostility from local residents.
The transport shortage had much to do with faulty planning by the PLA commanders. From the beginning, an attack on Xiamen had outweighed all other offensives along the Fujian coast, greatly diminishing any meaningful preparation
for the planned assault on Quemoy. The mission of taking Xiamen and Quemoy
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
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was handed to the PLA 3rd Field Army’s 10th Army, under the command of a
battle-hardened general, Ye Fei. He divided his three corps into two task forces.
The 29th and 31st Corps would take on Xiamen. These corps were more offensively oriented and much better equipped than the smaller and weaker 28th
Corps, which would take on Quemoy, then considered less important than Xiamen. The original plan was that the two task forces would launch simultaneous
assaults on the KMT defenders of both Xiamen and Quemoy.
But doing so would require the two task forces to commandeer a large number of fishing vessels from local villages as troop transports. The commanding
general of the 10th Army, General Ye, believed that many fishing vessels in the
region were being systematically destroyed by KMT planes to avoid their being
used by the advancing Communist troops.4 But Ye’s memoir does not provide any
evidence of such bombing or instances when it occurred. On the contrary, most
damage to and losses of commandeered fishing vessels were caused by storms
during a minor island offensive prior to the attacks on Xiamen and Quemoy.5 In
his memoir Ye Fei contradicts himself, stating that in the island battles immediately prior to the battle of Quemoy not a single transport ship was lost to enemy
planes and that this was taken as a welcome sign that the KMT might not use
planes at Quemoy either.6
The primary reason for the lack of fishing vessels was that local fishermen
were generally hostile to the Communist troops in the area. The biggest sector
of the economy in the region was fishing, and the most important asset for a
fisherman was his boat. Most fishermen resisted the PLA demand to surrender
their vessels as troop transports. They hid their vessels or scuttled them to avoid
their being taken over by the PLA troops.7 General Xiao Feng, the on-scene,
operational commander in the Quemoy battle, would recall in his own memoir
that “fishermen in this coastal area either abandoned their fishing vessels and fled
from us, or took their vessels with them and hid them; others even deliberately
destroyed their fishing vessels to avoid being commandeered by us. We could not
find the vessels when we found the fishermen; or we could not find the fishermen
to operate these vessels when we found the vessels.”8
Because of the shortage of transport ships, the original plan to attack Xiamen
and Quemoy simultaneously was abandoned. The new plan was to attack Xiamen first, concentrating all the ships and boats already commandeered by the
10th Army, and to postpone the campaign against Quemoy until the Xiamen
campaign was over and the ships and boats used in it could be released.
The battle for Xiamen started on 15 October and lasted two full days. The
battle had something expected and something unexpected. The “expected” was
the outcome, a smashing victory over demoralized defenders, who did not put
up a real fight. Some twenty-seven thousand KMT soldiers were either killed
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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or captured, the majority of the originally stationed defenders having fled on
ships to either Taiwan or other outlying islands still under KMT control. The
unexpected result of the Xiamen campaign was devastating losses of transport
vessels. After the Xiamen campaign, what remained for the 28th Corps to use in
its upcoming Quemoy assault was fewer than three hundred small fishing boats,
none motorized.
The battle plan for Quemoy was to land twenty thousand PLA troops on the
island’s beaches. But with fewer than three hundred small boats available, the
task force would have to be transported in two groups. The first would be three
PLA regiments, or about 8,700 troops, in addition to the 350 fishermen, most of
them unwilling to serve the PLA but having no choice. The plan contemplated
that once the first landing group reached the beachhead, the vessels would return
to the PLA positions to take the second landing group, which would consist of
four regiments, another eleven thousand troops. PLA intelligence estimated that
there were about twenty thousand KMT defenders on Quemoy at the time and
that the combined invasion force, twenty thousand PLA soldiers, would reach
parity in strength, one to one. Given the PLA’s superior morale and fighting spirit,
victory over the defeatist and demoralized KMT defenders on Quemoy would be
inevitable.9
But the plan went badly. After the first three regiments were delivered to the
beachhead—in the middle of the night, apparently undetected by the defenders
—the tide went out, and all the ships grounded in the shoals, where they were
mercilessly destroyed by the KMT defenders by shore, sea, and air. Not a single
ship or boat was able to return to pick up the reinforcing second landing group.
Although grave miscalculation of ocean tides was later blamed by most participants and PRC historians as the chief culprit for the transport debacle, it was not
the most decisive factor in the failure of the transport vessels to return for the
second group.
Ignoring advice from local fishermen, the PLA commanders on board the
vessels had ordered the vessels to approach the shore as closely as possible so that
the invasion troops would have an easier walk to the beach. The vessels arrived
at high tide, between 0130 and 0200 (1:30 and 2:00 am), passing over underwater antiship obstacles and ship-snatching barbed wire. When the tide began to
recede, some vessels became entangled with the newly exposed obstacles. PLA
commanders realized the danger and ordered the swift return of the vessels to
deeper water before the tide got too low. But it was too late; all of them became
stuck on a long stretch of beach in a scene of total chaos.10 When a land mine near
the landing beach was accidentally ignited by a KMT patrol, the explosion triggered feverish searchlight sweeps by the coastal defenses, which discovered the
shambles of landing vessels stuck on and near the beach.11 Gunfire and bombing
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
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erupted and lasted for more than two hours. Dawn, when it arrived, allowed
KMT B-25 bombers and warships to shell the hapless landing forces, destroying
all of them. Not a single vessel escaped.12 The entire Quemoy battle plan, which
hinged critically on the ability of the transport vessels to return to pick up eleven
thousand more PLA troops, had turned into a complete fiasco.
WAS THE PLA’S LACK OF NAVAL POWER AND AIRPOWER
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIASCO?
In his memoir, Ye Fei, the officer in overall charge of the battle of Quemoy, blames
the PLA’s lack of naval power and airpower during the battle for the defeat. “The
most important and most salient lesson [for the defeat at Quemoy] was that at
the time, the Chiang Kai-shek army had a navy and an air force, which remained
basically intact during the War of National Liberation [the Civil War, 1946–49];
while our army did not have a navy and an air force, which forced us to cross the
sea to fight by way of sailboats, without air cover, without naval support from
the sea.”13 So states Ye Fei, and his argument seems reasonable on the surface.
However, a careful scrutiny will reveal that his summary of the reasons for the
defeat is without merit.
During the battle of Quemoy, the KMT had at its disposal twenty-five B-25
light bombers and about fifty FB-26 fighter-bombers.14 The PLA had a squadron
of P-51 Mustangs, captured from the KMT, but these pursuit planes had been
used in the ceremonial extravaganza in Beijing marking the founding of the
People’s Republic of China in early October. They were still in North China.15
On the naval side, the KMT had a total of nine ships, mostly small patrol vessels
and light frigates.
During the battle, the PLA command was fully aware of these KMT naval and
air assets and took measures to deny their usefulness. The most important decision made by Ye Fei, in this connection, and his subordinate Xiao Feng—and it
was a correct one—was to conduct the amphibious assault at night, because the
KMT air force did not have a nighttime capability. Also, with the cover of night
the PLA troops could avoid being detected by the KMT warships and so launch a
surprise attack. On both accounts the PLA command was right, and the invasion
troops did successfully avoid attack by KMT air or naval assets during the entire
trip to the beaches on the first night of the battle. In addition, the PLA mounted
a battery of eighty pieces of artillery on nearby Dadeng Island.16 Though not
overwhelming, these guns could silence the KMT’s small patrol boats during the
landing phase.
Ye Fei’s argument is even less plausible if one considers the many amphibious
battles the PLA launched against even more dominant KMT sea and air superiority, notably at Hainan Island some six months later. In virtually all these other
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instances, despite overwhelming KMT naval and air superiority, the PLA island
assaults prevailed.
What General Ye neglected to point out in his memoir is another key reason
for the Quemoy defeat—the fatefully delayed departure of the invasion forces. It
was less than six miles from the PLA embarkation points to the Quemoy beaches.
Under the weather conditions at the time, a favorably robust northeast breeze,
it would take less than one hour to reach the destination. The invasion forces
were accordingly ordered to board the vessels around 1900 (seven o’clock) on the
evening of 24 October. But indecision on the part of Ye Fei and Xiao Feng and
command ambiguity between them, in addition to utterly chaotic boarding and
loading procedures, delayed the departure by several hours, greatly shortening
the period of darkness, the window during which the KMT air and sea forces
could not attack. Most of the vessels did not sail until after midnight.17
The armada itself was also disorganized. The three regiments set sail from
three different spots. Once entering open water, their vessels were to rendezvous
at a designated area and then proceed together. This order wasted about an hour.
Worse, because of radio silence to avoid enemy detection, the vessels had no
communications with each other. As a result, the rendezvous was never really
completed; the vessels swarmed to Quemoy without any coordination or unified
command, arriving intermittently between 0130 and 0200, far later than originally planned, with only three or four hours left within which to land their troops.
Given that delay, even if all three hundred transport vessels had returned to
the rear echelon and picked up the eleven thousand men of the second group,
they would most likely have been annihilated. The most important element of a
victory—that is, inability of the KMT forces to attack by air or sea—would have
been lost with the advent of daylight on 25 October.
We can then safely conclude that Ye Fei’s theory about the primary reason for
the Quemoy fiasco is incorrect.
WAS INTELLIGENCE FAILURE CRUCIAL FOR THE FIASCO?
Before the assault was launched on 24 October, the PLA commanders gathered
a substantial amount of intelligence on the enemy and the target area. Reports
poured into the command headquarters of General Ye, the overall commander,
and of Xiao Feng, the operational commander. These reports were generally classified as either political or operational intelligence. In both categories the PLA
commanders fundamentally misjudged the intelligence in front of them and
made seriously flawed decisions that doomed the entire invasion.
Political intelligence had been the PLA’s forte, as it dealt with timely and accurate assessment of the enemy’s will to fight. Yet both commanders erred gravely
in the Quemoy assault. Their overall assessments of the Quemoy defenders were
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more romantic than professional. They believed deeply that the KMT’s 22nd
Army on Quemoy was morbidly defeatist and incompetent, ready to flee at the
sight of the PLA invaders. “Landing on the beach of Quemoy is victory itself ”
was the watchword given to many PLA units in the operation.18 So pervasive was
the assumption of the enemy’s lack of will to fight that the transports carrying
the primary assault regiment contained large amounts of cash in several heavy
chests for the use of celebrating the “liberation of Quemoy” in an extravaganza
planned for the next day. Several other larger ships were loaded with live pigs
and with office furniture to be used by the new local government to be run by
communist cadres.19
To be fair, this was not the problem of only PLA commanders in Fujian
Province at the time. Rao Shushi, the political commissar of the PLA’s 3rd Field
Army, which was in charge of the entire East China region, was hopelessly contemptuous, on the eve of the battle, of the KMT troops’ will to fight. “Rao Shushi
developed a ‘mentality of underestimating the enemy,’” later recalled Marshal
Chen Yi, who commanded the 3rd Field Army. “He believed that once our troops
landed on the beach, enemies on Quemoy would surrender without fighting. All
we needed was to send in one or two divisions to attack, the Quemoy problem
would be solved.”20
But the PLA commanders’ estimate of the enemy’s will to fight was wrong.
Admittedly, the KMT troops were indeed a ragtag bunch. The 22nd Army, then
stationed at Quemoy, was under the command of a general named Li Liangrong.
Li and his troops were not Chiang Kai-shek’s favorites, and they were generally
underequipped and undertrained. But General Li made these troops into a formidable fighting force that displayed tenacity and ruthlessness in the three-day
battle.
First of all, Li was given substantial reinforcement at the crucial time. Chiang
Kai-shek realized Li’s inadequacy in troop strength and redeployed, swiftly and
sub rosa, one of his best units, the 18th Army, totaling twenty thousand troops, to
Quemoy. Arriving before and during the battle, these troops greatly boosted the
morale of General Li’s men. The determination of this ragtag but spirited army,
however, was already extraordinarily high, in part because of an utter hatred of
the communists.
A recent popular writing in mainland China by a high-level PLA general tells
a revealing story, one that explains the abject hatred of General Li’s men for PLA
soldiers and the ruthlessness of Quemoy’s defenders. It relates to the battle of Xiamen, fought several miles away immediately prior to the battle for Quemoy. The
PLA won that battle, during which many KMT soldiers took off their uniforms
and hid as civilians in residential neighborhoods. The PLA commander in Xiamen ordered cars to broadcast via loudspeakers promises of leniency and safe
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repatriation to Taiwan if they came out and surrendered. Within hours, hundreds
of KMT officers and soldiers answered the propaganda and emerged from hiding. They were rounded up by PLA troops at the harbor. After dusk, they were
machine-gunned, execution-style.21 Fear and outrage generated by incidents like
this permeated the 22nd Army on Quemoy, and General Li adroitly used such
psychology to instill in his troops despair and ruthlessness—the very essence of
a formidable enemy.22
If PLA political intelligence was inaccurate, tactical and operational intelligence was not much better. General Ye Fei was never clear about exactly how
many defenders there were on Quemoy. He believed there were no more than
twenty thousand; further, he estimated at the time, “Li Liangrong’s 22nd Army
was nothing but maimed soldiers and defeated generals [残兵败将].” He was
completely fooled by a KMT deception plan. Chiang meant to hold on to Quemoy at any cost, and as noted, he had reinforced it with his crack force, the 18th
Army, under the able Hu Lian. But even more important, Chiang ordered the
armada carrying General Hu’s troops to land secretly on the rocky south side of
Quemoy Island, opposite the anticipated PLA landing strips on the north and
northwest sides. Unbeknownst to Ye Fei, by 24 October, when the PLA launched
the assault, half of Hu’s twenty thousand troops were already on the island. The
other half was struggling to land safely through heavy waves; they succeeded after
the battle started.
This intelligence would have been crucial. Had General Ye known of it, he
would never have ordered the attack. The PLA force would have been greatly
outnumbered, in a ratio of less than one to two, even if all his planned troops
had been able to land at once, which would not be the case. In the end, the actual
PLA/KMT troop ratio during the battle was one to five.23 Faulty intelligence led
General Ye to believe that he could reach troop parity on Quemoy if he could land
close to twenty thousand soldiers. Ye’s landing plan was to be utterly invalidated
and disastrous, but in the meantime he was so confident in this parity that he
refused to consider any alternatives even when newly acquired evidence pointed
to the strong possibility that the enemy had already been reinforced by the entire
twenty-thousand-man 18th Army.
On 14 October, ten days before the order was given to invade Quemoy, General Xiao, the PLA operational commander of the battle of Quemoy, received a
shocking piece of intelligence. Two KMT officers belonging to Hu Lian’s 18th
Army, captured in an unrelated skirmish, had revealed that the whole 11th Division of that army had landed on Quemoy five days earlier.24 General Xiao immediately reported this crucial piece of intelligence to his superior, General Ye,
who dismissed it as bunk.25 Frustrated by Ye’s intransigence, Xiao did something
daring—he managed to report his concern to Ye’s superior, General Su Yu, the
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deputy commander for operations for the 3rd Field Army. General Su had been
designated by Mao Zedong as the overall planner for a quick invasion of Taiwan,
fulfilling Mao’s vow “to carry the Revolution to the ultimate end.”
Alarmed by the Quemoy situation, Su issued an instruction, now famous in
the Chinese military, known as the “three conditions for calling off the Quemoy
campaign.” That is, the attack on Quemoy should be called off if one of the following three conditions existed: first, if the enemy augmented the island defending force by more than one regiment; second, if there were not enough transports
to carry six regiments at one time; or third, if there were not at least six thousand
pro-Communist, politically reliable boat handlers available from the old “Liberated Area” of northern Jiangsu and Shandong, nearly a thousand miles north of
Fujian.26
But General Ye did not heed Su’s instructions and bullheadedly went on with
his attack plan. Nevertheless, Ye sensed General Xiao’s lack of enthusiasm in light
of the mounting difficulties of attacking Quemoy. On 18 October, six days before
the battle began, he spent nearly three hours with General Xiao and Xiao’s commissar, General Li Mancun, trying to dispel their doubts and eventually ordering
them to launch the earliest possible attack.27
But Xiao and Li Mancun were still not persuaded. “I raised the issue to my
superior of the 10th Army,” Xiao recounted in his memoir, “that . . . we did not
know how many enemy reinforcements had arrived at Quemoy, which made the
preparation for the invasion of Quemoy inadequate and it would be difficult to
launch an early assault on Quemoy.”28 But General Ye and his headquarters staff
would have none of this. “My superiors at the 10th Army all replied to me by
saying that the 28th Corps should resolutely implement the 10th Army headquarters’ order to seize the battlefield advantage to launch an earliest possible
invasion to liberate Quemoy,” Xiao Feng would bitterly recall.29 As to what exactly
the “battlefield advantage” was, General Ye declared with relish, “The enemies
defending Quemoy have already become frightened by us, like birds scared by
the mere twang of a bowstring [惊弓之鸟].”
On 20 October, four days before the battle began, General Xiao, still spooked
by uncertainty about enemy troop strength on Quemoy, again requested General
Ye to postpone the operation.30 Ye was not amused by the new request and denied
it with alacrity. However, two days later, on 22 October, new intelligence reports
came to General Xiao that another division of Hu Lian’s 18th Army had just appeared in waters off Quemoy. General Xiao immediately reported to Ye, hoping
that a delay of action would be approved.31
Incredibly, General Ye interpreted the intelligence the wrong way. He picked
up the phone and personally told Xiao that the intention of the KMT force near
Quemoy was not clear and that the PLA attack should be hurried, before General
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Hu’s troops could land.32 We now know that General Ye was completely out of the
picture with regard to Hu’s reinforcements. Not only had one of Hu’s divisions
landed on Quemoy days earlier, but the division reported to be on the sea was
just waiting for the choppy seas to calm in order to land, which happened within
hours.
General Xiao, still unwilling to take the risk of attacking, stated that he could
not possibly proceed with the operation the next day as ordered and requested
a one-day delay, until 24 October. Ye Fei finally agreed, and the operation was
thus set for the 24th. Incredibly, though, in granting the delay, Ye told Xiao that
“according to various intelligence reports, there had been no reinforcement of
enemy’s troops in Quemoy, which was only at 12,000 troops strong.”33 In fact, at
the time, there were more than thirty thousand KMT troops on Quemoy.
The departure for the invasion was set at night, to avoid naval and air raids.
Three regiments from General Xiao’s 28th Corps boarded the nearly three hundred small fishing boats being used as transports between 6 and 7 pm, ready to
set sail to attack Quemoy. Around 8 pm, however, Xiao received a revised intelligence report from 10th Army headquarters in Xiamen that the KMT 18th Army
had just landed a regiment on the south side of Quemoy. However, 10th Army
directed that General Ye’s order to attack Quemoy that evening was not to be
changed—instead, Xiao’s troops were to race to reach Quemoy ahead of the rest
of Hu Lian’s force.
But General Xiao, shocked by the new report, immediately ordered all three
of his regiments, on board and ready to set sail, to stand fast. He placed an urgent
call to the 10th Army headquarters in Xiamen and requested that the entire attack plan be called off until more intelligence on enemy’s troop strength could be
ascertained and more transports could be commandeered. But General Ye was
nowhere to be found. Answering General Xiao’s urgent call was Liu Peishan, Ye’s
deputy commissar and political director, who rejected Xiao’s request. General
Xiao later recalled, “I clearly stated to Liu on the phone that we [should] halt
the attack plan, wait for clarification on the true situations of the enemy, obtain
more transport ships before we take action. Hearing that, Director Liu only said,
‘Proceed according to the original plan, the decision shall not be changed.’ Then
he hung up the phone.”34
Around midnight, the invading armada set sail for Quemoy. It arrived an hour
and a half later, and the epic battle began.
WAS COMMAND CHAOS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIASCO?
In the aftermath of the disastrous defeat, Xiao Feng went to his superior, Ye Fei,
and asked to be punished for the defeat. Ye replied that it was he himself who
should be punished for the infamy at Quemoy. General Ye promptly drafted a
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lengthy cable to his superior, General Su Yu at the 3rd Field Army, asking for
punishment. Su, however, rejected Ye’s request and instead cabled Mao Zedong
directly asking that he, Su, be punished, for his failure to ensure victory. Mao, the
supreme leader of the Communist forces in China, rejected General Su’s request,
saying essentially that nobody should be punished. “The loss at Quemoy is not a
matter of punishment,” Mao declared. “Instead, it’s a matter of learning a lesson
from it.”35
All this is telling, because it reflects the kind of command chaos that existed
before and during the battle of Quemoy. No one was responsible for command
integrity or organizational coordination.
The 10th Army commander, General Ye Fei, had been born in the Philippines
of Chinese parents from the Fujian area. Ye, who had joined the communists
seventeen years earlier as a young man of no social or political distinction, had
returned to his hometown as a glorious conqueror and wartime leader of over
120,000 troops.36 When Ye captured the picturesque metropolis of Xiamen, he
promptly moved his headquarters to the city, immersing himself in urban life
and acting more like a mayor than a military commander with battles still raging
in his area.37 In fact, the moment Ye moved into Xiamen he sent for his mother,
who had been living in rural Fujian, moving her into his headquarters to share
the euphoria and glory.38
For the remaining, and militarily more daunting, task of taking Quemoy, General Ye designated the weakest of his three corps, the 28th Corps. However, in late
August 1949 the 28th Corps’s longtime commander, General Zhu Shaoqing, had
suffered a stomach illness and was now in Shanghai, newly captured from the
KMT, for medical treatment. The political commissar of the 28th Corps, General
Chen Meizao, was in a hospital in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province, enjoying the ease of urban life. In addition, the 28th Corps’s longtime chief of staff, Wu
Shu, had been reassigned without replacement. General Ye then appointed Zhu
Shaoqing’s deputy commander, a staff general named Xiao Feng, to command the
28th Corps, without a deputy commander or a chief of staff.39
The first invasion group was to consist of three regiments. However, as General Ye ordered, only two would come from the 28th Corps; the third would come
from another corps, the 29th, also under Ye’s command. This was done mainly so
that the 29th Corps could share the anticipated glory of victory at Quemoy. But
mixing troops from competing units confused the organic command structure of
the 28th Corps.40 Also, there was some rivalry between the 28th Corps and 29th
Corps, and there had been ill feeling in the competition to commandeer local
fishing vessels.41
General Ye realized the potential for rivalry among the three hurriedly mixed
regiments, but his response, rather inexplicably, was that there should be no
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 102

107

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

YU

103

overall commander for the entire invasion force. The three regimental commanders were to act with equal command authority, with individual battle plans;
Xiao Feng was to stay in the rear echelon listening to their radio reports once
the battle started.42 To achieve the element of surprise, however, as we have seen,
radio silence was ordered while the armada of wooden sailing vessels was on its
way. So there was absolutely no communication among vessels during the entire
landing process, which further aggravated the command problem.
In the event, the most deadly weapons used by the KMT defenders against
the invading PLA troops and vessels were the twenty-one M5A1 Stuart tanks.
The PLA command had known about the tanks beforehand and had prepared
antitank rockets to deal with them. But the antitank rockets came in three parts,
which needed to be assembled before launch. General Xiao ordered the parts carried by separate ships. When the force attempted to land and came under fierce
and devastating tank fire, none of the antitank rockets could be assembled.43
WAS THE BATTLE OF QUEMOY A “TURNING POINT” IN HISTORY?
Mao Zedong admitted that the battle of Quemoy was the biggest loss to the PLA
during the Chinese Civil War.44 Three regiments of PLA troops were completely
wiped out by the KMT, in utter contrast to the military zeitgeist of the time, when
the Nationalist army as a whole was in an avalanche of retreat and defeat. In the
annals of the Nationalists’ military history, the triumph at Quemoy, known in
Taiwan as the battle of Guningtou Beach, marked a turning point, the final halting of the momentum of the PLA assault against Taiwan. It was the battle that
saved the Republic of China; it was Chiang Kai-shek’s battle of Midway, turning
the tide of history and sealing for the future the general pattern of the Cold War
confrontation in Asia.
The KMT claim is not entirely without merit. The battle of Quemoy did indeed end the PLA’s amphibious attempts to capture the offshore islands. But far
more importantly, Quemoy has since become a focal point and symbol of the epic
struggle between communist and noncommunist forces in Asia. Metaphorically
and realistically, the battle made the tiny island of Quemoy, just a few miles from
Communist China, Asia’s West Berlin, triggering decades of military confrontations in and around it. In 1954 and 1958 the PLA launched major artillery bombardments almost bringing on a nuclear Armageddon by involving the United
States and possibly the Soviet Union. Intermittent artillery bombardment on
Quemoy, with real shells or pamphlets, would last for many years. They would not
stop until 1 January 1979, when the United States abandoned its diplomatic recognition of Taipei and switched to Beijing as the legitimate government of “China.”
However, the PLA historian Xu Yan disputes the idea that the battle of Quemoy was really a turning point of anything:45 “The defeat at Quemoy at the hands
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of the KMT forces was only a small episode at the last stage of the PLA’s strategic
pursuit against the collapsing KMT regime[;] . . . it did not affect the strategic
outcome of the war a bit” (p. 93). It is hard to disagree with Mr. Xu Yan. However,
it should also be noted that the battle of Quemoy had an unintended strategic
consequence that few could have realized at the time. That is, the utter shambles
at Quemoy may have saved the PLA from an even bigger catastrophe known as
the battle of Taiwan, which had been actively contemplated by the PLA high command, from Mao Zedong on down.
After the fiasco, Mao ordered the 3rd Field Army to prepare for an even
larger invasion of Taiwan. The task fell on the shoulders of General Su Yu, the
deputy commander for operations of the 3rd Field Army and the realist who had
cautioned about the three conditions that should have invalidated any attack
on Quemoy. Three weeks later, General Su, now the chairman of the Liberating
Taiwan Working Committee, proceeded with specific planning for an invasion of
Taiwan. On 20 November 1949 he laid out his plan to senior PLA commanders.46
The Quemoy lessons loomed large in Su Yu’s plan. By mid-December he had
become the leading voice of reason and calm, realistically assessing the difficulties of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. He reported to Mao Zedong several
times his concerns and cautions. That might not have gained him favor from the
triumphalist chairman, then getting ready to travel to Moscow to meet Joseph
Stalin and take charge of “making revolutions” in Asia while the Soviet Union
occupied itself with Western and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, on 17 December
Su Yu officially postponed the date for invading Taiwan.47
General Ye Fei may have left the best summary of this point. “In the early
1950s, when our navy and air force were still inferior to the enemy, if we proceeded with wooden sailboats to liberate Taiwan by crossing the Taiwan Strait,
we would have had an even bigger fiasco than the battle of Quemoy. After the
defeat at Quemoy, we learned our lesson; our head became more clear and lucid.
Perhaps the real significance of learning from the lessons and experience of our
Quemoy operation lies exactly here.”48
Yet the real significance of the battle of Quemoy goes beyond even this. The
battle may be most important not in itself but in spite of itself. Its importance has
something to do with what else was going on in the much larger international
arena.
At the time, the Harry Truman administration in the United States had all but
given up supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government. Two months before the
battle of Quemoy, the White House approved a China white paper that largely
blamed Chiang Kai-shek and his government for the loss of China to the Communists. Washington expected the defeat of the KMT army to be thorough and
inevitable, including the loss of the island of Taiwan, although it had been heavily
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built up by Chiang for the impending transfer of his government. The Nationalist general Sun Liren, the garrison commander of Taiwan and a favorite of the
U.S. administration, reported to Washington by a separate channel in September
1949, a few weeks before Quemoy, that the PLA was capable of assembling an
invading armada of a thousand vessels carrying two hundred thousand troops
who would take over Taiwan within twenty-four hours.49 The newly established
Central Intelligence Agency too was thoroughly convinced that the PLA would
take over Taiwan militarily by the end of 1950.50
But the battle of Quemoy changed all that. One week after the Nationalist
victory at Quemoy and most likely in response to it, the Truman administration
initiated contact with Chiang for the first time since 1948. The American consul
general in Taipei officially informed Chiang on 3 November that the U.S. government would support his efforts toward reform and democracy in Taiwan.51 This
was an enormous morale boost for Chiang and his defeated government. He
now for the first time had Washington’s support for using Taiwan as a base from
which he might stage a comeback to the mainland. It also marked the beginning
of official American recognition of the Republic of China in Taiwan, which lasted
until the 1970s.
Further, after the battle of Quemoy the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff adjusted,
albeit with a certain subtlety, its military posture toward Chiang in Taiwan. The
Joint Chiefs now suggested to the White House that limited military assistance
be provided to the KMT troops in Taiwan, though it ruled out direct military
involvement in Taiwan.52 The momentum of readjustment by the United States
in favor of the KMT government in Taiwan created by the battle of Quemoy,
however nuanced and limited, would be given robust boosts by two other major
international events: the outbreak of the Korean War less than eight months later
and the loss of the U.S. monopoly on atomic bombs at the same time.
In this sense, the battle of Quemoy was not only a turning point for the Civil
War that still remains unresolved across the Taiwan Strait but also the beginning
of a chain of events that shaped the Cold War throughout Asia and the Pacific
region for decades to come.
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NATIONAL INTEREST AND MOR AL
RESPONSIBILIT Y IN THE POLITIC AL THOUGHT
OF ADMIR AL ALFRED THAYER MAHAN
Thomas F. X. Varacalli

T

he political thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan was a response to two
particular waves of American progressivism. Social Darwinism, the first
wave, in its most secular, conservative, and unadulterated form, claimed that the
human race is constantly progressing, that the survival of the fittest is embedded
in the historical unfolding of history, and that morality is conditioned by the
contingencies of one’s historical epoch. Social Darwinism led to an emphasis on
human selfishness, competition, and the following of one’s interest.1 The second
wave, influenced by a variety of factors including Kantian ethics, European social
policies, and the American Social Gospel, focused on the more positive aspects
of progressivism. The state, according to this worldview, existed to better the
world and to promote moral responsibility in both the domestic and international spheres.2 Herbert Croly, one of the most influential progressive thinkers,
believed that “the promise of American life” could be achieved through various
internal social, political, moral, economic, and constitutional reforms that would
both redress a perceived loss of individual liberty and further the common good.3
Mahan combined both of these strands of American progressivism to provide
his country a new and reinvigorated foreign policy. Nations, Mahan argued, had
to be self-interested. The United States needed
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like many of his contemporary social Darwinists,
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with a genuine concern for moral responsibility. The United States had a duty
not only to ensure its national interest but also to improve and better the world.
American armament, for example, not only protected the United States from
foreign encroachment but protected the sovereignty of South America from
European imperialism—an objective distinct from national interest. American
armament, therefore, promoted a moral tenet: the right of South American nations to self-determination.
Mahan was not a comprehensive thinker. By profession he was a historian
and essayist. His comments and ideas about progressivism are sporadic, peppered throughout writings concerning particular moments of history or specific
policy issues. Mahan never created any overarching theory about the interplay
of national interest and moral responsibility. The absence of any grand theory is
intentional: Mahan, like his most important intellectual source, baron de Jomini,
made universal claims only through the study of particular situations. Examining
multiple historical and contemporary events, Mahan emphasized the supremacy
of national interest in American foreign policy, but he balanced this position with
a genuine concern for moral responsibility. Although America had to follow its
own interests, Mahan argued, he never advocated any action or social policy that
he believed to be evil.
Progressive expansionist tendencies did not begin with Mahan, but he was
one of the best exponents of this outward movement in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.4 The uniqueness of Mahan’s thought stemmed from
his integration of thorough strategic and military knowledge, shrewd political
analysis, and the academic vigor of two burgeoning fields of his time, economics
and history. Mahan’s career as an intellectual began with his study of sea power,
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890), which was based on
the lectures he delivered as President of the newly founded Naval War College.
Although Influence of Sea Power is largely a technical and terse account of sea
power, its most celebrated parts—the introduction and first chapter—provide an
outline of his political philosophy. Nations, he argues there, are concerned primarily with their own survival. They follow their own interests, creating a competitive international environment based predominantly on force and strategic
calculation. They employ various forms of coercion, including outright war, to
pursue their interests. The study of history, Mahan holds, demonstrates that the
development of sea power is one of the most influential elements in the forming
of a great nation.5
Mahan’s concept of sea power was broader than the mere military possession
of a navy. Rather, for him “sea power” was an economic term, one that explained
how a nation became dominant at sea, in three steps: the production of goods,
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the building of a navy to protect and transport these goods, and the creation of
colonies, which provided the raw materials necessary to produce more goods
while simultaneously creating other markets for trade.6 Sea power, then, was fundamentally tied to expanding economic markets. For nations such as the United
States to grow in influence, they had to expand economically as well as militarily.
The political implications of Mahan’s thought—the centrality of national interest in international affairs, the reality of competition, the imperative to maintain
a strong home market and economy, the importance of strategic military and
naval force, the necessity of constant economic and military expansion, and the
benefits of colonialism—were not lost on Mahan’s contemporaries. Influence
of Sea Power upon History, as well as its acclaimed sequel, The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812 (1892), produced a significant splash on both sides of the Atlantic. Many Europeans were enamored of
Influence of Sea Power upon History because they thought it defended their own
nations’ policies on armament and imperialism. It was translated into several
languages and placed in all the naval ships and schools of Germany and Japan.7
Kaiser Wilhelm owned two copies of the book, one in English and the other in
German, and claimed that he was “trying to learn it by heart.”8 In Great Britain,
Mahan received an audience with Queen Victoria and honorary doctorates from
Oxford and Cambridge.9 The nation that most effectively employed Mahan’s
ideas, however, was Japan. Several Japanese theorists, such as Akiyama Saneyuki
and Sato Tetsutaro, read Mahan religiously. Many of Mahan’s books were translated into Japanese.10 In America the book’s reception was a bit less sensational,
except in the Republican Party. The William McKinley administration picked
Mahan, by then retired, to serve on a board formed to advise on naval strategy
during the Spanish-American War and, then in peace, as a delegate to the first
Hague conference, where he was noted as the only representative to vote against
the ban on asphyxiating gas in war.11
Owing to Mahan’s forty-year naval career, the subject matter of his histories,
his philosophical emphasis on the competition of nations, and his staunch opposition to arbitration, his name has become synonymous with the promotion of
war, force, and imperialism. This unfavorable association began with several of
his contemporaries. The noted British pacifist Norman Angell considered Mahan’s political thought “a doctrine of savagery.”12 Charles Beard, in a sensational
piece, characterized Mahan as a “bookish” manufacturer of American imperialism and one of “the four . . . most powerful agitators that ever affected any nation.”13 A generation later, Richard Hofstadter dismissed Mahan, claiming that
“[Mahan] believed that every nation like every schoolboy was bound to come to
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blows with its fellows.”14 By midcentury, many historians had labeled Mahan a
social Darwinist.15
These interpretations not only are uncharitable but purvey a certain caricature
of Mahan’s political thought. It is true that Mahan was not afraid to use force to
protect American interests. In his books, essays, and articles, he supported the
annexation of Hawaii, the creation of the canal across the Central American
isthmus, the Open Door policy in China, the Spanish-American War, the taking
of Cuba, the colonization of the Philippines, and increases in naval armament.
Above all, Mahan urged his countrymen to uphold the Monroe Doctrine. Mahan
defended these positions primarily as imperatives of national interest. On several
key issues, however, Mahan entwined his position with a moral responsibility
that he perceived Western nations to have with respect to non-Western nations.
That emphasis on moral responsibility, which many of Mahan’s critics either flatly
ignore or dismiss as ethnocentric cultural and religious imperialism, is pivotal to
an understanding of the depth and balance of Mahan’s political thought. Mahan
is neither Hofstadter’s rambunctious schoolboy nor Beard’s trigger-happy imperialist. He did not desire war for its own sake. In fact, he thought that various
elements of his political thought, such as economic reciprocity, military and naval
armament, and the European balance of powers, would help reduce the likelihood of war.16
At first glance, it may seem that national interest and moral responsibility are
incompatible, in that the former deals with the appetites while the latter focuses
on morality. Mahan attempted to wed these two concepts by claiming that the
ultimate arbiter of both national interest and moral responsibility is the nation
itself. Nations, he argued, are sovereign and independent. As there is no universal
and impartial arbiter of justice, every nation has the right to form its own subjective understanding of moral responsibility. Only the individual nation is able to
decide whether its policy is based on national interest, moral responsibility, or a
combination of both. Even when a nation realizes that it has made an error in policy judgment, it is better that it err than allow another nation or arbiter to decide
what is moral or in the interest of that nation. Ultimately, the radical subjectivity
and nationalism of Mahan’s thought make his distinction between national interest and moral responsibility less apparent and self-evident than Mahan seems to
have intended. In principle, however, there remains a substantive difference between interest and responsibility: in the latter, perceived charity and beneficence
are offered to non-Americans. Mahan, though, did not provide an example in
which national interest is absent from acts of moral responsibility. Recognition
of the interaction in his political thought between national interest and moral
responsibility is important in any evaluation of his public-policy positions.
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THE NATURE OF NATIONS: COMPETITION AND THE PURSUIT OF
NATIONAL INTEREST
There is little evidence that Mahan was exposed to the classics of Western political thought. In the over two thousand personal letters that have been collected
and published by his most recent biographer, Mahan did not comment on Niccolò Machiavelli, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, or Karl Marx.17 These thinkers were
absent also from his published work, although he did quote Montesquieu on
the importance of commercial monopolies.18 Rather, Mahan’s thought was influenced primarily by the military strategist baron de Jomini, by various works
of nineteenth-century high Anglican theology recommended by his uncle Milo
Mahan, and by a vast array of political and military historians, ranging from
Thucydides and Plutarch to Leopold von Ranke and François Guizot.19 It was his
study of history that specifically led him to develop his sea-power thesis. Mahan
recounts in his autobiography how, while reading an account of the Carthaginian
Hannibal’s failed Second Punic War campaign in Theodor Mommsen’s History of
Rome, he came to understand the historical importance of the navy: “It suddenly
struck me . . . how different things might have been could Hannibal have invaded
by the sea, as the Romans often had Africa, instead of the long land route.”20 From
this insight, Mahan argued that the study of history demonstrated that Hannibal’s
undoing—failure to deploy naval power equal to that of the enemy—was not an
isolated event but a fault that had plagued many campaigns. In the preface of
Influence of Sea Power upon History he compares the failure of Hannibal (and the
concomitant success in that war of the Roman general Scipio) with the failure in
the nineteenth century of Napoleon and the success of the Duke of Wellington.
Although these cases were over two thousand years apart, they manifested a universal principle: in both, “mastery of the sea rested with the victor.”21
Mahan’s sea-power thesis and his political philosophy were based on a historiographical approach called “subordination.” The composition of history,
Mahan asserted in his 1902 presidential address to the American Historical Association, begins with a “multiplicity of details often contradictory” that “do not
readily lend themselves to a unity of treatment.”22 Like that of an artist, the task
of the historian is to find unity within the multiplicity of human affairs. Banal
curiosities need to be discarded and the important facts of history “subordinated” to “a central idea.”23 The central ideas of history, like the tension between
freedom and slavery, are motivated primarily by conflict. In Mahan’s histories,
the tension among nations in international affairs and the appropriate means
through which to handle conflict and war in particular situations receive the
most attention.
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Many of Mahan’s ideas about war, particularly about strategy and tactics, are
influenced strongly by Jomini’s Art of War. Jomini was not a political philosopher. Though Jomini recognized the importance of politics, especially the roles
of diplomacy and statesmanship in war, many moral ambiguities arise from his
work. Jomini, like Mahan, was not an adherent of the traditional just-war theory.
He recognized that nations go to war for a variety of reasons, some of them
more defensible than others. He openly admits, in the first chapter of his work,
that many wars arise from “so many doubtful and contested rights.”24 Whereas
just-war theory holds that war can be waged only for a just reason, Jomini does
not make the pursuit of justice a necessary prerequisite of warfare. Wars that
according to just-war theory must not be waged can still be fought according to
Jomini’s work, with its moral ambiguities. In the interplay of national interest and
moral responsibility, it is clear that national interest dominates Jomini’s thoughts;
Mahan, nevertheless, owing to the limitations of Jomini’s work, often focuses on
the role of conflict in human affairs.
The prevalence of conflict in both human and international affairs guided
Mahan’s emphasis on the impulses, sentiments, and feelings of nations and their
citizens.25 Although these elements of human behavior are volatile, Mahan posited a fairly static view of human nature: “It must be remembered that, among
all changes, the nature of man remains the same.”26 He provided neither a stage
of human history in which the flaws of human nature are overcome nor the possibility that human nature itself can change. Since he believed that human nature
was constant, Mahan was able to make a universal claim about humanity: “All
men seek gain and, more or less, love money; but the way in which gain is sought
will have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes and the history of the
people inhabiting a country.”27 Humankind is, was, and always will be moved by
a universal principle: the pursuit of interest. The nation does not differ from the
individual in its pursuit of interest. Rather, the pursuit of interests is amplified in
the nation, especially in the realm of international relations.
Successful nations, Mahan posited, adhere to what he called the “national will,”
or “popular will.” The national will is different from that of the government. It is
best defined as the opinion of the majority of the citizenry.28 Nations are simply
agents of the people. “Governments,” Mahan claimed, “are trustees, not principals; and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards, their own
people.”29 The policies of a strong government will need to be congruent with the
national interest, because the most successful policies of a nation are grounded in
“the sentiment of the people.”30 Thus, statesmen who wish to push certain policies
that are currently against the wishes of the people must somehow convince the
people to convert to their positions.31 While Mahan himself was an intellectual
and not a statesman, he took his own advice. In order that America might expand
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its commercial interests and become a sea power, Mahan attempted to convert
the American people through his own writings to support his main political
project—the expansion of America’s sea power.
The opening line of Influence of Sea Power upon History boldly states, “The
history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests
between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war.”32
Embedded in this thesis is Mahan’s view that conflict is a natural part of human
nature. Human nature, moved by various feelings and impulses, is volatile and
avaricious. History, he argues, has shown that the course of human affairs is a
narrative of competition. Whether at peace or at war, nations act out of both
impulse and calculation of profit. Tension arises naturally among neighboring
nations, because they often have the same pursuits. “Clashing interests” lead to
“angry feelings” over various economic concerns, and then to attempts by nations “to exclude others, either by legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.”33 Successful nations
have to find ways to procure their interests while simultaneously protecting
themselves against their competitors. War is just one possible solution to such
predicaments, but Mahan defended adamantly a nation’s right to wage it: nations
have a “right to insure by just means whatsoever contributes to natural progress,
and correlatively to combat injurious action taken by an outside agency, if the
latter overpass its own lawful sphere.”34 The basis for international relations is
national interest. The impulses, sentiments, and feelings of a nation dictate its
relationship with other nations. Peace, nevertheless, can be found, if there exists
mutual profit in attaining it. Nations invade other nations (or indigenous groups)
only if there is something to gain from the conquest or occupation. Sometimes
interests encourage nations to invade; in other cases, interests encourage nations
to negotiate treaties.35
The pursuit of interest stems from self-preservation, which Mahan defined
quite broadly. “The first law of states, as of man,” Mahan wrote, “is self-preservation
—a term which cannot be narrowed to the bare tenure of a stationary round of
existence.”36 Self-preservation is not simply a reaction against an external threat
but something more comprehensive: it is the right to defend the nation’s interests, whether in direct response to provocation or not.37 Self-preservation is not
merely instinctual but also strategic and calculative. The use of reason, not just
instinct and the passions, is necessary to preserve the nation. A nation ought to
realize that it may not possess tomorrow what it does at the current moment.
Preparedness for defense is legitimate, because it is prudent for a nation to take
precautions against future disasters. When not at war, the most appropriate act of
self-preservation is economic expansion. A healthy nation needs to engage economically with other nations and to compete with its neighbors. Mahan’s study
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of history even suggests that competition often has positive, constructive, and
moral qualities. The prosperity of the Western world derives “from the fact that
our present world of civilization consists of strong opposing nationalities, and is
not one huge, consolidated imperium . . . [where] the individual declension [i.e.,
decline] of the Roman citizen had destroyed the material from which the more
healthful organism of earlier days could have been reconstituted.”38 The defeat of
Carthage, for example, provided Rome with no antagonism; instead of flourishing, Roman mores faltered.39 Mahan defended competition by imagining what
the world would look like if there were no competition. Behind his argument is
the belief that creativity and innovation need some sort of impetus; complacency
breeds stagnation. Likewise, from a moral perspective, the absence of perceived
evil or actual struggle fosters decadence. It is vigorous, antagonistic competition
—the need to overcome something or someone—that molds great men and
nations. Without Napoleon, there would have been no Nelson. Competition
provides the necessity that forges the tools and means by which progress is made.
The closest synonym to “progress,” in Mahan’s understanding, is “growth.”
Nevertheless, Mahanian progress is a vague concept, best defined as the “onward
movement of the world [that] has to be accepted as a fact, to be advantageously
dealt with by guidance, not by mere opposition, still less by unprofitable bewailing of things undesirably past.”40 Progress is a fact not because nature itself inherently progresses but because a particular nation is bound to take advantage of
another’s weaknesses. Progress, in other words, occurs through human activity
and effort. Unlike Herbert Spencer, in whose thinking progress happens naturally, through evolution, from homogeneity to heterogeneity, Mahan argues that
progress is achieved laboriously, from human toil and experience.41 It is possible,
for instance, for progress to slow down and even, theoretically, to falter entirely.
Progress is “dependent upon each man’s thorough, consummate knowledge of
his own business, supplemented by an adequate understanding of the occupations and need of his neighbors.”42 Progress is the result of human reason, not
the movements of the natural order. Mahan admits that the “raw materials” of
progress often come from geographical and physical conditions, but, just as a
nation must touch a sea if it is to develop a navy, the success of a nation often
depends on its geographical, cultural, and racial characteristics.43 In the modern
age, Mahan argued of his time, progress advances by looking outward and is
achieved through interaction with the outside world. The aforementioned three
determinants of sea power—production, shipping, and colonies—involve constant motion and growth. This growth intensifies when other, opposing nations
are also expanding, thereby creating competition.
Mahan’s focus on development and competition affected the way in which he
understood the nature of human rights. Mahan defined natural rights as those
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“that result from the simple fact of being born.”44 Natural rights differed, for him,
from political or legal rights in that the latter “depend upon other fitnesses than
that of merely being a man.”45 Using this distinction, Mahan defended the imperialism, colonialism, and expansion of Europe over the less developed parts of the
world on the ground that the indigenous peoples of those regions did not have
natural rights to the lands they occupied, whatever legal or political rights they
might have enjoyed. No nation, he argued, has a natural right to its land. Territory
is held by fitness. Mankind at large has a natural right to the unused goods of idle
lands; hence, Mahan asserted, the raw materials of Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East belonged to those who could develop them. The strongest, most progressive
nation is the most likely to use and to develop a region’s natural goods most efficiently; the strong, then, should rule over those resources.46
As the historian Walter LaFeber has noted, Mahan defined “colonialism” differently from the seventeenth-century mercantilists. Sometimes Mahan’s use of
the term centered on created settlements, such as in Hawaii, but most of the time
he associated it with purely strategic points of trade and military forts.47 For example, Gibraltar, an English possession, was considered by Mahan to be a colony
although it was primarily a strategic naval fort. Colonialism, then, fundamentally
involved two things for Mahan. First, it brought wealth for the nation. Second, it
provided a base for further expansion and acted as a check against hostile movements of foreign nations. Mahan used the example of India, the possession of
which had given England both wealth and a strong military position in the Indian
Ocean. Protecting India required England to have a strong navy and, to create a
highway to India, colonial and strategic possessions in the Mediterranean. It was
for this reason that England possessed both Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.48 The
constant development of the navy, ever larger in response to England’s own needs
(and to the challenges posed by its neighbors and competitors) was necessary for
the successful administration of colonial India.
Mahan constantly stressed the importance of naval armament because a
navy represented not only power to protect but power to rule. Navies, Mahan
remarked, “can be felt where national armies cannot go.”49 More sophisticated
than ever before, navies provided defense, communication, transportation, and
the protection of trade. Most important of all, navies gave their nations a chance
to secure peace. For this reason, Mahan applauded the military buildup of the
Western powers, convinced that it was diminishing the likelihood of interEuropean combat. With their gaze on colonialism and imperialism, the Western
nations were able to participate in healthy competition without destroying each
other. Armament—not the pacifism of men like Norman Angell—created true
humanitarianism.50 Mahan wrote, “The most beneficial use of a military force is
not to wage war, however successfully, but to prevent war, with all its suffering,
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expense, and complications of embarrassments.”51 Mahan’s balance of powers,
however, did not adequately deter violence in non-Western states.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, CONSCIENCE, AND THE LIMITS OF
LAW
Throughout his writings, Mahan argued consistently that there is a strong correlation between national policy and public opinion. As a nation follows a certain
interest because its citizens demand it, so will a nation carry out a certain policy if
the people think it has a responsibility to do so. Moral responsibility stems from
a conviction that a certain position is morally right. It moves the nation to transcend politics based solely on calculation and instinct, to rise to questions of right
and wrong. Mahan stated that “to regard the world as governed by self-interest
only is to live in a non-existent world,” adding that the causes of war were now
based on convictions of good and evil, though interests certainly remained.52 At
first glance, this statement seems to contradict the centrality of national interest
in international affairs as outlined in Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan
resolved this ambiguity by explaining that an issue of national interest, especially
one concerning tension with other nations, “gradually assumes the aspect of a
right and a wrong.”53 There are two important points to be made here. First, questions of right and wrong are based on the feelings of the citizenry and are decided
by a majoritarian consensus; right and wrong, therefore, are not necessarily absolutes. Second, questions of right and wrong are sometimes not independent of
national interest. Hence, part of the tension between national interest and moral
responsibility is resolved by the fact that both derive from the sentiments of the
people.
Mahan’s moral subjectivity and the importance he gives to public opinion are
products of his Protestantism. Mahan believed in the supremacy of the individual
conscience in questions of what is right and wrong. He argued further that the
individual has not only the right to hold a belief but also a moral duty to act on
that belief. Mahan begins his spiritual autobiography, The Harvest Within, by emphasizing the relationship between the roles of exteriority and spiritual interiority. In particular, he emphasizes the role of intentionality: “the moral and spiritual
value of acts depends upon the motive.”54 This point is central to Mahan’s political
writings. If individuals or nations are to make a moral decision, they must do so
freely and without coercion. Morality cannot be forced by an alien, exterior force;
rather, an act is moral only when it is deliberated and acted on freely and without
compulsion.
Although Mahan did not articulate the distinction, he used the term “moral
responsibility” in two different ways: the moral responsibility a nation has to
itself, on one hand, and on the other, the moral responsibility a nation has to the
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human race. First and foremost is the duty the nation has to itself, to maintain
its own conscience. On these moral matters, which are especially prominent in
international affairs, the nation needs to stand by its own understandings, its
own reasoning capacities, not allowing other nations to interfere with its policies
and beliefs. The nation’s exercise of reason forms the basis of Mahan’s condemnation of international arbitration and, more generally, his reservations about
international law. Second, the nation has a moral responsibility to contribute to
the progress of humankind. Western nations, like America, ought to act out of
beneficence toward weaker nations, peoples, and indigenous groups that “require” exposure to Western culture and Christianity. The single greatest example
of this perceived feeling of responsibility was the divine and covenantal charge
that many Americans, including Mahan, believed they had assumed in acquiring
the Philippines.
To actualize moral responsibility, force often is needed. Force in and of itself is
neither innately evil nor incompatible with Christianity. “Force,” Mahan argued,
“must be used for the benefit of the community, of the commonwealth of the
world.”55 Since there is no ultimate earthly arbiter or judge to determine the rightness of an action, it is the right of the nation itself to decide what it ought to do.
Like individuals, nations have consciences, and although the conscience of any
given nation can—and may—be misguided, the nation still has a right and duty
to follow it. Mahan wrote, almost as a theologian might, that “even if mistaken,
the moral wrong of acting against conviction works a deeper injury . . . than can
the merely material disasters that may follow upon obedience.”56 Consequently,
it is better to commit a wrong act with a good intention than to do a good act for
a wrong reason. This supremacy of conscience for Mahan undoubtedly derives
from his Protestantism, but whereas Christianity assigns conscience to the individual, Mahan allocates it to the nation. Conscience, according to Mahan, is a gift
from God and cannot be violated. If a nation defiles its conscience, it abandons
its supreme reasoning tool.57 This reasoning, however, has a tremendous social
and political implication: such emphasis on conscience leads to subjectivity.
The parallel and connection between Mahan’s conception of conscience and his
conception of national interest are unmistakable. They both rest on the presupposition that a competing nation has no right to enforce its morality over another
nation except by means of force. Since different national consciences inevitably
disagree on important issues, disputes among nations are natural in and integral
to international affairs—hence, the need to arm, in case of war.
Since Mahan held that national conscience needs to be in accordance with the
judgment of an individual nation, his political thought was naturally suspicious
of international law and was opposed adamantly to arbitration. International law,
according to Mahan, did not guarantee moral decisions: “Law, itself, which its
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extreme advocates desire to see installed in place of war, is, in last analysis, simply
force regulated—a most desirable end—but inadequate for the very reason that
it is only a manifestation of a power which is manifold in its exhibition.”58 If law
is only regulated force, it has no inherent moral value. Law, in general, is simply
conventional because the majority of its premises are utilitarian and arbitrary.
Though law may advance justice occasionally, it is not certain to pronounce the
correct verdict. Since international law cannot be changed easily, it is an unreliable arbiter in particular scenarios. Furthermore, Mahan claimed, “the positiveness inherent in the very idea of law, its lack of elasticity, renders it too frequently
inadequate to the settlement of certain classes of disputes, because in them an
accepted law exists, decision in accordance with which would simply perpetuate
injustice or sustain intolerable conditions.”59 Positive international law, in other
words, is an inelastic universal principle unsuited for specific events. Consequently, adherence to international law creates dysfunctional scenarios in which
a nation is hindered from doing what it thinks is moral.
Mahan was especially critical of arbitration, which many of his contemporary
American and European intellectuals desired to be required by international
law. His case against arbitration was twofold. First, Mahan argued from the
perspective of conscience. Conscience, not positive law, is the supreme medium
through which God communicates. Arbitration, then, is an act “of submitting to
an impartial third party a question, not of interests, nor of facts, but of right and
wrong, and therefore of conscience.”60 Bluntly put, arbitration is the forfeiture of
conscience: “Fidelity to conscience,” Mahan wrote, “implies not only obedience
to its dictates, but earnest heart-searching, the use of every means, to ascertain
its true command.”61 Conscience, therefore, sometimes prohibits following a law.
Mahan, drawing on then-senator William Seward’s famous denouncement in
1850 of the Fugitive Slave Act, stated that there is a higher law than the Constitution, one that must be interpreted individually. By extension, the Fugitive Slave
Act represented, for both Seward at the time and Mahan later, a grave offense to
the higher law and consequently was not to be followed.62 If a citizen has a conscientious right to defy a positive domestic law, then surely a nation has the right to
defy a positive international law. Mahan used this line of reasoning to attack arbitration. If an international arbiter or legislative body decreed an unfair verdict or
issued an unjust decree, a nation ought to have a right to disobey that law simply
on the grounds that acceptance would violate its conscience. This decision to
reject the arbiter’s judgment was unlikely to go unpunished by the international
community, leading quite easily to war—unnecessarily, in Mahan’s view.
Second, Mahan criticized arbitration from the perspective of sovereignty. Even
if a nation benefits from arbitration in the short term, it risks threats to its national sovereignty. Mahan wrote that “law, strictly so called, presupposes a lawmaker;
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and for international law the lawmaker has not yet come into existence.”63 Mahan
feared that some sort of international body would have to be developed to give
arbitration teeth, causing American citizens to be subject in certain cases to foreign rule. Justice would not be guaranteed from this foreign rule; in fact, Mahan
doubted altogether the feasibility of justice in such a case, because all nations
have their own interests. In the modern world—interconnected even in Mahan’s
time—all nations have interests that could prejudice specific decisions. Arbitration, consequently, was hopelessly idealistic and naive; it does not erase the eternal realities, constants arising from nature itself: competition, national interest
and self-interest, force, and greed. Proponents of arbitration, he argued, did not
recognize its potential for tyranny. To express the futility of arbitration, Mahan
compared it to the perceived tyranny of the medieval papacy over kingdoms—
a sharp jab from a devout high Anglican.64 As in the Middle Ages, he claimed,
arbitration would be decided by an arbitrary power motivated by its own biases
and interests and overriding the consciences of nations.
After dismissing arbitration as an unreasonable assault against national sovereignty and the denial of national conscience, Mahan proceeded to argue that
it would hinder America’s ability to make sound moral decisions. He used the
example of the Spanish-American War. Had a third party arbitrated between
Spain and the United States, he was sure, American intervention in Cuba would
have been condemned, because an arbitrator would likely have applied existing positive law.65 Positive law, however, would have been unable to address
the many wrongs and injustices committed in Cuba by Spain, which according
to Mahan was an oppressive, feudal, and cruel power. Mahan held sincerely
that there was nothing unjust about America’s decision to intervene in Cuba—
freeing Cuba from Spanish tyranny was a legitimate end. To deny America
such an opportunity to follow its conscience and to liberate Cuba was to deny
America’s conscience and sovereignty. Moreover, it was more than likely that
international reprisals against American involvement in the Spanish-American
War would have stemmed from selfishness and various European interests, not
from moral concern for the oppressed.
THE APPLICATION OF MAHAN’S IDEAS TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC
Mahan’s grappling with the problems of international affairs and geopolitics
pushed him to reject the policy of American isolationism in a world of rapidly
advancing imperialism. Mahan was an imperialist, but he was an American imperialist. He was well aware of the limits of his nation’s armed forces and of how
little interest his commercial-minded countrymen had in warfare. Mahan’s policy
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positions reflected the tension between following public opinion and promoting
causes contrary to public opinion. Consistent with his philosophy, Mahan did not
call for any imperial project comparable to those of Britain or France, not only
because such a project would be beyond America’s capabilities but also because
it would not be in accordance with public opinion.
Having taken the pulse of the Republic, Mahan supported the principle of
reciprocity advanced by Secretary of State (1881 and 1889–92) James G. Blaine.
Mahan defined reciprocity as the abandonment of “exclusive interest, which is
the citadel of protection, to embrace that of mutual benefit, the cornerstone upon
which the advocates of freedom of trade rest their argument.”66 At first glance,
the principle seems to be in sharp contrast with Mahan’s emphasis on competitive national interest. Yet reciprocity is pursued not for its own sake but out of
national interest. It opens up markets, especially non-Western markets, and allows competition among nations to flourish without risk of bloodshed. Moreover,
reciprocity permits a Western nation, such as the United States, to spread its core
values with other, less developed nations. Of America’s increased engagement
with foreign nations Mahan wrote that “what the nation has gained in expression
is a regenerating idea, an uplifting of the heart, a seed of future beneficent activity, a going out of self into the world to communicate the gift it has so bountifully
received.”67 It was this understanding of reciprocity that later formed the basis of
his support for the Open Door policy, by which America benefited from trade
with China (national interest) while also fulfilling its duty to humankind by
promoting Western civilization and propagating Christianity (moral responsibility). Reciprocity, in this light, is charity with interest. It does not imply equality
between the interacting nations or peoples, but it does provide—when the United
States is involved—material and spiritual benefit by virtue of economic access to
American goods and cultural access to Christianity.
As his adherence to the principle of reciprocity demonstrates, Mahan was
concerned with economic, cultural, and political influence but not necessarily
dominion. Mahan took different stances on how to promote American influence.
Owing to his emphasis on particularity, Mahan’s policy positions are not formulaic and rigid; his reasons for particular stances on given issues varied according
to the nuances of specific policy positions. On issues like the canal across the
Central American isthmus, influence in the Caribbean, the annexation of Hawaii,
and control over the Persian Gulf, Mahan’s concerns were based primarily on national interest. However, on two very important matters—the Monroe Doctrine
and the Spanish-American War—his policies were based on both national interest and moral responsibility. These two examples highlight how Mahan’s stances
integrated the two concepts.
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The Monroe Doctrine
Mahan stressed, from the publication of Influence of Sea Power upon History until
his death, the crucial importance of the Monroe Doctrine. He stated bluntly that
the Monroe Doctrine was a “product of interest.”68 Mahan valued particularly the
practicality of the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that it was the product of prudent
reflection on American security. Before its promulgation by President James
Monroe, the early Republic had suffered various assaults on both land and sea
by the European colonial powers. Mahan wrote, “Not reason only, but feeling,
based on experience of actual inconvenience, suffering, and loss—loss of life,
and loss of wealth, political anxiety, and commercial disturbance—conspired to
intensify opposition to any avoidable renewal of similar conditions.”69 Although
its bedrock claim—that no European power was free to recolonize lost colonies
or gain new ones—had remained consistent in the nineteenth century, Mahan
argued, the doctrine had to be expanded and developed to address America’s
contemporary interests; it had been founded in part on the basis of interest, and
the interests of nations change.70 Mahan asserted forcefully, especially in his writings on the construction of the isthmian canal, the importance of continuing to
assert the Monroe Doctrine in support of contemporary concerns. He warned
repeatedly that with the completion of the canal, Europe would be tempted to
attain new territories in the Americas that could threaten American superiority in the Caribbean as well as control over the canal. It was, therefore, in the
American interest to have a navy strong enough to deter European colonization
in the region.71
If national interest formed the (elastic) foundation of the Monroe Doctrine, it
was force that upheld its implementation. The Monroe Doctrine, in other words,
was only as strong as the American navy made it.72 In Mahan’s thought, however,
force was not applied simply in the pursuit of interest but also in the promotion
of moral responsibility. First, Mahan argued that the Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of America’s moral conscience. America, therefore, reserved the right to
intervene in Latin and South America if its conscience compelled it to intervene.
Mahan received worldwide attention on this issue while serving as an American
delegate at the first Hague conference. There, consistent with his political philosophy, Mahan made a provocative stand against article 27 of the conference’s
declaration, which stated, “The Signatory Powers consider it their duty, in case a
serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind
these powers that the permanent Court of Arbitration is open to them.”73 Mahan
perceived in this proposed language a clear violation of national conscience, in
that it called for third-party intervention in American affairs within South America, perhaps even paving the way for destruction of the Monroe Doctrine itself.
Mahan, with the support of the majority of the American delegation, requested
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 122

127

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

VA R A C A L L I

123

and received an addendum explicitly stating that article 27 was not applicable to
the Monroe Doctrine.74 Not a single nation at the conference dared to object to
the request.75
Second, the Monroe Doctrine was based on moral responsibility in that it assisted the nations of South America in maintaining their own self-determination.
America, Mahan wrote, has “a common sympathy with peoples struggling for
relief from a very real oppression.”76 In opposition to those European nations
who desired to take back parts of South America, the U.S. position was “sustained
by policy and by a conviction of rightfulness.”77 Legitimate concern for Central
and South America, Mahan insisted, did enter into America’s calculation in
upholding the Monroe Doctrine. Mahan’s view protected the self-determinism
of the various countries of South and Central America; with the notable exception of the lands annexed as a result of the Spanish-American War, it did not
call for American colonialism there. He did not claim that America had “quasi
suzerainty” over South America, as England did over its colonies.78 By treating
South American nations as sovereign nations, Mahan claimed, the United States
occupied higher moral ground than its European competitors, who would have
disregarded South and Central American self-determinism altogether.
The Spanish-American War and the Acquisition of the Philippines
Mahan’s position on the Spanish-American War highlighted how a nation can
be motivated simultaneously by both national interest and moral responsibility.
Mahan claimed that Cuba’s “deliverance from oppression [had been] the object
of the war.”79 America had had a moral goal in the war. While it may have had
certain interests in the possession of Cuba—an island only ninety miles away
from American coastline—its actions had been based also on nobler sentiments.
In short, the United States had seen a nation suffering under an unjust authority
and, finding this tyranny repulsive, had followed its conscience and uplifted its
neighbor from the “generally iniquitous character” of Spain.80
The war having culminated in the liberation of Cuba and the Philippines, Mahan believed that America was embarking on a new chapter in its history, one of
colonialism. Mahan reflected on the moral responsibility America had to its new
dependencies. Colonialism, Mahan wrote, is “novel to us; we may make blunders;
but, guided by [the example of British] experience, we should reach the goal more
quickly.”81 Mahan did not shy away from the fact that the United States had been
formed as a result, in effect, of British colonialism. Moreover, he did not believe
that America’s experience with British colonialism provided a sufficient reason to
oppose colonialism. Rather, it had the potential to be a great colonial power itself
precisely because it had been ruled by a colonial power, making it more sensitive
to possible abuses. Mahan warned that if America “sees in its new responsibilities,

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 123

128

3/8/16 10:29 AM

124

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue

first of all, markets and profits, with incidental resultant benefit to the natives, it
will go wrong. Through such mistakes Great Britain . . . lost the United States.”82
Genuine care and consideration needed to be shown to the people of its new
dependencies. Mahan stressed that it would be bad policy to create unnecessary
tension with its colonies, especially the Philippines.
This newfound moral responsibility with respect to the Philippines certainly
was not without consideration of interest, for it was in the nation’s interest to have
a stable and productive colony. Mahan went so far as to declare that the two concepts do not need to be separate: the “interest of the nation is one with its beneficence.”83 From the standpoint of interest, there are two clear reasons why he supported the acquisition of the Philippines. The first was that it was compatible with
the foundational propositions of his naval philosophy. Colonialism was a natural
corollary of production and naval power. Possession of the Philippines, Mahan
hoped, would stimulate the American navy to develop and expand. The second
reason was geopolitical. Mahan believed that “enlightened self-interest demands
us to recognize not merely, and in general, the imminence of the great question
of the farther East, which is rising so rapidly before us, but also specifically, the
importance to us of a strong and beneficent occupation of adjacent territory.”84
Mahan both feared and respected the Far East, especially Japan. Hence, America’s
occupation of the Philippines would have a twofold effect. It would force the East
to recognize America as a formidable power; an Eastern power expanding its
territory would have to do so in light of America’s presence in the Philippines.
Moreover, the Philippines gave America better access to the Far Eastern markets.
REFLECTIONS ON MAHAN’S POLITICAL THOUGHT
With the advent of the United Nations and increased internationalism, Mahan’s
political thought seems to have been rejected by contemporary U.S. policy making. Yet in fact Mahan’s influence may be today more pertinent than it may appear at a glance. By 1893, when Frederick Jackson Turner declared the end of the
American frontier, Mahan had already (in 1890) identified the new American
frontier: the sea.85 The history of the twentieth century, with its world wars, and
of the early twenty-first, with its globalization, shows that Mahan was correct.
The sea is a perpetual frontier—there are always new markets and new modes
of expansion. For the most part, Mahan favored peace and negotiation (though
as the Philippines experience showed he was open to coercion and force). This
point, however, needs to be tempered with the realization that had Mahan been
a British or German subject he most certainly would have given quite different
advice to his countrymen. Ultimately, the decision between acting from national
interest and acting from moral responsibility rested on the nuances of the particular moment.
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Mahan’s political thought was based on a combination of national interest
and moral responsibility. Although the former is concerned with calculation and
appetites, whereas the latter derives from principles of morality, Mahan was able
to reconcile the two concepts by arguing that both derive ultimately from the national will. Their actualization rests equally on the ability of the nation to make its
own decisions. Mahan held consistently that since there can be no earthly arbiter,
decisions about whether an action is just, moral, necessary, or useful must be left
solely to the individual nations making them.
However, a significant international problem emerges: if individual nations
are viewed as the only just arbiters, decisions from national interest might be
called—quite inappropriately—judgments of conscience. That is, there arises
the danger of national interest subsuming conscience. Under the banner of
conscience or moral responsibility, nations might declare war or commit acts of
aggression when, in truth, it is only their interests that are being served. Mahan
does not resolve this tension; his thought is based on the conviction that moral
truths of right and wrong can be determined only on the basis of the feelings of
individual nations. Mahan falls short of moral relativism, though, because he acknowledges openly that nations may err. But nations have the right to err; other
competing nations hoping to interfere cannot speak infallibly or unbiasedly, are
motivated by their own selfish interests, and would object if other nations interfered in their own business. By stressing the importance of determination by the
individual nation whether its own actions are moral, Mahan was attempting to
avoid the international tyranny of nations disguising their own interests as matters of conscience and responsibility. Mahan’s concern for the potential dangers of
arbitration is genuine and shows, contra the judgments of Hofstadter and Beard,
that Mahan was neither a trigger-happy imperialist nor a rambunctious schoolboy but a sober-minded observer of world affairs.
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STRATEGY AS A BATTLEGROUND
The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, by Hew Strachan. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013. 322 pages. $66.70 (paperback $26.99; Kindle $17.20).

About halfway through his account of
the direction of war, the distinguished
Oxford military historian Hew Strachan
makes a seemingly minor point about
Bernard Brodie, one of the pioneers of
limited-war theory during the Cold War.
“Brodie had studied Socratic philosophy
and had been trained as a historian.
These were in some sense the traditional
disciplines of strategic thought,” but in
the early nuclear age they “were now
in retreat” (p. 187). Some might doubt
that a Socratic approach combined with
historical inquiry is a foundation of
strategic thought, or at least of Brodie’s,
but in truth Strachan thereby described
his own approach to strategic theory
and practice as well as anyone possibly could. Strachan, however, is not in
retreat. He has taken the initiative and
is very much on the offensive—against
just about everyone’s sacred cow.
Following Clausewitz directly and perhaps Socrates’s greatest student, Plato,
indirectly, Strachan has a dialectical approach to thinking about strategy, which
is fundamentally a conversation, the sort
any war college could only welcome.
It occurs at many levels, and often the
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interlocutors speak at cross-purposes.
Most fundamentally it is a conversation
between theory and practice, one insisting on clarity and therefore abstraction,
the other on concrete experience.
As the conversation develops, Strachan
brings in new interlocutors. Virtually all
the great and many minor strategic theorists and practitioners of the modern era
have something to say in this dialogue:
Clausewitz, of course, but also Jomini,
Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Billy Mitchell,
Brodi, Herman Kahn, Mao Zedong;
Generals Powell, Clark, Petraeus, and
McChrystal; Admirals Morgan and Mullen; and many, many others. While they
converse with each other, all also are
engaged in a conversation with practice,
i.e., what works and what does not.
That conversation is rooted in a
deeper one about the relation of the
past (continuity and change) to the
present and the foreseeable future
(contingency), meaning Strachan harnesses his vast understanding of the
past to help us think about the future
direction of strategy and war. His
dialogue is always about at least these
three big questions: What is strategy?
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Who should direct it? And where and
how should it be made (p. 215)?
Those looking for a clear answer to the
first question are likely to be disappointed. Strachan observes that Clausewitz’s
“On War contains many references to
the need for principles and system, but
never delivers them in a way designed to
be learnt by the parrots of military crammers and spoon-fed examinees” (p. 203).
Neither does Strachan. Like Socrates, he
is an interrogator. He asks what other
people, such as the British prime minister and the American president and
their military and other subordinates,
mean by policy, grand strategy, military
strategy, and operations. Like Socrates
again, he is pretty sure either they do
not know or their views are one-sided,
if not misguided, and at best limited
in utility to a particular moment in
time. He frustrates his readers as much
as Socrates does in Plato’s dialogues
because he never quite defines strategy
himself. It exists somewhere between
war’s political purpose and operations
that purport to achieve it (p. 220).
As a middle ground between political
purpose and military action, strategy
also becomes a battleground between
those who make policy and those who
design and execute operations to achieve
it. Strachan’s focus is often on the disappearance of strategy in this conflict.
Sometimes it is subsumed by policy,
which is what he insists happened during the Cold War, when the purpose of
strategy was to ensure that major-power,
i.e., nuclear, war did not occur, so the
use of violence to achieve political
objectives among major powers against
each other became unthinkable. This
also happened after the Cold War, when
strategy as a means to achieve political
purposes was nearly extinct (with many,
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in Europe especially, welcoming its
demise), and operations came to occupy
the middle ground. This was especially
true in the United States, though in such
a narrow way that Strachan ascribes
fleeting successes in Afghanistan and
Iraq after 9/11 and 2003 to the triumph,
i.e., failure, of merely operational thinking. So, in many ways his book becomes
a discussion of civil-military relations,
with a powerful critique of the pioneer
of the field, Samuel Huntington.
Like Socrates, Strachan is willing to
question taboos. He argues that, in
both England and the United States, the
danger of a military leader on a white
horse coming to power at the expense of
freedom was vastly exaggerated. Liberal
principles had taken such deep root in
the people that a military coup d’état
was simply inconceivable. What private
in the U.S. or British military would
obey an order from a general to arrest
the president or prime minister? So
Huntington’s principle of strict separation between the roles of statesmen and
generals was not merely unnecessary
but in many ways counterproductive.
“The principal purpose of effective civilmilitary relations is national security: its
output is strategy. Democracies tend to
forget that” (p. 76). Following Clausewitz, whom he uses to criticize rather
than support Huntington, Strachan insists that war is interactive, the realm of
chance, friction, contingency, and unexpected actions from the adversary. And
war has its own grammar, often leading
to escalation. War, in other words, has its
own nature, which politics defies at its
own risk. A good Clausewitzian might,
indeed must, try to impose the political
logic of war on all this, but once the dogs
of war are unleashed, they tend to make
havoc—that is, they follow their own
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direction. As often as not, then, policy
and strategy are directed by war; they do
not direct it. Responding to that reality
requires a dialogue between soldiers and
politicians—not the subordination of
one element to the other, but rather their
“harmonization” (p. 78). For any kind
of rationality to be imposed, politics
must therefore listen to strategy, which
must listen to war, both in its enduring
nature and in its changing character.
All this suggests a far more prominent
role in the conversation for generals
and admirals than current norms, often
violated in practice, tend to permit.
As a student of the American founders
and the American political tradition,
this reviewer is not sure Strachan is right
to challenge the Anglo-American taboos
as much as he does. As a professor of
strategy, however, I am certain Strachan
has captured something vital for understanding the direction of any war.
It arises from Clausewitz’s discussion
of war as more than a true chameleon
changing its colors from war to war. War
does have a nature. It is embodied especially in Clausewitz’s trinity: the relation
among reason, passion, and creativity
that exists in any war. But that relation
changes from war to war. Sometimes one
element is more important than another,
which gives an entirely different direction to a conflict than the one preceding
or succeeding it. Sometimes the elements quarrel among themselves. Each
attempts to give direction to war, and
the changing historical direction of war
is very much the result of the conversation among the parts and the interaction
of their whole with others. No wonder,
then, that Strachan does not give us the
clear and final answers we crave. War
will not allow them; neither will he. We
therefore will have to figure the answers
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out for ourselves. A fine way to start is
by reading this subtle and erudite book.
KARL WALLING

Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China,
Russia, and the United States’ Pursuit of Relevancy
and Power, by Gregory O. Hall. New York: Routledge, 2015. 188 pages. $145 (paperback $42.95).

Gregory O. Hall, a professor of political science at Morehouse College, has
taken an acknowledged fact of contemporary international relations—the
dominance of the United States, Russia,
and China within the international
system—and developed a compelling
academic model supporting this.
Hall argues that the Tripolar Conflict,
Cooperation, and Competition (TC3)
Framework model reflects the reality of the international system since
at least the early 2000s. From Central
Asia to the Middle East and Northeast
Asia, Hall demonstrates that the United
States, China, and Russia are locked in
a complex web of interrelationships that
increasingly determines the outcome
of pressing regional, and even global,
issues. As the traditional economic and
military advantages of the United States
decline relative to those of some rising
powers, the international system will be
even more defined by the interactions
of these three dominant global powers.
Hall cogently traces the gradual transition of the global system following the
“unipolar” moment that emerged after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990s. While the United States
remains first among equals in numerous
metrics of national power, the comparative diminution of its own influence
and the rise of other power centers
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have led to an international environment in which regional problems must
be resolved in conjunction with the
other critical global actors—namely,
Russia and China. Hall contrasts previous examples of American unilateral
action—from military intervention in
the Balkans in the late 1990s to the 2003
invasion of Iraq—with more recent
examples of U.S. foreign policy being constrained by Russian or Chinese
concerns. Whether it is Russian support for the al-Assad regime in Syria,
China’s sustainment of the Kim dynasty
in North Korea, or both Moscow and
Beijing’s attempts to constrain possible U.S. military action against Iran’s
nuclear program, Hall marshals the full
panoply of regional issues to demonstrate the relevance of his framework.
For the national security community,
Hall’s work represents an important
translation of international relations
theory to the realm of practical policy
making. His “strategic triangle” between
the United States, Russia, and China is
an accepted fact of international politics
with which leaders around the world
have grappled for at least the last decade.
On almost any security issue of note,
whether traditional or nontraditional,
the acquiescence of at least two of the
three major powers is essential for any
action. Whether it is Russia and China
constraining U.S. options in Middle
East hot spots such as Syria or Iran, or
the United States and China increasing
their influence in traditionally Russiandominated Central Asia, the triangular
relationship plays out on nearly every
conceivable regional security question.
While the popular literature continues
to debate a “post-American world”
and other slogans, a “strategic triangle”
has long been the reality for Russian,
Chinese, and U.S. decision makers.
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While Hall is particularly adept at
translating the academic literature into
a compelling narrative that fits the
global political reality, he is less sure
footed in properly contextualizing the
limits of American power. Although it is
clear that global power is more diffuse
than in the years directly following the
Soviet Union’s collapse, and American
power is certainly more constrained on
a variety of regional issues, Washington
still maintains an unparalleled ability to
act militarily when and where it chooses
even in the face of strong objections
from Moscow and Beijing. The 2011
intervention in Libya demonstrates that,
while Russian and Chinese concerns
were certainly considered in ways
unheard of during the 1990s and early
2000s, Washington still ultimately exercises a tremendous degree of discretion
in the use of force and remains able to
apply its overwhelming military advantage in a variety of contingencies despite
deep misgivings in Moscow and Beijing.
As Professor Hall rightly notes, the
continued economic and military
advances of less developed nations such
as Turkey, Brazil, Iran, and South Africa
will inject new forces and issues into the
international agenda. Nontraditional
security issues such as water scarcity
and environmental degradation, while
certainly not replacing the traditional
primacy of inter-state competition
and conflict, will likely act as a supplement to those dynamics. As the global
system seeks to adjust to these actors
and issues, the predominance of the
United States, China, and Russia in the
international system and the reality of
cooperation and competition between
these powers will continue to define the
twenty-first-century international order.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY
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The Battle of Lake Champlain: A “Brilliant and
Extraordinary Victory,” by John H. Schroeder.
Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2015. 184
pages. $26.95.
War in the Chesapeake: The British Campaigns to
Control the Bay, 1813–14, by Charles Neimeyer.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2015. 256
pages. $44.95.

In 1814, the United States faced a crisis
of a magnitude not experienced since
the Revolution and not to be exceeded
until the Civil War. Congress declared
war against the British Empire in 1812
to stop the impressment of sailors on
American ships, to maintain the rights
of neutral trade, and to stop perceived
British support for Native Americans then violently opposing western
settlement. Congress and the Madison
administration expected a quick victory
by ending British control over Canada.
After all, Britain was locked in existential struggle with Napoleonic France
and could send little assistance to its
forces in North America. However, the
British in Canada managed to turn back
multiple American invasions. Even the
stunning naval victory on Lake Erie in
1813 resulted only in local superiority.
The key cities of Montreal and Quebec
remained firmly in British hands.
With the abdication of Napoleon in
1814, Britain deployed large land and
naval forces to North America. Britain’s
goals were to retaliate for American
depredations in Canada, permanently
eliminate American military power on
the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain,
establish a neutral Indian territory
north of the Ohio River, and seize New
Orleans. The American treasury was
almost empty, the Atlantic coast was
under close blockade, American naval
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power on the Atlantic was all but neutralized, and politically the nation was
bitterly divided over continuing the war.
Two new books reexamine this period of national crisis. First, John H.
Schroeder retells the dramatic story of
turning back a powerful British invasion intended to clear Lake Champlain
of an American military presence. Lake
Champlain makes up a large segment of
the traditional invasion corridor linking
Montreal to New York City. In September 1814, ten thousand British soldiers,
many of them veterans of Wellington’s
victories in Spain, marched into New
York State heading toward the American
base at Plattsburgh. A strong Royal Navy
squadron accompanied this formidable
army. Defending Plattsburgh were a
few thousand regulars and militiamen
under Brigadier General Alexander
Macomb. Master Commandant Thomas
Macdonough commanded the naval
squadron on the lake. Macomb and
Macdonough were determined to defend
Plattsburgh, and they prepared an
integrated defense. Macomb stationed
most of his soldiers in three earthen
fortifications across the narrow peninsula formed by the Saranac River and
Plattsburgh Bay. Macdonough deployed
his four major war vessels anchored in
line across the bay. This arrangement
exploited American advantages—yet
there would be no escape for either force
if the British attacks were successful.
Sir George Prevost, governor general
of British North America, directed a
less-well-coordinated offensive. He
urged Captain George Downie to attack
Macdonough’s squadron. However,
Prevost delayed the accompanying
land assault to await the results of the
fight on the water. Downie intended
to lead a column of warships to pierce

138

3/8/16 10:29 AM

134

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue

the American line, but the wind and
currents in the bay refused to cooperate.
Instead, the four British warships came
into close range of their opposites and
anchored to begin a cannonade. Barely
fifteen minutes into the fight, an American ball slammed into a British gun,
dismounting it—and crushing Downie.
The next ranking officer on the flagship could not locate the signal book to
inform Captain Daniel Pring that Pring
was now in command. As a result, each
British skipper fought his own battle.
Schroeder recounts the well-known
story of Macdonough’s use of anchors
and cables to rotate his big vessels
to bring the maximum number of
guns into action. Eventually, superior
American gunnery prevailed, and one
British vessel after another struck its
colors. When Prevost learned that the
Americans had shattered his naval force,
he called off the land attack and led his
frustrated troops back to Montreal.
While Schroeder adds little that is new
to the oft-told battle narrative of this
improbable victory, his notable contribution is the detailed analysis of how
British defeat on this inland body of
water affected the peace negotiations.
The British ministry offered command in North America to the Duke
of Wellington. The Iron Duke carefully spelled out the requirements for
military success. In his analysis, Britain
could not win a decisive victory until it
controlled the water. Only this would
yield the operational and tactical mobility to take advantage of the troop surge.
Failing to control key lakes and rivers,
Wellington opined, the government
would be best served by ending the
war as rapidly as possible. The ministry received the news of the failures
at Plattsburgh and Baltimore in rapid
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succession and sent new instructions
to its negotiators in Ghent. Britain
dropped its objectionable demands, and
a treaty was signed on Christmas Eve.
The defense of Baltimore is the final
chapter in Charles Neimeyer’s excellent
narrative of the campaign in Chesapeake
Bay. As early as the spring of 1813, a
formidable Royal Navy force under Sir
George Cockburn entered the bay with
the purpose of shutting down American
commerce and persuading Madison
to withdraw regulars from the fight in
Canada to defend the cities, villages, and
plantations along the hundreds of miles
of coast and along rivers that empty into
the bay. The Royal Navy raided with impunity. Captains ordered crews to torch
villages, seize food and tobacco, and
evacuate thousands of escaped slaves,
sending them to freedom in British colonies. Yet Madison refused to redeploy his
regulars from the northern campaigns,
even after the burning of Washington.
Neimeyer relates this tale lucidly,
weaving events and policy change with
insightful analysis. The Americans
responded to British raids with Commodore Joshua Barney’s famed flotilla
of gunboats. While Barney was ultimately forced to destroy his squadron
to avoid capture, he and his flotillamen
and accompanying Marines were the
only bright spot in what was otherwise
a debacle at Bladensburg, Maryland.
Neither author tells a new story, yet
both Schroeder and Neimeyer provide
a fresh look fortified with penetrating
analysis. Their works are well-balanced,
speaking perceptively to national policy,
strategy, diplomacy, and joint operations
from both sides. These are scholarly
works written for a popular readership and are at the top of their genre.
RICHARD V. BARBUTO
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The Ashgate Research Companion to Military
Ethics, ed. James Turner Johnson and Eric D. Patterson. Farnham, Surrey, U.K., and Burlington,
Vt.: Ashgate, 2015. 464 pages. $149.95.

The editors and twenty-nine other contributors have produced an impressive
collection of essays on military ethics,
not “ethics and the military.” Thus, one
will find nothing about false reporting, fraternization, abusive command
climates, limitations on gifts, gays in the
military, women in combat, contractor oversight, civil-military relations,
hazing, rape, drug or alcohol abuse,
suicide by service members, marital
violence, postretirement employment
restrictions, interservice rivalries, or
headquarters politics (careerism).
The first of four parts addresses why a
nation morally may use force. Pacifism
of any variety is not considered; the
Christian-based ideas of just war serve
as the fundamental approach. Chapter
1 explains jus ad bellum (the state’s right
to go to war) as seen by the approach’s
classic founders from antiquity through
Aquinas (Gregory M. Reichberg).
Chapter 2 looks at very recent bases for
the use of force (jus ad vim), including
the “responsibility to protect” weakening the Westphalian idea of sovereign
inviolability (Daniel R. Brunstetter).
Chapters 3 and 4 examine current
international law (Davis Brown) and the
military’s role in decisions to use force
(Martin L. Cook). The part’s final four
chapters focus on “special problems” in
resorting to force: preemption (Mary
Manjikian), asymmetric warfare and
terrorism (Keith Pavlischek), intervention in “failed states” and genocides
(Luke Glanville), and weapons of
mass destruction (Darrell Cole).
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Half the book’s pages are devoted to part
2’s “Right Conduct in the Use of Military
Force” (jus in bello). Chapters 9–12
discuss the ground of limitations on
violence: from the just war tradition (J.
Daryl Charles), from a Kantian perspective (Brian Orend), from several
contemporary doctrines of human rights
(Robert E. Williams, Jr.), and from
international humanitarian law (Howard M. Hensel). Chapters 13 (Amos N.
Guiora) and 14 (Pauletta Otis) address
terrorism; chapters 15–18 explore the
problems arising from targeting dual-use
facilities (Paul Robinson), employing
autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) (James L. Cook), pursuing
“targeted killing” of specific individuals
(Laurie R. Blank), and conducting cyber
warfare (George R. Lucas, Jr.). Chapters
19–21 explain recent academic debates
about the moral equality of combatants
(Henrik Syse), how to classify and treat
prisoners and detainees (John Sawicki),
and what—if anything—remains forbidden even to those with just cause whose
enemies are fighting without restraint
(David Whetham). Chapter 22 studies
military ethics in peacekeeping operations (Bard Maeland); chapter 23 reviews the immense problems associated
with justifying and enforcing noncombatant immunity (James Turner Johnson);
and chapter 24 discusses the enigmatic
topic of “proportionality” in contemporary armed conflict (Paul Gilbert).
Part 3 offers reflections on the recently
developed topic of postconflict justice,
jus post bellum. Chapters 25–28 consider who must take control at war’s
end (Eric D. Patterson), how to fight
with a future peace in mind (Timothy
J. Demy), war crimes trials (Carla L.
Reyes), and eventual reconciliation as
an ethical military goal (Nigel Biggar).
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Part 4 is a valuable addendum giving
academic, primarily historical, reviews
of military ethics in the Islamic (John
Kelsay), Chinese (Ping-cheung Lo),
and Indian (Torkel Brekke) traditions.
The editors provide summary introductions to all four parts, and they asked
the authors to begin each chapter with
an abstract and to close with a conclusion section preceding a list of references. All three features are helpful.
Aptly titled a “research companion,” this
is a cutting-edge effort by many leading
students of military ethics. I learned major things from every author; and while I
especially admire certain chapters, other
experts are likely to applaud different
contributions most, depending on their
own backgrounds. However, all the
chapters are aimed at advanced scholars
or the highest level of decision makers.
Finally, two critical remarks underscore
scholarly responsibilities. The word
guerrilla is spelled with a single r more
than a score of times—even quoted
materials repeatedly are mangled—in
an otherwise laudable chapter by the
volume’s expert on unconventional
warfare. Second, an author asserts that
the Gulf of Tonkin incident was merely a
matter of erroneous U.S. Navy reporting. While the Navy now judges that the
night “battle” of 4 August 1964 never
took place, no one doubts that the 2
August day engagement of USS Maddox
(DD 731) and three North Vietnamese
P‑4 torpedo boats happened. (There
were eyewitnesses and photographs;
a Vietnamese 12.7 mm machine-gun
round lodged in Maddox’s superstructure; and in 1984 General Vo Nguyen
Giap told former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara the attack was deliberate.) The lesson for all of us is that, in
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professional ethics, theories are interesting but facts matter, usually decisively.
THOMAS GRASSEY

Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat
Operations and Major Wars, by Aaron Rapport.
Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Univ. Press,
2015. 266 pages. $79.95.

Innovative, provocative, and compelling,
Aaron Rapport’s Waging War, Planning
Peace offers a distinct perspective on
U.S. failures in postwar stability and
reconstruction operations since 1941.
The disconnect between waging war
and planning peace is the subject of this
intriguing study that applies theories of
national security policy to four historical case studies. A lecturer at the
Department of Politics and International
Studies at the University of Cambridge,
Rapport examines how the ambitious
state-building aims of U.S. presidents
and senior advisers were consistently
undermined by meager planning.
Rapport invokes “construal level theory”
to explain postconflict reconstruction
failures following World War II and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, arguing that
the Roosevelt and Bush administrations
projected confidence and visionary objectives for peace after the war without
providing the necessary organizational
support. In turn, failures following the
Korean and Vietnam Wars are attributed
to administrations that did not articulate
end-state agendas and instead concentrated on immediate operational and
military gains. The flaw common to the
actors in all four historical studies is that
kinetic aspects of the war were prioritized at the expense of postwar planning.
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The construal level theory consists of
several key components. The more distant our goals, the greater we construe
the long time horizon abstractly. The
more immediate our goals, the greater
we construe the short-term horizon in
detail. Consequently, the desirability
of distant goals can overshadow their
feasibility. National leaders who formulate lofty goals for the distant future
support transformative objectives, while
those who focus on the particulars of
combat operations tend to be preoccupied with a maintenance outlook
that is far more cautious about future
estimations. Proponents of desirability
and transformative strategies for peace
display deductive reasoning based on
preexisting concepts, whereas advocates
of feasibility and maintenance approaches demonstrate inductive thinking
sensitive to context-specific information. Undergirding these processes in
strategic assessments, the construal
level theory presupposes the dynamic
of communication fluency. In other
words, civilian and military leaders’
predispositions toward either desirability or feasibility will determine the
flow of information and whether the
incoming data are accepted or rejected.
Rapport suggests that the semantics of
“postwar” be reformulated. The semantics of “post” makes reconstruction endeavors more of an afterthought, and the
“post” verbiage buys into a sequential
scheme of arranging operations instead
of a fluid model of cooperative interaction. From this descriptive analysis, he
offers a prescriptive remedy to the problem: instead of sequencing or paralleling
phases of the total operation, he suggests
overlapping the coordination of waging
war and planning peace so as to harmonize stabilization considerations with
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kinetic aims. To that end, greater joint
agency collaboration between military
and civilian leaders—both desirability
visionaries and feasibility organizers—
must take place for abstract ends
and concrete means to synergize in
the range of military operations. By
bringing the why of desirability and
the how of feasibility together through
interagency cooperation, U.S. presidents and their senior advisers will be
better equipped to win the peace, and
not simply the war, through a continuum of joint operational planning.
Overall, Rapport’s use of construal
level theory for understanding the gap
between jus in bello and jus post bellum
is persuasive. Readers must decide
whether this particular theory assumes
too great a role in explaining the lack
of correlation between war fighting
and state building and, in the process,
minimizes the cultural, political, and
economic factors that frame the context
and motivate the power brokers of a
given historical period. For scholars and
students, policy makers, and warfighters, Rapport’s interdisciplinary work
in history, international policy, and
psychology is a fascinating study worth
the time and money to read and heed.
EDWARD ERWIN

Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E. Stanley.
Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac Books, 2015. 238 pages.
$25 (paperback).

Bruce Stanley, a retired Army officer and
professor at the United States Army’s
School of Advanced Military Studies, has
written a detailed and well-documented
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volume on the recent use of private
military contractors by the United States
Department of Defense and their utility.
He has done this by taking a scholarly,
microeconomic approach to assessing
how and under what conditions the
military has most recently employed
private military contractors within the
context of overall U.S. foreign policy.
While Stanley begins with a clear, easily
understandable introductory discussion of what private military contractors
are, how they differ from mercenaries,
and why they are valuable to the U.S.
military today, he later delves into the
microeconomic model’s concept of supply and demand as it relates to private
military contractors within theaters of
operation. He provides all the economic,
mathematical, and statistical modeling
and analysis that a postgraduate student
might desire. However, readers who
have a “diminishing marginal utility”
for the nuances of academic economics
may safely bypass the in-depth mathematical discussions and proceed to his
qualitative discussion of this subject.
Stanley’s book looks at four recent U.S.
military engagements, each of which
saw the use of private military contractors: DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM (1990–91), Bosnia (1995), U.S.
operations in Afghanistan (2001 to very
nearly the present), and U.S. operations
throughout the Iraq war (2003–12).
He examines the similarities between
these engagements, the existing demand for the contractors’ services, and
how the various contracted providers were able to supply those services
for the Department of Defense.
Stanley maintains a balance in his examination of the use of contractors in the
performance of our military’s mission.
He does not delve into the oft-heard
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complaints from many in uniform that
contractors are solely in the business
to make money. Frankly, all business
entrepreneurs are in business to make
a profit; it is a crucial part of the very
fabric of America. Profit is the entrepreneur’s reward for assuming risk within
the marketplace. Indeed, the protection
of capitalism is among the fundamental
reasons our armed forces exist. This suggests a tolerant view of those engaged in
business in general; and private military
contractors in particular share substantial risk to life and limb to support our
armed forces. Since the end of the Cold
War, the Department of Defense has
successively and significantly reduced
the numbers of active-duty personnel.
While the numbers of soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and Marines have fallen, the
mission requirements of our armed
services have not diminished. As a
result, in an effort to use our uniformed
service members in the business of
actual combat tasks, the Department
of Defense and its subordinate military
departments and combatant commands
have resorted to using contractors to
provide the many logistical and other
supporting service tasks necessary to
support their combat operations.
Stanley’s study includes the sobering
numbers of civilian military contractors
wounded and killed in these various theaters. Over certain periods, the casualty
numbers experienced by some private
military contractors closely mirrored
those experienced by soldiers. His book
provides a deeper understanding of the
very real risks these companies and their
employees have faced in the support
of our deployed service members.
The United States has successfully
conducted recent and current military
operations to support our foreign policy.
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Readers should note that doing so
requires us to maintain both a sufficient
number of uniformed armed forces
personnel and a treasury sufficient to
fund both military operations involving
soldiers conducting extended combat
operations anywhere in the world and
the significant expense of hiring private
military contractors to perform the support services necessary to enable them.
This economic model, while currently
feasible and tenable for the United States
as a wealthy nation, may not work for
another nation with more-constrained
resources. In the future, while the
“demand” may be there and the “supply” of contractors may still exist, if
a nation does not have the financial
resources to pay for those contracted
services, this model might not work.
Outsourcing Security is a valuable
read for military and civilian defense professionals. Stanley applies
a thoughtful analysis to what many
may have thought they understood,
and his work brings both depth
and academic merit to the topic.
NEAL H. BRALLEY

Success and Failure in Limited War: Information
& Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf
& Iraq Wars, by Spencer D. Bakich. Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 2014. 344 pages. $35
(paperback).

This groundbreaking treatise by Dr.
Spencer Bakich, visiting lecturer in
political science at the University
of Richmond, endeavors to explain
America’s mixed success with limited
war since 1950 by way of a new theoretical approach to analyzing policystrategy formulation and execution at
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the highest levels of government. For the
purposes of his theory, Bakich characterizes limited wars as those fought
at a high level of intensity for limited
aims but whose outcomes “are of a
considerable consequence for the states
involved and for the broader international system.” Furthermore, restraint
is necessary to avoid escalation—a
tendency of limited wars. Not surprisingly, Bakich focuses his analysis on
four preeminent case studies from the
“American century”: the Korean War;
the Vietnam War; the Persian Gulf War
(Operation DESERT STORM); and the
Iraq war (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM).
The book’s first two chapters are largely
theoretical. Bakich points out how established approaches such as “rationalistic
strategic choice theory” and the “foreign
policy decision making (FPDM) school”
cannot fully explain how information
influences strategy, or its outcome,
in war. He argues that organizational
theory does not capture the true nature
of relationships between strategic
leaders and national security organizations. As Bakich writes, “A gap remains
in our understanding of the sources
of strategic success in [limited] war.”
To bridge this gap, Bakich confidently
posits his “information institutions”
approach. Simply put, it is the pattern
of information flow between those at
the apex of power and their national
security organizations that predisposes
states to success or failure in limited war.
The information institutions approach
suggests that top decision makers served
by an information-rich and densely
networked national security apparatus should have a better grasp of the
strategic environment and experience
greater military-diplomatic coordination
in planning and execution, significantly
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enhancing the effectiveness of their
limited-war strategies. Bakich carefully
explains the methodology used to test
his theory and introduces two direct
competitors: organizational culture
theory and democratic civil-military relations theory. Key propositions on strategic performance are also tabulated to
test each of the three theories against the
empirical data (the four case studies).
In the next four chapters, Bakich
convincingly demonstrates how only
the information institutions approach
correctly predicts (or explains) both
the military and diplomatic strategic
outcomes in all four limited-war cases,
with the competing theories falling short
in one way or another. For example,
in the Persian Gulf War, defeating
the Iraqi army without fracturing the
international coalition defined strategic success for the United States. The
information institutions approach alone
correctly anticipates military and diplomatic success in the Persian Gulf War.
Organizational culture theory expects
both military and diplomatic failure
(given the extant organizational culture
characterized by a military-dominant
conception of war and a Jominian norm
of civil-military relations), whereas
democratic civil-military relations
theory forecasts military success but
diplomatic failure (given divergent
military and diplomatic strategic preferences). The book’s final chapter nicely
encapsulates the results of the aforementioned analyses and their significance
for theory and policy. One finishes the
book persuaded that the information
institutions approach offers a more
satisfactory explanation for America’s
mixed military and diplomatic results
in limited war than do the alternatives.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 140

Interestingly, Bakich’s emphasis on institutional as opposed to organizational relationships in ascertaining the pertinent
information flows reveals the oftendisproportionate influence of key
individuals in the decision-making
process. In the Korean War, MacArthur’s
near stranglehold on strategic intelligence available to top policy makers
was abetted by John Allison (in charge
of the Department of State’s Office
of Northeast Asian Affairs) arguing
for American intervention north of
the thirty-eighth parallel, against the
advice of State’s own Policy Planning
Staff—with disastrous results. In the
Persian Gulf War, President George H.
W. Bush’s personal, “hands-on” approach to information gathering, down
to the analyst and desk-officer level,
was tempered by National Security
Adviser Brent Scowcroft’s and his deputy
Robert Gates’s deft management of the
interagency process. These and other
anecdotes will keep the reader engaged
and enthusiastic about the book.
With over eight hundred endnotes
gleaned from more than four hundred
authoritative sources, this is first and
foremost a scholarly work. Those in
the international relations community
seeking to understand the puzzle of
America’s recent strategic performance
in limited wars will find this information
institutions approach a worthy adjunct
to the more established theories. Those
who read purely for pleasure will enjoy
the four case studies, each offering a
unique take on the various policies and
strategies crafted and the decisions made
at the highest levels of government. In
short, the book has much to offer, to
the serious reader and dilettante alike.
DERRILL T. GOLDIZEN
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Fu-go: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon
Bomb Attack on America, by Ross Coen. Lincoln:
Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2014. 296 pages. $28.95.

The world recently commemorated the
seventieth anniversary of the surrender of Japanese forces at the end of the
Second World War. Even seven decades
later, however, little-known stories of
various military operations are being
published that provide insight into ways
the Pacific War was fought using remarkable technology and ingenuity. This
is very much the case with Ross Coen’s
fascinating book, which provides a
detailed discussion of the use of the first
unmanned intercontinental weapon:
the fu-go balloon. These attacks were, at
the time, the longest-range attacks ever
conducted in the history of warfare.
In his carefully researched and richly
documented book, Coen weaves the
story of an improbable project that
succeeded in launching upward of nine
thousand gas-filled balloons from the
Japanese home island of Honshu to
attack the North American coast in
late 1944 and early 1945. At least six
hundred of these balloons are known
to have actually made it to the United
States and Canada, carrying antipersonnel and incendiary bombs. The intentions were to kill individuals; set forest
fires in the heavily timbered Pacific
Northwest; and demonstrate that Japan
could attack the American mainland,
thus creating panic and anxiety.
Once this bizarre form of attack was
recognized by U.S. military forces,
strict censorship was exercised on press
and other media outlets, which were
forbidden to publish any information
about the silent attacks against which
there was little defense. This lack of
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public awareness led directly to the only
combat deaths to occur in the continental United States during the entire war.
On 5 May 1945, a group of hikers came
across a crashed fu-go balloon near Bly,
Oregon, and in the process of trying
to determine what the device was they
caused it to explode, killing twenty-sixyear-old Elsie Mitchell and five children.
The fu-go balloons were cleverly designed to make the transpacific crossing
by using an automatic altitude-control
device to drop sandbag ballast at intervals as the hydrogen-filled balloons rose
and settled owing to the solar heating of
the gas envelope. The balloons flew as
high as thirty thousand feet to capture
the prevailing easterly jet stream, carrying them across the Pacific in as little as
three days. A fu-go measured approximately thirty-three feet in diameter, was
constructed from laminated washi
paper, and was supported by nineteen
thousand cubic feet of hydrogen.
The censorship that resulted in the
Oregon deaths also had a more positive effect by denying the Japanese any
knowledge about whether the balloons
were successfully crossing the ocean.
Facing increasingly destructive raids on
the home islands that made the manufacturing and launching of the balloons
more difficult, and with no indication
that the attacks were succeeding, the
program was abandoned in April 1945.
(The last balloon recovered in North
America during the war was found near
Indian Springs, Nevada, which is near
current-day Creech Air Force Base, the
home of the Predator/Reaper drone
program.) Balloon remnants have been
found as far east as Michigan, and as
recently as October 2014, when a balloon was detonated by Canadian bombdisposal personnel in British Columbia.
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Today’s headlines are filled with discussions questioning the ethics of launching
unmanned weapons (drones) against
targets when nearby innocent civilians
might be killed or injured by an attack.
It is interesting to reflect on the ethical
ramifications of launching thousands
of unmanned weapons (the fu-go balloons) against an entire continent, with
no ability to predict within thousands
of miles where the weapons would
strike or who would be injured or killed.
Such attacks today would certainly
violate the law of armed conflict, but
they must be judged within the context of warfare in the last century.
I strongly recommend this book to
those with an interest in the technology of warfare, and to those
who may have heard of the balloon
bomb attacks and thought them
to be almost-mythical events.
JOHN E. JACKSON

Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War
Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–
1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages.
$10.94.

Few states in modern times have seen
their military beaten as badly as Egypt
did in 1967—and have that military
survive. Even fewer, perhaps no others, have then deliberately rebuilt that
defeated force to a point at which a
mere five years later it could again offer
battle and, arguably, produce victory.
How the Egyptians accomplished this
has been something of an incomplete
and little-known story up to now. This is
mainly due to a lack of translated articles
and writings penned by senior Egyptian
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leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has,
with this volume, begun to fill in some
of the major gaps in the account.
Aboul-Enein’s book is actually a collection of articles initially published
in Infantry magazine. Each of the
original accounts was written by General
Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked
by Nasser to build the defeated and
demoralized Egyptian forces into a
professional, combined-arms military
that could retake and hold occupied
Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war
minister for both Nasser and Sadat and
was the master architect of the stunningly successful creation of professionalism
in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice,
despite whatever biases and personal
axes to grind he may bring to the table,
deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein’s
translation gives Fawzi that opportunity.
Fawzi’s challenge was massive. The preFawzi army was much more involved
with state security than with power
projection or war fighting. As the 1967
war had revealed, the Egyptian armed
forces, even with Soviet equipment,
were woefully inferior technologically
to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was
riddled with low morale and displayed
an apparently well-deserved inferiority complex. Its soldiery was, for the
most part, uneducated and poorly
trained. The Egyptian high command
was overcentralized, overpoliticized,
and, as events had proved, unable to
exercise anything like the command and
control required in modern combat.
The end of the war both left Israel with
strategic depth and turned the Suez
Canal into a natural defensive barrier
that was further fortified with a series
of formidable defensive positions.
Fawzi admits to having certain unusual advantages in accomplishing his
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mission. Nasser was willing to give his
new war minister as close to a blank
check as could be imagined. Nothing
was more important than securing a
victory and expunging the shame of
1967. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
became a guaranteed supplier of
military hardware, not only making
up the quantitative Egyptian losses but
substantially improving equipment
quality as well. Fawzi makes the point
that the Soviets were less motivated by
a common ideology in this effort than
by the need to prove that their equipment was at least on a par with that of
the United States, and to maintain their
geopolitical position in the region. Fawzi
also confirms that the Soviet presence
on the ground was extensive, that Soviet
forces not only advised but performed
certain military duties as well.
Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt
and improved others. Surface-launched
ship-to-ship missiles, modern surfaceto-air missile batteries, new armor
and aircraft all entered the Egyptian
inventory. Fawzi understood, however, that new hardware would not be
enough. Military-school attendance was
increased, and the military’s intellectual capabilities expanded. But beyond
that, he explains, the three-year “war
of attrition” that Egypt waged against
Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort
to blood the Egyptian army, test new
tactics, and deploy new forces. Over this
period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces
came to embrace a defensive mind‑set,
while the Egyptian army became
imbued with the spirit of the offensive.
Although most books claim Israel won
the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this
was not the case. According to Fawzi,
not only did Israeli jets increasingly
avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian
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soldiers underwent quantum improvements as well—and these improvements
were the real war aims of this period.
It is also clear that whatever strategic
deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they
might have against the Egyptians did
not work when it came to preventing at
least a limited war. As the Egyptian army
began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his
officers crafted plans for what would
become one of the most successful setpiece battles of the twentieth century:
the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal
and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line.
Reproducing the Infantry articles, complete with their original and somewhat
repetitive forewords, gives the book
something of a choppy feel. It is also
clear that this work is a synopsis of
Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete translation. Some readers will be left with a
desire to know more. Not surprisingly,
the focus of the book tends to be at
the strategic level. Readers who want
more tactical details will have to find
them elsewhere. Unfortunately for our
understanding of Egyptian perspectives
of how the war was waged, Fawzi was relieved of his duties two years before the
war began and was arrested for conspiring to overthrow Sadat, so this critical
element is sadly lacking. However, these
shortcomings pale when compared
with the value inherent in this work.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military,
by George E. Reed. Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac
Books, 2015. 216 pages. $26.50.

Although the term “toxic leadership” has
recently come into vogue, the U.S. military is no stranger to the phenomenon.
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Any current or former member of
the armed forces can usually provide
a firsthand account of a leader he or
she believes was toxic. So even when a
very healthy dose of skepticism regarding anecdotal reporting is applied, it is
surprising that senior military leaders
have not paid more specific attention to evaluating to what degree toxic
leadership has affected their services’
personnel and their performance, and
to determining what to do about it.
George Reed, who carries very respectable credentials as both a former Army
officer with twenty-seven years of
experience and a civilian scholar, has at
least begun to examine toxic leadership
in the U.S. military seriously. For those
interested in understanding this type
of leadership, Tarnished is an excellent starting point. However, as Reed
is laudably quick to point out, more
work—much more work—is required.
The study of leadership is as fraught as
it is vital. There is not even a universally accepted definition of the term.
The field abounds with conflicting
theories, mountains of individual case
studies, and an ever-increasing number of blandly self-assured “how-to”
books of questionable utility. Tarnished is a welcome change of pace.
Reed begins by defining toxic leadership as “demotivational behavior that
negatively impacts unit morale and
climate.” Reed then explores how toxic
leaders behave and why; in many cases,
their seniors in the chain of command
may fail to recognize these behaviors
and even reward these leaders. This, not
surprisingly, is in marked contrast to the
perspectives of toxic leaders’ subordinates and the deep and lasting negative impact that results from working
for such a leader. Loss of productivity,
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decreased communication of necessary information to senior leaders, and
rampant dissatisfaction with not only
the leader but the service are just some
of the consequences Reed documents.
But as serious and at times tragic as
these results can be, they pale in comparison to the loss of combat effectiveness such units could experience and
the potential cumulative impact of toxic
leadership on the profession of arms.
Reed makes a convincing case that a
toxic leader’s behavior likely stems from
feelings of inferiority, which, when
combined with narcissism, creates a
potentially disastrous mix. The manner
in which toxic leadership often involves
ethical breaches is also examined.
Among the useful ideas presented in
Tarnished is that toxic leadership is best
viewed along a spectrum. At one end are
found true psychopaths, whose numbers
in the military are likely to be few. At
the other end of the scale are individuals with behaviors that may actually
be correctable, or at least mitigated.
Part of this book’s allure is Reed’s
healthy understanding of reality. He
notes that losing control in the moment or having a bad day does not
make a leader toxic. Tarnished does
offer suggestions for those sentenced to
work with toxic leaders, but Reed has
the candor to admit that these suggestions may not work. This is a refreshing
change from books that suggest that
“speaking truth to power” will result in
a happy ending, or those that, having
identified a problem, offer no solution.
This is not to suggest that Tarnished is
without flaws. In discussing specific
cases, there is a tendency to identify
toxic leaders as “a Navy captain,” or “a
visiting field officer.” If these cases are
in the public domain, then providing

149

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

actual identities would be better.
Although it is ostensibly devoted to
military leadership, civilian cases do at
times move into the narrative. There is
also a surprising lack of historical cases.
Were Admiral King, General Patton,
and General LeMay toxic leaders?
Does the answer matter? One of the
more difficult questions involving
toxic leaders is, Do results ever trump
their behavior? Tarnished claims, quite
reasonably, that how leadership is
delivered can be as important as what
it delivers, or even more important. But
is that always true? Another question
that will leave most readers wanting
more is whether, and to what degree,
the culture of the U.S. military and the
nature of the profession of arms rewards
(some would say demands) attributes
from leaders that, if not toxic, may seem
very similar. However, when all is said
and done, Tarnished is a most welcome
addition to the discipline of leadership. It belongs in the handful of books
that should be on the shelves of both
scholars and practitioners of leadership.
RICHARD J. NORTON

The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era, by Liu
Mingfu. New York: CN Times, 2015. 288 pages.
$24.99.

This 2015 publication of the English translation of The China Dream,
originally published in Chinese in 2010,
merits reading by a wider Western
audience wishing to understand a clear
exposition of a conservative, hawkish
view of China’s approach to international
relations. The author, Liu Mingfu, is a
retired People’s Liberation Army colonel.
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The book does not necessarily represent
the mainstream view of the Chinese
general public or the official Chinese
government position, but it does ring
more true to the spirit of Chinese
president Xi Jinping’s current thinking
than it did to former Chinese president
Hu Jintao’s approach when the book was
released in Chinese over five years ago.
The fact that the foreword for the book
was written by Liu Yazhou, a princeling
political commissar of the National Defense University, gives the work gravity
within the Chinese defense community.
Henry Kissinger spent four paragraphs
in On China (2011) summarizing Liu’s
views regarding China’s grand goal
to become number one in the world,
thereby restoring its historic glory.
According to Liu, this is to be done
through cultivating “martial spirit,” not
through “peaceful rise.” The inherent
conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations is
portrayed as a “marathon contest” or
“duel of the century,” as if world politics
is a sporting event between a champion
and a major contender for the global
championship. Kissinger follows his
discussion of the Liu triumphalist view
of the national destiny debate with a
much longer analysis of State Councilor
Dai Bingguo’s more moderate reaffirmation of the peaceful rise strategy.
Liu begins the first chapter by paying
homage, Chinese fashion, to his ancestors, laying out his interpretation of the
visions of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and
Deng Xiaoping for turning China into
the world’s leading nation. Getting to
the crux of his argument in the second
chapter, “The Fight for the Century,”
Liu clearly blocks out the results of five
centuries of global political competition.
Citing George Modelski’s hegemonic stability theory that there is an approximate
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one-hundred-year life cycle for global
hegemons, Liu names the champions: Portugal in the sixteenth century,
Holland in the seventeenth century,
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and America in the twentieth
century. Maybe China had a fleeting
world championship title in the fifteenth
century—not through colonial conquest,
but through tributary recognition of the
center of world power. Liu’s argument is
that China is back—to claim the champion’s title in the twenty-first century.
The rest of the book elaborates how
China can become the world champion
by drawing on lessons from former
and current champions, especially the
United States. For instance, Liu notes
that American strategy included an
internal strengthening phase of isolationism under President Washington, a
century of regional consolidation under
the Monroe Doctrine, and world power
generation under FDR’s globalism. He
also likes America’s “cheap rise”: in
other words, coming late to both world
wars, but concluding those wars with
the victor’s share of the spoils. Comparing China to America, Liu notes that
China underwent domestic consolidation under Mao and Deng, and has
its eye on being king of Asia, with the
ultimate goal of being king of the world.
The first champion’s goal, toward
achievement of which China is well on
the way, is to become the wealthiest
nation—because all world champions
have been the wealthiest nation. All
world champions have also been the
strongest military power—hence the
focus on martial spirit. In terms of strategy, Liu prefers Sun Tzu to Clausewitz,
pointing out that China will seek to win
without fighting. In what may seem like
a non sequitur to Americans and many
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others, Liu continually repeats the theme
that “the first nonhegemonic champion
nation in history will appear, and that
nation is China.” However, he also refers
on multiple occasions to China as king,
and the difference between kingly thinking and hegemonic thinking is ironically
opaque. Liu refers to the United States
as “one country, two systems,” meaning democracy at home and hegemony
abroad. Since Liu prefers to see China
exercise democracy abroad and hegemony at home, we could also refer to
China as “one country, two systems,” but
with practices inverted from those of the
United States of his characterization.
For those who like the sporting analogy, the book is an entertaining read
and an enticement to place one’s bets
on the grand sporting event of world
politics. On a more sober note, Liu’s
world view rings more true to current
Chinese policies than to those of five
years ago. President Xi Jinping gave his
“China Dream” speech in November
2012, apparently somewhat influenced
by Liu Mingfu’s book of the same title
published two years earlier. Thus, the recent translation is food for thought that
should be chewed on by a wider Western
audience now that it is available.
GRANT RHODE

Logistics in the Falklands War, by Kenneth L.
Privratsky. Barnsley, U.K.: Pen & Sword, 2015.
248 pages. $34.95.

Major General Kenneth Privratsky,
USA (Ret.), highlights the importance
of the integration of combat operations
and logistics in this book about the
Falklands War of 1982. Logistics in the
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Falklands War is the result of years of
research, begun when Privratsky was
at the Army’s Command and General
Staff College in the mid-1980s and
continued while a fellow at Stanford’s
Hoover Institution. Most of all, the
author wants the reader to “appreciate the extent of the efforts behind the
victory” rather than simply present
a logistical view of lessons learned.
The book begins by examining British
and Argentine claims on the Falkland
Islands before walking through the
sequence of Argentina’s invasion threat
and subsequent invasion; Britain’s mobilization and deployment; combat operations; and the aftermath of the conflict.
He highlights the key role of industry
during the rapid mobilization. Commercial ships were quickly modified for
the war. For example, the cruise ship
Uganda was converted to a hospital ship
in only sixty-five hours once it reached
the shipyard. This included modifying
its interior spaces for a clinic, surgical
facilities, and labs; installing a helicopter deck; adding equipment to produce
fresh water; and applying Red Cross
markings. In total, fifty-four ships were
taken up from trade, outnumbering the
number of warships involved. Privratsky
aptly describes the outload as rushed
and gives readers a sense of being on
the docks during the unchoreographed
flurry of activity. Many converted commercial ships were designed only for
pier-side off-loading; however, once in
theater, supplies and equipment had
to be transferred to vessels capable of
shallow-water operations. Off-loading
difficulties and concerns over Argentine
air strikes sent Queen Elizabeth 2 home
with “seventy percent of 5 Brigade’s 81
mm mortar and 105 mm gun ammunition . . . buried in lower decks.”
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Privratsky argues convincingly that
logistics was the center of gravity of the
campaign. The movement of ammunition, supplies, and equipment—whether
by shallow water–capable ships, helicopters, or backpacks—dictated the pace of
the ground war. The author’s thorough
research, including interviews, leads
to a comprehensive description of the
combat operations and movement of
supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore
of East Falkland on D-Day, 21 May 1982,
to the surrender on 14 June 1982, at Port
Stanley, the capital on the east shore of
East Falkland. The British, with their
firm resolve and their jointly trained and
professional military forces, tirelessly got
the right supplies to the right place. His
vivid description of the harsh conditions
on the Falkland Islands reinforces the
importance of the integration of combat
operations and logistics. Nevertheless,
although that integration was successful,
“[b]y the time the Argentines surrendered in Stanley, some [British] artillery
batteries were on their last rounds.”
In many ways, Britain embarked on a
“come as you are, bring what you can”
affair to reclaim the Falkland Islands
from Argentina. The remote islands’
formidable terrain and inhospitable
climate—along with the hostile Argentine military forces—exacerbated the
difficulty of moving supplies and equipment, which directly impeded combat
operations. As Privratsky writes, “Wars
sometimes occur at times and in places
least expected.” And a lack of bullets,
beans, and fuel can cause unplanned
pauses to a campaign plan or, worse
yet, leave troops alone and exposed.
Privratsky firmly believes that effective
combat operations are enabled by integrating combat and logistics units and
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conducting realistic training. Privratsky’s
insights could also apply to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a
natural disaster has destroyed piers or
off-loading equipment, or occurred in a
remote location without prepositioned
stores. Military operational planners and
military history enthusiasts should add
this book to their professional library.
CYNTHIA K. SEXTON

The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory, ed. James B. Lewis.
London: Routledge, 2015. 418 pages. $178.

The Japanese invasion of Korea, known
in the West as the Imjin War, has been
largely overlooked by Western scholars. While Stephen Hawley’s The Imjin
War and Kenneth Swopes’s A Dragon’s
Head and a Serpent’s Tail are excellent works, those wishing for a more
thorough treatment of some of the
issues leading to the war and a more
succinct history of the war itself have
had to rely on Korean- or Japaneselanguage sources. However, James B.
Lewis’s The East Asian War, 1592–1598:
International Relations, Violence, and
Memory now fills the void, offering a
variety of perspectives on this seminal
conflict among Korea, China, and Japan.
Lewis has assembled an impressive list
of international scholars representing
a variety of academic specialties. This
book is far more than a simple military
or political history of one of Asia’s largest
conflicts prior to the twentieth century.
It is divided into three parts, the first an
examination of the international and
domestic background to the conflict.
Japanese and Korean scholars assess
the issues that led to a deterioration
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of relations between Korea and Japan. Economic issues, including trade
disputes, predominate in this section,
and set the stage for a review of the war
itself, which is the subject of the next
part of the book, simply entitled “War.”
The nine chapters that compose the section on the Imjin War present the reader
with a wealth of information previously
unavailable to an English-language
audience. These chapters rely almost
exclusively on either primary-source
material in Japanese and Korean or secondary sources from scholars in Korea,
Japan, and China who have provided
their own accounts and interpretations
of this conflict. Each of the belligerents
gets a thorough review, covering political, military, cultural, and social forces
that shaped the six-year-long tragedy
that has come to be known as the Imjin
War. From a military perspective, readers will find plenty of groundbreaking
information on the naval aspects of this
war, which featured the largest maritime
expedition in history up to that time.
The valiant resistance put up by the
Korean navy against the invading Japanese is worth a separate book in itself.
The third and final part of this book
should not be overlooked. Examining the “impact and memory” of the
Imjin War, these five final chapters
provide the reader with a review of
the ways in which this conflict helped
shape attitudes among China, Korea,
and Japan over the ensuing centuries. Whether through literature, art,
or fashion, this conflict left a lasting
impact that Western audiences would
have had a difficult time discerning
prior to the publication of this book.
There is a comprehensive glossary and
index at the end of the book; however,
the term “glossary” is a bit misleading,
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as this section is a traditional index,
albeit an inclusive and very useful one.
The references are all listed at the end
of each chapter, and readers will be
impressed with the breadth of sources
used to put this book together. In light
of the many challenges facing East Asia
in the twenty-first century, Lewis’s book
should be read by anyone interested in
some of the antecedents to the political
and cultural tensions that exist in that
volatile part of the world. Both general
readers and scholars alike will find
something of interest in this impressive work. It is highly recommended.
JEFFREY SHAW

The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Cooperation, ed.
Sam J. Tangredi. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 224 pages. $21.95 (paperback).

Naval Cooperation is an anthology of
essays on the employment of maritime
forces in security cooperation and partnership missions, taken from the U.S.
Naval Institute’s periodical Proceedings.
The Naval Institute Wheel Book series
represents an analogy to the practice of a
naval officer keeping a pocket-size notebook, or “wheel book,” that served as a
ready reference of accrued and evolving knowledge and experience. This
book places maritime force partnership
and cooperation in a strategic context
by evaluating the relationships among
maritime partnership, operations,
and strategy. This approach facilitates
examination of the relationships among
strategy, strategic objectives, and global
maritime partnership, moving the reader
to consider not only the relationship of
partnership to strategy but the intended
outcome of partnership activities.
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One of the interesting elements of this
collection is the variety of experiences
and perspectives its authors represent:
U.S. and international chiefs of service; flag officers who commanded
fleets; maritime theorists; and senior
and junior naval officers from U.S.
and international navies. The articles
reflect these contributors’ personal
experiences in cooperation operations
ranging from counter-piracy patrols
off the coast of Africa to disaster-relief
missions in Asia, multilateral exercises
such as Rim of the Pacific exercises (i.e.,
RIMPAC), and military-to-military
maritime training events. Each article
receives an editor’s introduction to both
its topic and author. These introductions
are especially helpful in contextualizing the different periods in which the
articles were written and the relevant
cooperation and participation issues.
Geoffrey Till’s 2005 piece “Navies and
the New World Order” is notable for its
assessment of trends within the contemporary security environment affecting
the international maritime system. Till
argues that the sea is transforming from
a domain of peer-to-peer naval competition to one that requires collective action
in defense of the established norms
and rules of the international maritime
system. This will require partnership
and cooperation among navies to guarantee maritime security in support of
the global economy, while protecting an
international system of transportation at
sea from the constant threat of criminals, terrorists, and pirates, and to pro
ject power ashore in support of stability.
Admiral Michael Mullen’s “1,000-ship
navy” concept, the Global Maritime
Partnership (GMP), and the 2007 maritime strategy “A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower” (as well
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as Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s
2015 revision of the same) then provide
the thematic foundation for the book’s
articles on cooperation and partnership.
This anthology initiates a discussion of
which types of missions and tasks are
included in GMP. Collectively, they can
be developed into a naval cooperation
operations framework or operating concept, as described in the U.S. maritime
strategy. GMP missions can be conceptualized across a scale of complexity
from combat operations at sea, through
maritime operations in support of
combat operations ashore and freedomof-the-seas operations that include naval
operations to secure seaborne commerce
and trade, to training activities such
as multinational or bilateral exercises
and military-to-military engagement.
In a 2014 article, Admiral Jonathan
Greenert and Rear Admiral James
Foggo consider the employment of
a “Global Network of Navies” in the
execution of GMP. Their concept does
not focus on the specific number of
ships engaged in maritime partnership
activities during a specific period, but
rather concentrates on the collective
effect of a flexible network of partners
engaged in cooperative operations
and independent national and naval
tasking in the maritime environment.
Other contributors argue that GMP can
be used to accomplish common naval
tasks among navies, thereby conserving
resources by replacing one state’s maritime
forces with international naval forces.
For example, in an article originally published in 2013, Rear Admiral Michael
Smith, USN, argues that U.S. naval planners should include allied and partner
navy contributions in operational plans.
The opposing view envisions GMP
as an employment that diverts forces
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and resources from national military
commitments and operations into missions that build partnership capacity.
Naval Cooperation brings the “wheel
book” analogy to life. It inspires reflection on previous arguments and observations regarding maritime partnership
and cooperation by providing a collection of ideas from the past. This collection enables a comparative or trend
analysis of the objectives and impact of
U.S. maritime strategy over time. This
edition stimulates further evaluation
of the effectiveness of partnership and
cooperation activities and their progress
toward those objectives. This book will
stimulate a reader’s thoughts on the
opportunities and challenges of global
maritime partnership and cooperation among international navies.
SEAN SULLIVAN

Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence, by Karen Armstrong. New York: Knopf,
2014. 512 pages. $30.

Karen Armstrong’s Fields of Blood
may be an unconventional choice for
traditional military historians; it is more
a work of comparative religion than a
work of military history, and attention
to military matters of strategy, operations, or tactics is thin. Nevertheless,
for historians interested in the causes of
wars, the social and cultural history of
war, or the relationship between religion
and violence more broadly, Armstrong
delivers an important addition to a
growing interdisciplinary literature.
Armstrong, though not an academic, is
well known for her sweeping, expansive
works on comparative religion, with a
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particular emphasis on the Abrahamic
traditions. Known for books such as A
History of God (1993) and A Case for
God (2009) as well as Islam: A Short History (2000) and Muhammad: A Prophet
for Our Time (2006), Armstrong has
staked her claim with religious apologists. In Fields of Blood, Armstrong takes
on Western secularist critics who argue
that religion is a fundamental source
of violence in the modern world (and
was in the premodern world as well).
Instead, Armstrong argues, our modern
conception of “religion” is inadequate for
understanding the intimate relationship
between the sacred and the secular that
existed before the early modern period
and the development of the secular state.
Armstrong instead sees the origins of
systemic, structural violence as inherent
in the development of agrarian civilizations, which she explores in chapters
on Eurasia, the Indus valley, China, and
Mesopotamia. Armstrong contends
that emerging religious systems served
both to explain and to rationalize, and
in some cases to reject, the violence
endemic to the maintenance of empire.
In the second part of the book, Armstrong explores the development of
Christianity and Islam and concludes
with a long chapter on the traditions of
crusade and jihad. Armstrong rejects
an essentialist version of either Christianity or Islam that would mandate
violence, and instead places both into
a more nuanced political context.
In the final part of the book, which
covers the ground most familiar to the
average reader, Armstrong details the
development of the modern Western
idea of “religion” as being personal and
private; the advent of Lockean political
philosophy that advocated the separation of church and state; and the rise of
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the liberal, secular nation-state. The last
several chapters are devoted to understanding religious backlash against this
trend of secularization. Even here, Armstrong rejects the premise that “fundamentalism” is inherently violent, writing,
“Only a tiny proportion of fundamentalists commit acts of terror; most are simply trying to live a devout life in a world
that seems increasingly hostile to faith”
(p. 303). In this last part of the book,
Armstrong also seeks to make sense of
terrorism and “global jihad.” Unsurprisingly, Armstrong places culpability for
both at the feet of colonialism, modernity, and political struggle, and suggests
that “religion” may motivate actors on
nearly any side of a given conflict. She
writes, “Identical religious beliefs and
practices have inspired diametrically
opposed courses of action” (p. 393).
Fields of Blood is a survey; certainly
scholars of any region and era will find
details with which to quibble, and they
may believe that one important event
or another is treated too cursorily.
Yet as an introduction to the complex
historical relationships between the
world’s major religious traditions and
violence, it serves its purpose quite
well. And given the recent attention
to religious extremism and the rise of
Daesh (also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the
Islamic State), Armstrong’s work should
be taken seriously by any who wish
to understand the complex interplay
among religion, politics, economics, and
violence. Although Armstrong rejects
the view that religion is inherently violent, this work takes an important step
toward understanding religion as simply
epiphenomenal to political violence.
JACQUELINE E. WHITT
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OUR REVIEWERS

Rich Barbuto is professor of history and has served as the deputy director of the Department of
Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since 2004. A 1971 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he served for twentythree years as an armor officer, with tours of duty in Germany, Korea, and Canada. He authored
Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada, and Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat, as well as a
chapter in Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America.
Neal H. Bralley, Colonel, USA (Ret.), is the Supervisory Assistant Professor, Department of Logistics and Resource Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Army
University, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a 1997 Naval War College graduate.
Edward Erwin serves as command chaplain of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily. He holds a PhD
in theology and ethics from Duke University.
Derrill Goldizen is an associate professor of joint maritime operations at the Naval War College.
He is a retired Air Force officer with experience supporting Army ground and aviation operations
and Air Force intelligence operations. He has taught at the graduate level in two disciplines, space
physics and joint military operations.
Thomas Grassey is a retired Navy Reserve captain. A graduate of Villanova University, he received
a PhD in philosophy from the University of Chicago. He served on the faculty of the Naval War
College and is a former editor of the Naval War College Review.
Alexander B. Gray is currently senior adviser to a member of the U.S. House of Representatives’
Committee on the Armed Services. The views expressed here are his alone.
John E. Jackson, Captain, USN (Ret.), has done extensive research in the areas of lighter-than-air
flight and unmanned aircraft. His latest book is U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Innovation, published
by Naval Institute Press in November 2015. He has flown five different commercial airships and
wrote the chapter on Navy airships entitled “Ships in the Sky” in the book One Hundred Years of
U.S. Navy Air Power, published in 2010 on the occasion of the centennial of Navy aviation.
Richard J. Norton is a faculty member in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval
War College. He holds a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and is a retired
naval officer with more than twenty years of active service.
Grant Rhode serves as assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War
College. He holds master’s and doctoral degrees in international relations from the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, as well as a master’s degree in the social anthropology of
Chinese society from the University of Oxford. He is coauthor of Treaties of the People’s Republic
of China and articles on Chinese foreign policy, ethnic relations in Japan, and U.S.-Chinese educational exchange.
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Cynthia K. Sexton is an associate professor of national security affairs in the College of Distance
Education at the Naval War College. She earned a master’s of arts in national security and strategic
studies from the Naval War College and a master’s in logistics management from Wright State
University, Ohio. She retired in 2005 as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force.
Jeffrey Shaw is an associate professor of strategy and policy in the College of Distance Education at
the Naval War College.
Sean Sullivan is an associate professor at the Naval War College and a retired naval officer who
served as an operations officer and staff planner in ships, destroyer and amphibious squadrons,
and the Third Fleet, participating in the planning and execution of allied and coalition activities in
the Pacific Ocean and the Arabian Gulf.
Karl Walling served as an interrogator in the U.S. Army, 1976–80. He was awarded a double
doctorate in social thought and political science from the University of Chicago in 1992. He has
been a research fellow at the Program on Constitutional Government at Harvard University and
the Liberty Fund. He has been a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, first in Newport
and currently in Monterey, from 2000 to the present. His publications include Republican Empire:
Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government and (together with Bradford Lee) Strategic Logic
and Political Rationality.
Jacqueline Whitt is an associate professor of strategy at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force
Base in Montgomery, Alabama; before that she taught history at the United States Military Academy. She is the author of Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War,
and is currently working on a project on narratives of national security since 1945. Her research
and teaching interests are in the cultural and social history of war and strategy.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 153

158

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 154

159

3/8/16 10:29 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1

REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
By provoking us to free our minds of constraint and convention, worthy
science fiction allows us to create a mental laboratory of sorts. In this
place, we can consider new problems we might soon face or contemplate
novel ways to address old problems. It sparks the imagination, engenders
flexible thinking, and invites us to explore challenges and opportunities
we might otherwise overlook.

T

GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY, USA (RET.)
FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

he Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) exists to encourage sailors to read books that are relevant to their careers and,
in a greater sense, books that unleash the power of reading to improve their lives
in and out of uniform. The eighteen nonfiction books in the current program
should be merely a starting point for literary exploration. There are scores of
reading lists to be found on the Internet, each with a particular focus or purpose
or both. Some strict list compilers limit their recommendations to nonfiction
books, somehow believing them to be more appropriate to whatever agenda they
are addressing.
I would argue that in many circumstances stories told in fictional contexts can
be even more effective in shaping one’s thoughts and in developing one’s ability
to think and act creatively. Since the CNO-PRP was launched in 2006, featured
books have included Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game, Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers, Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite Runner, Patrick O’Brian’s Master and
Commander, and many other works of fiction. Without question, fiction can be
powerful.
General Dempsey’s comments cited above speak to fiction’s ability to create a
“mental laboratory” in which new and unconventional ideas can be considered.
His thoughts appear in the foreword to a recently published book by the Atlantic
Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, which produces a
wide range of possible future war-fighting scenarios. The Center’s Art of Future
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Warfare project seeks to investigate how emerging antagonists, disruptive technologies, and novel war-fighting concepts could shape tomorrow’s conflicts. Its fascinating new e-book entitled War Stories from the Future is available for free download
(in multiple formats) at www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/books/war-stories
-from-the-future. The price is right, and the ideas are stimulating.
The CNO-PRP recommends another stunning consideration of future warfare, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War by P. W. Singer and August Cole,
as a Title of Interest. The Reuters news agency describes the book as
[f]ascinating. . . . Though it is fiction, the authors have taken great pains to keep
their storytelling realistic. . . . Ghost Fleet has a certain weight. Cole and Singer are so
steeped in future wars that they depict the fighting—on the ground, in space and on
the Internet—with an air of indisputable authority. . . . Ghost Fleet is full of wonderful
moments. It’s got space pirates, drug-addled hackers out of a William Gibson novel
and American insurgents fighting occupation in Hawaii. Cole and Singer make these
fantastical elements work, and weave them into the story.

Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Supreme Allied Commander, NATO,
2009–13, and current dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, has written the following about Ghost Fleet:
Global war between China and the United States—unimaginable? Hardly. In Ghost
Fleet, Peter Singer and August Cole lay out a plausible, frightening, and pitch-perfect
vision of what such a war could look like in the near future. This page-turning marvel
is the best source of high-tech geopolitical visioneering since Tom Clancy’s Red Storm
Rising and Sir John Hackett’s The Third World War. A startling blueprint for the wars
of the future, and therefore it needs to be read now!

And Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the thirtieth Chief of Naval Operations, calls
the book “[a] page turner. . . . Thoughtful, strategic, and relevant.” Ghost Fleet is a
great read, and a great idea generator. While it is unquestionably a work of fiction,
it includes over four hundred footnotes that describe the emerging technologies
employed by both sides of the postulated conflict and link readers to sources for
further research. It is a complete package.
Inquisitive minds from every age group frequently ask, “Will you tell me a
story?” Skillful writers of fiction can respond to this request in ways that can be
eye-opening, challenging, and rewarding.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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